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Fac Simile of a Page of the Manuscripts dictated by Napoleon at St Helena to Count Montholon, and corrected by himself.

XXXIV

XXXIV

MEMOIRS

OF THE

HISTORY OF FRANCE

DURING THE REIGN OF

NAPOLEON,

DICTATED BY THE EMPEROR

AT SAINT HELENA

TO THE GENERALS WHO SHARED HIS CAPTIVITY;

AND PUBLISHED

FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPTS

CORRECTED BY HIMSELF.

HISTORICAL MISCELLANIES.

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OF

NAPOLEON.

HISTORICAL MISCELLANIES.

CONTINUATION OF THE NOTES

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Printed at Paris in 1816.

NOTE VII.—OFFENSIVE WAR.

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"1. IN despotic states, the armies alone engage in war; they generally fight dispassionately, and consequently very ill, unless they are animated by the spirit of fanaticism, which is almost the only one of which they are susceptible. The people take no interest in the dispute, provided neither their customs nor their religion are violated; sometimes they even offer up secret prayers for the fall of a throne which oppresses them, and extend their arms to the enemies of their tyrant, as to deliverers. Republics, on the contrary, are defended by the love of their citizens; in them war becomes

national; the armies are supported and supplied by the whole population; every one takes up arms, and fights for the most valuable of all possessions—political liberty. In the former, one battle is enough to overthrow an empire; for despotic government, being essentially military, has no support but the army. As soon as that is destroyed, the throne falls; and the conqueror erects another on its ruins, whilst the nation offers no opposition. It is a herd of slaves changing their master.

"But Republicans develope an energy of character and of will in their defence, on which the victories of their enemies can make no impression."

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"2. The Russians may succeed in defeating the Turks, and in driving them out of Europe, but not in conquering them; for an army is not to be conquered. Another cause, no less powerful than popular patriotism, contributes to retard the progress of conquests in Europe; and that is, the policy of the different sovereigns, who can never view the successes of their neighbours without jealousy."

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"3. Thus our mode of subsistence, which makes it necessary to form establishments for making bread and biscuits, the most difficult food to prepare; our mode of fighting, consuming ammunition which must continually be renewed; the solid manner in which it is necessary to construct our fortifications, to make them cannon-proof; the difficulties which the patriotism of nations, and the system of power adopted in Europe, oppose to the making of conquests: all these circumstances imperatively oblige us to advance only progressively in an enemy's country, to secure our rear and

communications, to establish, at proper intervals, depôts of provisions and ammunition, to preserve our flanks unmolested, to keep the population of the countries we traverse under our authority by troops of reserve, and, in short, to make war methodically. This sort of war requires two armies—a fact which has not hitherto been well understood; that is to say, an active army and an army of reserve. The active army, which ought to be composed of all the best troops, qualified by discipline, courage, and experience, to fight in the field, should be the army for battles. This army should march forward, penetrate into the interior of the enemy's country, attack his armies, defeat them, or compel them to fall back, and so gain ground. But this army is subject to wants which are perpetually renewed; it must subsist, and therefore must recruit itself, in order to replace the daily destruction of men and horses by the sword and by disease; and, above all, it must continually renew the ammunition expended in action; for, as I have already stated, it can scarcely carry more than enough for a single battle in its train. Its depôts and magazines of military stores and provisions must be placed in safety from the enemy's parties, and from the population of the conquered countries, by fortifications, the defence of which may be intrusted to recruits. But that is insufficient; it is also necessary to remain masters of the country, in order to collect the provisions of which the depôts are to consist; it is of the highest importance that the communications between the depôts and the active army should never be interrupted, that the convoys may not be prevented from arriving. These two objects can only be attained by troops occupying the country, and forming an army of reserve to keep the population in awe, and sweep off all the enemy's parties hovering on the rear of the active army."

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"It is this line of defence, without which no rational plan of campaign can be laid down, that I call base of operations."

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"Let us now examine to what distance an active army may depart from its base of operations, without endangering its safety and its existence. Let us not forget that it can only live on bread made in the depôts which are there established, a manner of living which generally draws its operations into a circle, the extent of which it is possible to calculate pretty nearly; and this will shew that the distance required depends on the necessity of providing for its most pressing occasions, the want of provisions. Our soldiers usually carry bread for four days only; but it is easy to load them with provisions for eight days, by supplying them with biscuit, to be carried in a sort of leathern pouches, forming part of their accoutrements: seven or eight pounds of biscuit ought to suffice for eight days, if a pound of meat, instead of half a pound, be given out daily; a distribution which it will never be difficult to make, because it is easy to have as many herds of oxen following the columns as may be required. We shall thus double our soldiers' provisions, without overloading them: they will be better fed, and the operations of the army will be less impeded by the want of provisions. Let us suppose that it is wished to attack a neighbouring state with an active army of 120,000 men, formed in four corps. After having established our depôts of stores and provisions, our hospitals, our magazines of all kinds, in two or three of our fortresses near the frontier which we propose to attack, we suddenly assemble under these fortresses the troops intended to form our four divisions of the

active army; we load our soldiers with biscuit for eight days, and we immediately put ourselves in motion without giving the enemy time to make preparations for their defence. We pass our frontiers, and march against them in three columns. It would undoubtedly be a capital stroke to come suddenly into the midst of their cantonments by forced marches, to attack and pursue their troops, prevent them from joining, and thus disperse their scattered forces in the very commencement of the campaign, without running the risks of a battle; but we cannot suppose the enemy so unskilful as to suffer themselves to be thus surprised. It is therefore to be presumed that we shall find their armies assembled and ready to give us battle, to decide the quarrel, or else to dispute the ground with us, taking the chances of a defensive war, without hazarding the fate of their army on one event. In either case, we advance on them without hesitation; since we should not have commenced offensive operations, unless we had considered ourselves to be the stronger party. In the mean time we supply, on our frontiers, the place of the army intended for battle, which is marching forward, by troops from depôts and garrisons; by recruits who are daily receiving arms, equipments, and instruction; and by all the young and lately-formed cohorts, whose inexperience does not allow of their figuring on a field of battle; and of these we form our army of reserve, without any scrupulous concern about the proportion of this army to the active force; a proportion which greatly depends on the difficulties created by the population of the enemy's country, and the number of places the garrisons of which it is necessary to keep in check. Let us suppose it to be 60,000 men in two corps; these troops advance in the track of the active army, protect its convoys, free its rear from all the enemy's parties, restrain and disarm the population of the

towns and villages, and observe, blockade, or besiege the fortresses of the enemy left in the rear. Suppose the active army, after eight days' grand operations, rapid and continued marches, battles and successes against the enemy's army, has reached some river crossing its line of march, and thirty or forty leagues distant from the frontier—it is time for it to stop, take breath, repose, and take up a new base of operations; for the provisions which it had taken with it are exhausted, its communications with its depôts begin to grow difficult on account of their distance, and it has occasion to renew its ammunition, and to rally the great number of stragglers, who are always left behind after battles, night-marches, and transverse movements.

"It is also occupied in fortifying points of security for the new base of which it makes choice. It is now necessary to construct the temporary forts, of which I have spoken in the 9th chapter of this work: their fortifications, which may be raised in a fortnight, will be sufficient to place our magazines and establishments of every kind out of the reach of insult, to protect our bridges over the river chosen as our new base, and to afford necessary points of *appui* in case of reverses. This kind of mixed fortification, which is a medium between permanent and momentary fortification, although little used at present, is nevertheless the best adapted to supply the pressing and eventual wants of armies. It answers for the moment the purpose of permanent fortification, the construction of which always requires so much expense and time, and it affords greater consistency and safety than momentary fortification. Each *corps d'armée* will construct one of these camps in fifteen days, on the most essential points, where the principal roads cross the river; and we shall shortly obtain four temporary fortresses proper for securing our new base. We shall, at the same time, transport thither our

depôts of ammunition; we shall collect provisions, form arsenals, hospitals, and magazines there, and bring our army of reserve thither. In this state of affairs, suppose our active army, which is marching to new battles, finds the enemy's army disposed to engage at the greatest distance possible, or at thirty or forty leagues from our new base of operations, which is the most unfavourable supposition for us. The enemy cannot attempt to place themselves between our active army and its base of operations, on the communications between the depôts and that army, commonly called lines of operations: this prudence forbids, for in so doing, he would place himself between our active army and our army of reserve, one of which would act against his rear, whilst the other would attack him in front, in a position which would ensure his total destruction on the slightest reverse, because he would be cut off from all possibility of retreat. Besides, this imprudent movement could not be executed without the permission of our active army, which can always oppose the march of any adversary who should attempt to penetrate to our rear. The enemy would therefore attack us only in front or in flank. If the battle should be lost, in either case our retreat is secure; our army of reserve sends a few legions to meet us, and clear away the light troops of the enemy which might endeavour to penetrate to our lines of operations; this army awaits and protects our arrival, and we reach our base of operations after a retreat of four or five days at most, which is neither sufficiently difficult nor long enough to dishearten the army. On our arrival we reinforce the active army, from the army of reserve, incorporating its soldiers in the active legions, in order to complete them and to repair their losses; we send the skeletons of the regiments thus drafted into the active army to our frontiers, there to receive recruits, and form a new army of reserve on our first

base of operations; from our places of depôt we draw the arms, waggons, and ammunition necessary to replace what we have consumed or lost; we there find abundance of provisions for our troops; in short, we renew and refit all our army, both with recruits and supplies, with the greatest celerity."

MACEDON under the successors of Alexander, Asia under Mithridates, Parthia under the Arsaces, Prussia under Frederic the Great, Russia, and Spain, in modern times—were they not despotic monarchies? Were not Achaia, and Etolia, in the time of Paulus Emilius; Holland, in 1786; Venice, in 1797; Switzerland, in 1798, republics? Nations, like individuals, have their different ages; infancy, strength, and decay. Every government which arises and maintains itself without the intervention of a foreign force, is national. Property, municipal laws, the love of country, and religion, are the bonds of every species of government. Should a victorious army ever enter London, the world would be astonished at the trifling resistance which would be offered by the English.

Whenever the Russians shall gain possession of Constantinople, they will retain there as many Mussulmans as they may think proper to keep, by securing them their property, and

tolerating their religion. The Moors of Spain submitted to every thing, even to the Inquisition. In order to drive them out, Ferdinand and Isabella were obliged to issue an order; all indirect means had failed.

A modern Turkish army is a thing of very little importance: the Ottomans will not be able to maintain their ground, either in Asia Minor, Syria, or Egypt, when once the Russians shall, in addition to the Crimea, the Phasis, and the shores of the Caspian Sea, become possessed of Constantinople. Neither the patriotism of the people, nor the policy of the courts of Europe prevented the partition of Poland, or the spoliation of several nations; nor will they prevent the fall of the Ottoman empire. It was contrary to her inclination that Maria Theresa entered into the conspiracy against Poland, a nation placed at the entrance of Europe to defend it from the irruptions of the northern nations. The disadvantages attending the aggrandisement of Russia were feared at Vienna; but great satisfaction was nevertheless felt at the acquisition of several millions of souls, and the influx of many millions of money into the treasury. The House of Austria would in the same manner feel averse, at the present day, to the partition of Turkey, but would

nevertheless consent to it; Austria would be much gratified at the increase of her vast dominions by the addition of Servia, Bosnia, and the ancient Illyrian provinces, of which Vienna was formerly the capital. What will England and France do? One of them will take Egypt —a poor compensation! A statesman of the first order used to say, "Whenever I hear of fleets sailing under the Greek cross, casting anchor under the walls of the seraglio, I seem to hear a cry prophetic of the fall of the empire of the Crescent."

There is a difference between Asia and Europe with respect to territorial circumstances. The deserts which inclose Asia on all sides, are inhabited by populous nations of barbarians, who breed a great quantity of horses and camels. The Scythians, the Arabs, the Tartars, under the califs, the Gengis-kans and Tamerlanes, &c., emerged from those immense wildernesses, and inundated the plains of Persia, the Euphrates, Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt, with millions of cavalry. These conquests were rapid, because they were undertaken by whole populations inured to war, and accustomed to the temperate and laborious life of the desert. But Europe, inhabited from

north to south, and from east to west, by civilized nations, is not exposed to similar revolutions.

Every offensive war is a war of invasion; every well conducted war is methodical. Defensive war does not preclude attack, any more than offensive war is necessarily exclusive of defence, although its object is to force the frontier, and invade the territory of the enemy. The principles of war are those which have regulated the great captains whose deeds have been handed down to us by history: Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Prince Eugene, Frederic the Great, &c.

Alexander conducted eight campaigns, during which he conquered Asia and part of India; Hannibal, seventeen, one in Spain, fifteen in Italy, and one in Africa; Cæsar, thirteen, eight against the Gauls, and five against Pompey's legions; Gustavus Adolphus, three, one in Livonia against the Russians, and two in Germany against the House of Austria; Turenne commanded in eighteen, nine in France, and nine in Germany; Prince Eugene of Savoy in thirteen, two against the Turks, five in Italy against France, and six on the Rhine, or in Flanders; Frederic conducted eleven, in Silesia,

in Bohemia, and on the banks of the Elbe. The history of these eighty-eight campaigns, carefully written, would be a complete treatise on the art of war; the principles which ought to be followed in offensive and defensive war, would flow from it spontaneously.

Alexander crossed the Dardanelles, in the year 334 before the Christian era, with an army of about 40,000 men, of which an eighth part was cavalry. He forced the passage of the Granicus, which was defended by an army under Memnon, a Greek, who commanded on the coasts of Asia for Darius; after which he employed the whole of the year 333 in establishing his power in Asia Minor. He was supported by the Greek colonies on the shores of the Black Sea and Mediterranean; Sardis, Ephesus, Tarsus, Miletus, &c. The kings of Persia allowed the provinces and cities to govern themselves by their peculiar laws; their empire was an union of confederate states; it did not form a single nation; and this circumstance facilitated its conquest. As Alexander aimed only at the throne of the Persian monarch, he easily appropriated the rights of sovereignty to himself, because he respected the usages, manners, and laws of the people, who suffered no change of condition.

In the year 332 he encountered Darius, who, at the head of 600,000 men, occupied a position near Tarsus, on the banks of the Issus, in the straits of Cilicia; defeated him, entered Syria, took Damascus, where the great king's treasures were deposited, and laid siege to Tyre. That proud metropolis of the commerce of the world stopped him for nine months. He took Gaza, after a two months' siege, crossed the desert in seven days, entered Pelusium and Memphis, and founded Alexandria. He met with no obstacle, because Syria and Egypt were always connected by interest with the Greeks; because the Arabian nations detested the Persians, and their hatred was founded on religion; and finally because the Grecian troops of the satraps joined the Macedonians. In less than two years, after two battles and four or five sieges, the coasts of the Black Sea, from the Phasis to Byzantium, and those of the Mediterranean as far as Alexandria, all Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt, were subdued by his arms.

In 331 he repassed the Desert, encamped at Tyre, crossed Cœlesyria, entered Damascus, passed the Euphrates and Tigris, and defeated Darius in the plains of Arbella, as that prince was advancing against him at the head of a still more numerous army than that of the Issus.

Babylon opened its gates to him. In 330, he forced the pass of Suza, took that town, Persepolis, and Pasagarda, where was the tomb of Cyrus. In 329 he turned towards the North, and entered Ecbatana, extended his conquests to the Caspian Sea; punished Bessus, the vile assassin of Darius; penetrated into Scythia, and defeated the Scythians. It was in this campaign that he disgraced so many trophies by the murder of Parmenio. In 328 he forced the passage of the Oxus, received 16,000 recruits from Macedon, and subjected the neighbouring nations: it was in this year that he killed Clitus with his own hand, and required the Macedonians to worship him, which they refused to do. In 327 he passed the Indus, defeated Porus in a pitched battle, took him prisoner, and treated him as a king. He intended to pass the Ganges, but his army refused. He sailed on the Indus in 326 with 800 ships; on reaching the ocean he sent Nearchus, with a fleet, to coast the Indian Sea as far as the Euphrates. In 325 he spent sixty days in crossing the desert of Gedrosia, entered Kermann; returned to Pasagarda, Persepolis, and Suza; and married Statira, the daughter of Darius. In 324 he again marched towards the north, passed to

Echatana, and ended his career at Babylon, where he was poisoned.

His mode of warfare was methodical; it merits the highest praise; none of his convoys were intercepted; his armies constantly kept increasing: the moment at which they were weakest was when he commenced operations at the Granicus; by the time he arrived at the Indus, his numbers had tripled, without reckoning the corps commanded by the governors of the conquered provinces, which were composed of invalided or wearied Macedonians, recruits sent from Greece, or drawn from the Greek troops in the service of the satraps, or, finally, of foreigners raised amongst the natives in the country. Alexander merits the glory he has enjoyed for so many ages amongst all nations. But suppose he had been defeated on the Issus, where the army of Darius was drawn up in order of battle on his line of retreat, with its left to the mountains, and its right to the sea; whilst the Macedonians had their right towards the mountains, their left towards the sea, and the pass of Cilicia behind them! Or suppose he had been beaten at Arbella, with the Tigris, the Euphrates, and the Deserts in his rear, without

fortresses, and at a distance of nine hundred leagues from Macedon! Or suppose he had been vanquished by Porus, when driven to the Indus!

In the year 218 before the Christian era, Hannibal left Carthagena, passed the Ebro, and the Pyrenees, which mountains were previously unknown to the Carthaginian arms; crossed the Rhone, and the farther Alps, and in his first campaign established himself in the midst of the Cisalpine Gauls, who, constantly hostile to the Roman people, sometimes victors over them, but more frequently vanquished, had never been subjected to their sway. In this march of four hundred leagues, he spent five months; he left no garrison nor depôts in his rear; kept up no communication with Spain or Carthage, with which latter place he had no intercourse until after the battle of Thrasymene, when he communicated by the Adriatic. A more vast, comprehensive scheme was never executed by man: Alexander's expedition was much less daring and difficult, and had a much greater chance of success. This offensive war was nevertheless methodical; the Cisalpine people of Milan and Boulogne became Carthaginians to Hannibal. Had he left fortresses or depôts in his rear, he must

have weakened his army, and hazarded the success of his operations; he would have been vulnerable at all points. In the year 217 he passed the Apennines, beat the Roman army in the plains of Thrasymene, converged about Rome, and occupied the lower coasts of the Adriatic, whence he communicated with Carthage.

In the year 216, eighty thousand Romans attacked him, and he defeated them at the field of Cannæ. Had he marched, six days afterwards, he would have entered Rome, and Carthage would have been the mistress of the world! The effect of this great victory was, however, immense. Capua opened its gates; all the Greek colonies, and a great number of towns of lower Italy, espoused the victorious side, and abandoned the cause of Rome. Hannibal's principle was to keep all his troops in junction, to have no garrison but in a single place, which he reserved to himself, to hold his hostages, his great machines, his prisoners of distinction, and his sick: depending on the fidelity of his allies for his communications. He maintained himself sixteen years in Italy, without receiving any succours from Carthage; and he only evacuated Italy by order of his government, to fly to the defence of his country.

Fortune betrayed him at Zama, and Carthage ceased to exist. But had he been vanquished at Trebbia, Thrasymene, or Cannæ, what greater disasters could have happened than those which followed the battle of Zama? Although defeated at the gates of his capital, he could not save his army from utter destruction.

Cæsar was forty-one years of age when he commanded in his first campaign, in the year 58 before the Christian era, 140 years after Hannibal. The people of Helvetia had left their country to settle on the shores of the ocean, to the number of 300,000. They had 90,000 men in arms, and were crossing Burgundy. The people of Autun called Cæsar to their assistance. He left Vienne, a fortress of the Roman province; marched up the Rhone, passed the Saone at Chalons, came up with the army of the Helvetians a day's march from Autun, and defeated them in a long-disputed battle. After forcing them to return to their mountains, he repassed the Saone, took possession of Besançon, and crossed the Jura to fight the army of Ariovistus, which he met a few marches from the Rhine, defeated it, and forced it to re-enter Germany. At this battle he was ninety leagues from Vienne; at the battle

with the Helvetians seventy leagues. In this campaign he constantly kept the six legions which composed his army joined in a single corps. He left the care of his communications to his allies, having always a month's provisions in his camp, and a month's provisions in a fortress, where, like Hannibal, he kept his hostages, magazines, and hospitals. On the same principles he conducted his seven other campaigns in Gaul.

During the winter of 57 the Belgians raised an army of 300,000 men, which they placed under the command of Galba, king of Soissons. Cæsar having received intelligence of this event from the Rhemi, his allies, hastened to encamp on the Aisne. Galba, having no hopes of forcing his camp, passed the Aisne to advance on Rheims; but Cæsar frustrated this manœuvre, and the Belgians disbanded; all the towns of this line submitted in succession. The people of Hainault surprised him on the Sambre, in the vicinity of Maubeuge, before he had time to draw up in line: out of eight legions which he then had, six were engaged in raising the intrenchments of the camp, and two were still in the rear with the baggage. Fortune was so adverse to him on this day, that a body of cavalry from Treves deserted him, and

spread a report of the destruction of the Roman army, wherever they went; he was, however, victorious.

In the year 56, he advanced at one push on Nantes and Vannes, detaching corps of considerable strength into Normandy and Acquitain; the nearest point of his depôts at that time was Toulouse, from which place he was distant 130 leagues, and separated by mountains, great rivers, and forests.

In the year 55, he carried the war to Zutphen, in the interior of Holland, where 400,000 barbarians were passing the Rhine to take possession of the lands of the Gauls: he defeated them, killing the greater part, and driving the others to a considerable distance. He then repassed the Rhine at Cologne, crossed Gaul, embarked at Boulogne, and made a descent in England.

In the year 54, he once more crossed the Channel with five legions, conquered the banks of the Thames, took hostages, and returned into Gaul before the equinox. In autumn, having received intelligence that his lieutenant Sabinus had been slaughtered near Treves with fifteen cohorts, and that Quintus Cicero was besieged in his camp at Tongres, he assembled 8 or 9000 men, commenced his march, defeated

Ambiorix, who advanced to meet him, and relieved Cicero.

In the year 53, he suppressed the revolt of the people of Sens, Chartres, Treves, and Liege, and passed the Rhine a second time.

The Gauls were already in agitation; the insurrection burst forth on every side. During the winter of 52, the whole population rose; even the faithful people of Autun took part in the war. The Roman yoke was odious to the people of Gaul. Cæsar was advised to return into the Roman province, or to repass the Alps; he adopted neither of these plans. He then had ten legions; he passed the Loire, and besieged Bourges in the depth of winter, took that city in the sight of the army of Vercingetorix, and laid siege to Clermont; he failed, lost his hostages, magazines, and horses; these were at Nevers, his place of depôt, of which the people of Autun took possession. Nothing could appear more critical than his situation. Labienus, his lieutenant, was kept in alarm by the people of Paris; Cæsar ordered him to join him, and with his whole army in junction, laid siege to Alesia, in which town the Gallic army had inclosed itself. He occupied fifty days in fortifying his lines of countervallation and circumvallation. Gaul raised a new

army more numerous than that which she had just lost; the people of Rheims alone remained faithful to Rome. The Gauls arrived to compel him to raise the siege; the garrison united its efforts with theirs, during three days, in order to destroy the Romans in their lines. Cæsar triumphed over all obstacles; Alesia fell, and the Gauls were subdued.

During this great contest, the whole of Cæsar's army was in his camp; he left no point vulnerable. He availed himself of his victory to regain the affection of the people of Autun, amongst whom he passed the winter, although he made successive expeditions at a hundred leagues distance from each other, with different troops. At length in the year 51, he laid siege to Cahors, where the last of the Gallic army perished. The Gauls became Roman provinces, the tribute from which added to the wealth of Rome eight millions of money annually.

In Cæsar's campaigns of the civil war, he conquered by following the same method and the same principles, but he ran much greater risks. He passed the Rubicon with a single legion; at Corfinium he took thirty cohorts, and in three months drove Pompey out of Italy. What rapidity! what promptitude! what bold-

ness! Whilst the ships necessary for passing the Adriatic and following his rival into Greece were preparing, he passed the Alps and Pyrenees, crossed Catalonia at the head of nine hundred horse, a force scarcely sufficient for his escort, arrived before Lerida, and, in forty days, subdued Pompey's legions commanded by Afranius. He then rapidly traversed the space between the Ebro and the Sierra Morena, established peace in Andalusia, and returned to make his triumphant entry into Marseilles, which city his troops had just taken; he then proceeded to Rome, exercised the dictatorship there for ten days, and departed once more to put himself at the head of twelve legions which Antony had assembled at Brindisi.

In the year 48 he crossed the Adriatic with 25,000 men, held all Pompey's forces in check for several months, until being joined by Antony, who had crossed the sea in defiance of the fleets of the enemy, they marched in junction on Dyrrachium, Pompey's place of depôt, which they invested. Pompey encamped a few miles from that place, near the sea. Upon this, Cæsar, not content with having invested Dyrrachium, invested the enemy's camp also: he availed himself of the summits of the surrounding hills, occupied them with twenty-

the fate of the great Pompey, of Metellus, Scipio, and Sextus Pompey. Pompey, to whom the Romans were so much attached; whom they surnamed the Great, when he was but twenty-four years of age; who, after conquering in eighteen campaigns, triumphed over three parts of the world, and carried the Roman name to such an elevation of glory; Pompey, defeated at Pharsalia, there closed his career. Yet he was master of the sea, whilst his rival had no fleet.

Cæsar's principles were the same as those of Alexander and Hannibal; to keep his forces in junction, not to be vulnerable in any direction, to advance rapidly on important points, to calculate on moral means, the reputation of his arms, and the fear he inspired, and also on political means, for the preservation of the fidelity of his allies, and the obedience of the conquered nations.

Gustavus Adolphus crossed the Baltic, took possession of the isle of Rugen and Pomerania, and led his forces to the Vistula, the Rhine, and the Danube. He fought two battles; was victorious both at Leipsic and at Lutzen, but met his death in the latter field. In this short career, however, he established a great reputation, by his boldness, the rapidity of his movements, the discipline and intrepidity of his

troops. Gustavus Adolphus was actuated by the principles of Alexander, Hannibal, and Cæsar.

Turenne conducted five campaigns before the treaty of Westphalia, eight between that treaty and the treaty of the Pyrenees, and five subsequent to the latter, and before his death, which happened in 1675. His manœuvres and marches, during the campaigns of 1646, 1648, 1672, and 1673, were conducted on the same principles as those of Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, and Gustavus Adolphus.

In 1646 he left Mentz, descended the left bank of the Rhine as far as Wezel, where he passed that river, reascended the right bank as far as the Lahn, joined the Swedish army, passed the Danube and the Lech, and thus executed a march of two hundred leagues across an enemy's country. On arriving on the Lech he had all his troops joined and at hand, having, like Cæsar and Hannibal, abandoned the care of his communications to his allies; or, perhaps, having submitted to a momentary separation from his reserves and communications, preserving, however, a place of depôt.

In 1648 he passed the Rhine at Oppenheim, joined the Swedish army at Hanau, marched to

the Rednitz, retrograded on the Danube, which he passed at Dillingen, beat Montecuculi at Zusmenshausen, passed the Lech at Rhain, and the Inn at Freyssingen. The Court of Bavaria abandoned Munich in consternation. He then fixed his head-quarters at Muldorf, which place he laid under contribution, and ravaged the whole electorate to punish the Elector for his bad faith.

In 1672, he conducted the conquest of Holland, under the orders of Louis XIV. He descended the left bank of the Rhine to the point where that river separates into several branches; passed it, and took possession of sixty fortresses; his van-guard reached Naarden. It is unknown by what fatality he halted, and did not enter Amsterdam. The Dutch, recovered from their surprise, cut the sluices; the country was laid under water. The French army, weakened by garrisoning the places taken, did nothing more. The King returned to Versailles, leaving the command to Marshal de Luxembourg. Turenne passed the Rhine with a detached army, to march to the aid of the Bishops of Munster and Cologne, the king's allies. He reascended the right bank, reached the Maine, and kept the Grand Elector's 40,000 men in check, until that prince being joined by the army of the

Duke de Lorraine, Turenne was obliged to cover himself by the Rhine, which allowed the enemy to post themselves on Strasburg, where the Prince de Condé arrived in time to destroy the bridge, and to defeat the scheme of the Grand Elector, who then advanced on Mentz, threw over a bridge a cannon-shot from that place, and inundated the left bank with his parties. Turenne repassed in the winter, to the right bank at the bridge of Wesel, beat the Grand Elector, drove him on the Elbe, and forced him to sign a separate peace with France on the 10th of April. The boldness and length of these marches struck all France with astonishment; but, until they had been justified by success, they were criticized by men of middling talents.

In the campaign of 1674, Montecuculi took the lead, and passed to the left bank of the Rhine to carry the war to that side; Turenne took no notice of this move. He made another initiative move himself, passed the Rhine, and compelled Montecuculi to return to the right bank.

Turenne established his camp at Wilstedt, in order to cover Strasburg, which was two leagues behind him, and his bridge of Ottenheim, which was on his right, at four

leagues distance. Montecuculi encamped behind the Kintzig, a league and a half from the French army, supported on the fortress of Offemburg, where he had a garrison. Turenne's position was bad; it was more advisable for him to risk a battle than to expose himself to the loss of his bridge of Ottenheim, and his retreat, or the bridge of Strasburg.

Had Montecuculi advanced by night, in the course of six hours, at one march, on Ottenheim, taking his line of operation on Friburg, he would have forced the bridge of Ottenheim before the French army could have had time to send support to it. But he did nothing of the kind; he was irresolute, and contented himself with extending his left. He thought a few demonstrations sufficient to induce his enemy to abandon the camp of Wilstedt, and expose Strasburg. Turenne did no such thing, but made his position worse by extending his right. He comprehended, however, the danger in which he stood, raised the bridge of Ottenheim, established one at Altenheim, and thus brought it two leagues nearer Strasburg and his camp at Wilstedt. Still it was too far from Strasburg; it ought to have been constructed only one league from that city.

Montecuculi changed his plan; he resolved

to pass the Rhine below Strasburg; for this purpose he ordered a pontoon train of the inhabitants of that city, who were all sold to him, and advanced to receive it. Turenne immediately caused the isles to be occupied, constructed an estacade, and raised intrenchments on the Renchen. Montecuculi seeing himself thenceforth cut off from Offemburg and from Caprara's corps, was obliged to abandon his plans.

In this campaign Turenne committed a great error, which would have occasioned the ruin of his army, if he had had to deal with the Prince de Condé: this was the constructing his bridge at a distance of four leagues from Strasburg, instead of fixing it within a league of that city. But he proved himself beyond comparison superior to Montecuculi; 1st, by obliging him to follow his movement, and abandon the lead which he had taken; 2dly, by preventing him from entering Strasburg; 3dly, by intercepting the bridge of the Strasburghers; 4thly, on the Renchen, by cutting off Montecuculi from Offemburg and from Caprara's corps, which undoubtedly compelled him to repass the mountains of the Black Forest, and crowned the success of the campaign.

Prince Eugene of Savoy vanquished the Turks in the campaign of 1697, when the battle of Zenta produced peace. In 1701 he entered Italy by Trent, at the head of 30,000 men, passed the Adige at Carpi, penetrated into the Brescian, and compelled Catinat to fall back behind the Oglio. He beat Villeroy at Chiari. In 1702 he surprised Cremona, and lost the battle of Luzara to Villeroy. In 1704 he commanded in Flanders, and gained the battle of Hœchtett. In 1705 he made the campaign of Italy against Vendome, and sustained a check at Cassano. In 1706 he marched from Trent along the left bank of the Adige, which he passed before a French army, reascended the left bank of the Po, and exposing his flank to the enemy, passed the Tanaro before the Duke d'Orleans, and joined the Duke of Savoy under Turin, where he turned all the French lines, attacked their right between the Sesia and the Doria, and forced them. This march is a masterpiece of daring enterprise.

In 1707 he penetrated into Provence, and besieged Toulon. In 1708 he commanded on the Rhine, fought the action of Oudenarde, and besieged Lille for four months. In 1709 he gained the battle of Malplaquet. In 1712 he took Quesnoy, and besieged Landrecy. Mar-

shal Villars saved France at Denain. The peace of 1704 put an end to this war. In the campaign of 1716 against the Turks, Prince Eugene conquered at Temeswar, besieged and took Belgrade, and forced the Porte to make peace. In 1733 he made his last campaign, but his great age had rendered him timid; he was unwilling to risk his fame in an eighteenth battle; he suffered Philipsburg to be taken before his face, by Marshal Berwick.

Frederic, in his invasions of Bohemia and Moravia, in his marches on the Oder, and to the banks of the Elbe and Saale, frequently put in practice the principles of those great captains; he placed his especial confidence in the discipline, bravery, and tactics of his army.

Napoleon made fourteen campaigns: two in Italy, five in Germany, two in Africa and Asia, two in Poland and Russia, one in Spain, and two in France.

In the first campaign of Italy, in 1796, he set out from Savona, crossed the mountains at the weak point, where the Alps end and the Apennines begin, separated the Austrian army from that of Sardinia, took possession of Chefasco, a fortress at the confluence of the Tanaro and Stura, twenty leagues from Savona, and established his magazines there. He com-

pelled the King of Sardinia to surrender to him the fortress of Tortona, situate twenty leagues east of Cherasco, in the direction of Milan; established himself there; passed the Po at Placenza; seized on Pizzighettone, a fortress on the Adda, twenty-five leagues from Tortona; advanced on the Mincio; took possession of Peschiera, thirty leagues from Pizzighettone, and on the line of the Adige, occupying the wall and forts of Verona on the left bank, which secured him the three stone bridges of that city, and Porto Legnano, which gave him another bridge over that river. He remained in this position until the taking of Mantua, which he caused to be besieged and invested. Between his camp under Verona and Chambery, his first depôt on the frontier of France, he had four fortified places in echelon, which inclosed his hospitals and magazines, and only required garrisons amounting to 4000 men; convalescents and conscripts were sufficient for this purpose: thus he had, on this line of a hundred leagues, a place of depôt at every four marches. After the taking of Mantua, when he proceeded into the States of the Church, Ferrara was his place of depôt on the Po; and Ancona, seven or eight marches farther on, his second place, at the foot of the Apennines.

In the campaign of 1797, he passed the Piave and the Tagliamento, fortifying Palma-nuova and Osopo, situated eight marches from Mantua; passed the Julian Alps, repaired the old fortifications of Clagenfurth, five marches from Osopo, and took up a position on the Simmering. He was there eighty leagues from Mantua; but he had, on this line of operations, three places in echelon and a point of *appui* at every five or six marches.

In 1798 he commenced his operations in the East by the taking of Alexandria, fortified that great city, and made it the centre of his magazines and organization. When he marched on Cairo, he caused a fort to be established at Rehmaniah, on the Nile, twenty leagues from Alexandria, and had the citadel and several forts at Cairo put in a state of defence. He caused one to be erected thirty leagues from that capital, at Salahia, at the entrance of the Desert, on the road to Gaza. The army, encamped at this village, was fifteen days' march from Alexandria; it had three fortified points of *appui* on this line of operations.

During the campaign of 1799, he crossed a space of eighty leagues in the Desert, laid siege to Saint-Jean d'Acre, and pushed his corps of observation to the Jordan, two hundred and

fifty leagues from Alexandria, his grand depôt. He had caused a fort to be built at Quatieh, in the Desert, twenty leagues from Salahia; another at El-Arich, thirty leagues from Quatieh; another at Gaza, thirty leagues from Salahia. On this line of operations of two hundred and fifty leagues, he had eight places sufficiently strong to resist the enemies he had to apprehend; and, in fact, in these four campaigns he never had a convoy or a courier intercepted. In 1796 a few stragglers were massacred in the vicinity of Tortona; in Egypt, a few djermes were stopped on the Nile, between Rosetta and Cairo; but this was in the first commencement of operations. The dromedary regiments, which he had organized in Egypt, were so completely accustomed to the Desert, that they always kept the communications open between Cairo and Saint-Jean d'Acre, as well as in Upper and Lower Egypt. With an army of 25,000 men, he then occupied Egypt, Palestine, and Galilee; which was a space of nearly 30,000 square leagues, inclosed in a triangle. It was three hundred leagues from his head-quarters before Saint-Jean d'Acre to Desaix's head-quarters in Upper Egypt.

The campaign of 1800 was conducted on the same principles. When the army of Germany

reached the Inn, it possessed the fortresses of Ulm and Ingolstadt, which afforded two grand depôts. In the armistice of Pfullendorf, the surrender of these places had been omitted to be required; Napoleon considered them of such importance for securing the success of his operation in Germany, that this surrender was made the condition, *sine quâ non*, of the fresh prolongation of the armistice.

The Gallo-Batavian army at Nuremberg secured the left wing on the Danube; and the army of the Grisons the right wing, in the valley of the Inn. When the army of reserve descended from the Saint-Bernard, its first place of depôt was established at Ivrea; and, even after the battle of Marengo, Napoleon did not consider the whole of Italy reconquered, until all the fortified places between him and the Mincio should be occupied by his troops. He gave Melas permission to return on Mantua, on condition of surrendering all those fortresses.

In 1805, having carried Ulm against the Austrian army, 80,000 strong, he advanced on the Lech, had the ancient ramparts of Augsburg repaired, lined them, and made this town, which offered him so many resources, his place of depôt. He would have restored Ulm, but the fortifications had been razed, and the local cir-

cumstances were too unfavourable. From Augsburg he marched on Braunau, and secured himself a bridge on the Inn by the possession of this important point: this was a second place of depôt, which enabled him to proceed as far as Vienna, which capital was fortified against any sudden assault. He afterwards passed into Moravia, took possession of the citadel of Brunn, situate forty leagues from Vienna, which was immediately armed and provisioned, and became his point of *appui* for manœuvring in Moravia. At a day's march from this place he fought the battle of Austerlitz. From that field of battle he could retreat on Vienna, repass the Danube there, or direct his march by the left bank on Lintz, and pass that river by the bridge of that town, which was covered by strong works on the hills.

In 1806 he fixed his head-quarters at Bamberg, and effected the junction of the different corps of his army on the Rednitz. The King of Prussia thought, by advancing to the Maine, to cut off his line of operations on Mentz, and stop his movement. For this purpose he directed Blucher's corps, and that of the Duke of Weimar, thither; but the French army's line of communication was no longer on Mentz, but ran from the fort of Cronach, situate at the

debouché of the mountains of Saxony, to Forsheim, a fortified place on the Rednitz, and thence to Strasburg. Having now nothing to apprehend from the offensive march of the Prussians, Napoleon debouched in three columns; his left by Coburg, under the command of the Dukes of Montebello and Castiglione, and composed of the fifth and seventh corps of the army; his centre, with which he marched in person, by Cronach and Schejlitz, was formed of the first and third corps, commanded by Marshal Bernadotte and the Prince of Eckmuhl, of the guard and reserves of cavalry. The right marched by the country of Bayreuth: it debouched on Hoff, and was composed of the fourth and sixth corps, commanded by the Duke of Dalmatia and the Prince of Moskowa. The Prussian army, between Weimar and Neudstadt, which was already in motion to support its van-guard, halted. Finding itself cut off from the Elbe and Berlin, and all its magazines taken, it comprehended its danger, but not before its position was quite desperate; and although so near Magdeburg, in the heart of its country, two marches only from the Elbe, it was beaten, cut off, and could effect no retreat. Not a man of this old army of Frederic escaped, except the King and a few squadrons,

who with difficulty gained the right bank of the Oder. Above 100,000 men, and hundreds of cannon and colours, were the trophies of this day.

In 1807, being master of Custrin, Glogaw, and Stettin, Napoleon passed the Vistula at Warsaw, and had Praga fortified, which served him at once for a tête-de-pont and a place of depôt; he constructed Modlin, and put Thorn in a defensive state. The army took up a position on the Passarge, to cover the siege of Dantzic, which became its place of depôt, and its point of *appui* for the operations that preceded the battle of Friedland, which decided the war. If hostilities had continued, this line would have been shortened by the fortress of Pilaw, which would have been taken before the army passed the Niemen.

In 1808 most of the fortresses of the north of Spain, Saint-Sebastian, Pampeluna, Figueras, and Barcelona, were in the power of the French army when it marched on Burgos.

In 1809 the first guns were fired near Ratisbon: Augsburg was Napoleon's centre of operations. The Austrians having razed Braunau, he chose the fortress of Passaw, situate at the confluence of the Inn and the Danube, and much more advantageous, as it secured him at

once a bridge over each of these rivers. He had it fortified, and also secured the bridge of Lintz by works of the first strength. His army, on arriving at Vienna, had, independently of that communication on Bavaria, a communication secured with Italy, by the castle of Gratz and the fortified place of Clagenfurth.

In 1812 Dantzic, Thorn, Modlin, and Praga, were his places on the Vistula: Veilau, Kowno, Grodno, Wilna, and Minsk, his magazines near the Niemen: Smolensko, his grand depôt for his movement on Moskow. In this operation he had a fortified point of *appui* at every eight days' march; all the post-houses were embattled and intrenched; they were occupied only by one company and one piece of cannon; which so effectually secured the service, that during the whole campaign not a single estafette or convoy was intercepted; and that even during the retreat, except the four days when Admiral Tchichagoff was repulsed beyond the Beresina, the communications of the army with its places of depôt were constantly free.

In 1813 Konigstein, Dresden, Torgaw, Wittemburg, Magdeburg, and Hamburg, were his places on the Elbe; Mersburg, Erfurth, and Wurtzburg, his echelons for reaching the Rhine.

In the campaign of 1814 he had fortresses

in all directions; and the full importance of those of Flanders would have been seen, if Paris had not been given up by treachery; or even if, after its fall, the defection of the sixth *corps d'armée* to the enemy had not prevented Napoleon from marching on Paris: the allies would have been forced to abandon the capital, for surely their generals would never have risked a battle on the left bank of the Seine, with that great city in their rear, which they had only occupied for three days. The treachery of several ministers and civil agents facilitated the entrance of the enemy into Paris, but it was that of a marshal which prevented the momentary occupation of the capital from becoming fatal to the allies.

The plans of all Napoleon's fourteen campaigns are conformable to the true principles of war; his wars were bold, but methodical; nothing can be more satisfactorily proved than this is by the defence of the Adige in 1796, when the House of Austria lost several armies, and by that of the Passarge in 1807, to protect the siege of Dantzic.

But if an instance of an offensive war, conducted on false principles, be looked for, we shall find it in that of 1796 in Germany. The French army of the Sambre and Meuse took

possession of the citadel of Wurtzburg, and established itself on the Rednitz, being 50,000 strong; at the same time that the left and centre of the army of the Rhine and Moselle passed the Necker, and advanced with 50,000 men on Neresheim; and its right, 20,000 strong, marched, under the command of Ferino, on the Vorarlberg, at the foot of the mountains of the Tyrol. These three *corps d'armée*, divided from each other by mountains and great rivers, had each a particular line of communication with France, so that the defeat of any one of them would hazard the safety of the other two. The flanks are the weak parts of an invading army; one ought to endeavour to support them both, or at least one of them, on a neutral country, or some great natural obstacle. In contempt of this first principle of war, the French army, by dividing into three separate corps, created six flanks; whilst by skilful manœuvres it would have been easy to support both its wings very strongly. The column of the centre fought at Neresheim, with its left uncovered, and its right not even supported on the Danube, having neglected to seize on the fortress of Ulm, which the enemy had abandoned, and which alone could render this campaign regular. This column thus found

itself wholly detached, eighty leagues from the Rhine, without any point of *appui*, as an intermediate place of depôt. The Archduke, having lost the principal part of the forces with which he had opposed the army of the Sambre and Meuse, and the corps of the right commanded by Ferino, advanced to Neresheim; after having failed there through the intrepidity of the French, he repassed the Danube and the Lech, weakened himself by 25,000 men before the left and centre of the army of the Rhine and Moselle, which had just defeated him at Neresheim; and went to overwhelm the army of the Sambre and Meuse, and drive it beyond the Rhine.

In this campaign the General of the army of the Rhine also committed a great error: he left two great fortified places, Philipsburg and Manheim, in his rear, without blockading them; merely causing them to be observed by a corps of 4000 men. He ought to have invested them strictly, and deprived them of all communication with the Archduke, all knowledge of the events of the war, all intelligence from the country. This blockade would have been a considerable step towards the fall of those places. He was severely punished for this imprudence; the garrisons of these two places drove the corps

of observation which he had left, beyond the Rhine, excited the peasants to insurrection, and intercepted his communications, as soon as they heard of the successes of the Archduke; they were even very near surprising Kehl and the bridge of Strasburg. The principles of war and prudence were never more grossly violated than in this campaign. The plan of the Cabinet was defective; the execution was still more so. What, then, should have been done? 1st, The three armies should have been under one general-in-chief; 2dly, the forces should have marched in junction, having only two wings, and one of them should have been constantly supported on the Danube; 3dly, the French should in the first instance have possessed themselves of four of the enemy's fortresses on the Rhine, or at least have opened trenches before two, and secured Ulm, to have their grand place of depôt on the Danube, at the debouché of the Black Mountains.

Another offensive campaign, which was equally contrary to the most important rules of the art of war, was that of Portugal. The Anglo-Portuguese army consisted of 80,000 men, of which number 15,000 were militia, who were in observation at Coimbra, and supported on Oporto. The French army, after taking Cui-

dad-Rodrigo and Almeida, entered Portugal, 72,000 strong: it attacked the enemy in position on the heights of Busaco. The two armies were of equal force, but the positions of Busaco were very strong: the attack failed, and the next morning the army turned these lines by proceeding on Coimbra. The enemy then effected his retreat on Lisbon, burning and laying waste the country.

The French general pursued him closely, left no corps of observation to restrain the division of 15,000 Portuguese militia at Oporto, abandoned his rear, and Coimbra, his place of depôt, where he left 5000 sick and wounded. Before he had arrived opposite Lisbon, the Portuguese division had already occupied Coimbra, and cut him off from all means of retreat. He ought to have left a corps of 6000 men to defend and fortify Coimbra, and keep the Oporto division in awe.

It is true that he would, in that case, have arrived at Lisbon with only 60,000 men; but that number was sufficient, if it was the English general's intention to embark: if, on the contrary, he intended to maintain himself in Portugal, as there was every reason to believe, the French ought not to have passed Coimbra, but to have taken up a good position before that

city, even at several marches distance, fortified themselves there, subjected Oporto by means of a detachment, organized their rear and their communications with Almeida, and waited until Badajoz was taken, and the army of Andalusia arrived on the Tagus.

When arrived at the foot of the intrenchments of Lisbon, the French general failed in resolution; yet he was aware of the existence of these lines, since the enemy had been labouring on them for three months. The general opinion is, that if he had attacked them on the day of his arrival, he would have carried them; but, two days after, it was no longer possible. The Anglo-Portuguese army was there reinforced by a great number of battalions of militia; so that, without gaining any advantage, the French general lost 5000 sick and wounded, and his communications with his rear. When before Lisbon, he discovered that he had not sufficient ammunition: he had made no calculation previous to his operation.

Another offensive campaign, which was likewise conducted contrary to all the principles of war, was that of Charles XII., in 1708 and 1709. That prince set out from his camp at Allstadt, near Leipsic, in September 1707, at the head of 45,000 men, and crossed Poland.

20,000 men, under the command of Count Lewenhope, landed at Riga: there were 15,000 men in Finland: he was therefore able to assemble 80,000 men, of the best troops in the world. He left 10,000 at Warsaw, as the guard of King Stanislaus; and in January 1708, arrived at Grodno, where he wintered. In June he crossed the forest of Minsk, and appeared before Borisow, forced the Russian army, which occupied the left bank of the Beresina, beat 20,000 Russians, who were intrenched behind some morasses, passed the Borysthenes at Mohilow, and, on the 22d of September, defeated a corps of 16,000 Muscovites near Smolensko. He was on the confines of Lithuania, and about to enter the proper territories of Russia. The Czar, alarmed, made him proposals of peace. Up to that time his march had been conducted according to rule; his communications secured: he was master of Poland and Riga; he was only ten days' march from Moscow, and it is probable that he might have entered that capital: when he quitted the high road leading to it, and directed his march on the Ukraine, to effect his junction with Mazeppa, who brought him only 6000 men. By this movement, his line of operations, beginning from Sweden, exposed the flank for four

hundred leagues to Russia: he could not preserve it, and it became impossible for him to receive any succours. General Lewenhope, with 16,000 men and 8000 waggons, passed the Boristhenes, at Mohilow, twelve days after him. He had scarcely made four marches in the direction of the Ukraine, when he was attacked by the Czar, at the head of 40,000 men. He fought valiantly, on the 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th of October; but he lost his whole convoy and 11,000 men, and joined his master in the Ukraine with only 5000 men, in want of every thing. In May, 1709, the Czar having formed great magazines at Pultawa, Charles XII. laid siege to that place; but in June the Czar appeared with 60,000 men, to compel him to raise the siege. The King had now but 30,000 men, part of whom were Cossacks of the Ukraine; he attacked the Russian army, and was defeated. His army was completely destroyed: he had great difficulty in reaching Turkey with 1000 men, by passing the Dneiper.

If Charles XII. wished to go to Moskow, he directed his march with propriety until his arrival near Smolensko, and his line of operations with Sweden and Riga was covered by the Dwina as far as the Boristhenes at Mohilow; but, if his plan was to winter in the

Ukraine, in order to raise Cossacks there, he ought not to have passed the Niemen at Grodno, and traversed Lithuania: he ought to have set out from Cracow, proceeded to the lower Dnieper, and brought his convoys from Sweden, behind the Oder and the Vistula, by the Cracow road; for it was impossible for him to maintain his communications with his states by a line, which ran along the Russian frontier for four hundred leagues, exposing the flank, whilst it would have been easy for him to have preserved them by Cracow, covered by Lithuania, the Niemen, and the Vistula. Yet he did not make his arrangements for war like Hannibal, so as to dispense with all communications with Sweden; for General Lewenhope, who commanded so considerable a detachment, and a convoy of such importance, followed him at the distance of twelve days' march: he therefore calculated on that general's arrival.

To this primary error, which was likely to produce his ruin, he added another—that of attacking the Russian army at Pultawa. He was only twelve leagues from the Boristhenes; he might therefore, in two marches, have placed that river between the Czar and himself, and fixed himself in Volhinia and Podolia: for, what was there to induce him to give battle?

If he had conquered at Pultawa, what could he have expected to do with an army in which there were not above 18,000 Swedes, and at forty days' march from Moskow! He could no longer entertain the hope of striking a decisive blow against the enemy: he had, therefore, every inducement to avail himself of the fine weather, and of the fear with which he still inspired the Muscovites, in order to pass the Dnieper in the month of May, and to re-enter Poland. He ought to have given battle in such a manner as to secure his retreat, and to have boats and a fort twelve leagues from Pultawa, on the Boristhenes; but he did not make war methodically; he did not understand war; he was only a brave and intrepid soldier. As soon as he quitted the high road to Moskow, he lost his line of communications, and received no more news from Sweden: he only heard of the disaster which General Lewenhope had sustained from that general himself. It is positively asserted that the errors of his operation did not escape the observation of many of the officers of his staff, who, despairing of inducing him to relinquish his plan of marching on the Ukraine, long urged him to wait at Smolensko for the arrival of General Lewenhope and his valuable convoy.

After this summary notice of the campaigns

of the greatest captains, we think it unnecessary to make any observations on pretended systems of the art of war. A great number of fortresses were constructed in the war of Hanover, to serve as a base of operations to the French armies, which were thus weakened by furnishing the garrisons, whereby the successes of Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick were only rendered the more easy and brilliant. By fortifying capital cities, generals have all their resources, riches, and influence, at command. These afford cellars and public buildings which serve to contain the magazines of the army. As almost all these towns have anciently had fortifications, they still retain ramparts of masonry, sluices, &c. which are useful; whilst places fortified with works of earth only, are not entirely secure from a sudden attack, unless guarded by a garrison as numerous as that of an intrenched camp. What immense labour would it not require to raise blockhouses sufficient to secure the magazines from the injuries of the air and of bombs and howitzers! If the army of reserve be composed of raw recruits, it will be of no use, either to rally the army and stop it in a defeat, or to keep the country in awe. This system creates vulnerable points, of which the enemy may avail them-

selves, who being in their own country, have an opportunity of changing their line of operations at pleasure.

The conquered provinces ought to be kept in obedience to the victor by moral means, the responsibility of the communes, and the mode of organizing the administration: hostages are one of the most powerful restraints; but to be so they must be numerous, and chosen from amongst persons of the greatest influence; and the people must be persuaded that the death of the hostages would be the immediate consequence of a breach of faith on their part.

Unity of command is of the utmost importance in war. Two armies ought never to be placed on the same scene of action. Modern troops have no more occasion for bread and biscuit than the Romans had: give them flour, rice, or pulse, on their marches, and they will take no harm. It is an error to suppose that the generals of antiquity did not pay great attention to their magazines: it may be seen in Cæsar's Commentaries, how much he was occupied by this care in several campaigns. They had only discovered the art of not being slaves to it, and of not being obliged to depend on their purveyors; and this art has been understood by all our great captains. The

system followed by the French in the war of Hanover, was the art of getting great armies beaten by small ones, and of doing nothing with immense means.

Generals-in-chief are guided by their own experience, or their genius. Tactics, evolutions, the science of the engineer and the artillery officer, may be learned from treatises, much in the same way as geometry; but the knowledge of the higher branches of the art of war is only to be gained by experience, and by studying the history of the wars and battles of great leaders. Can one learn in a grammar to compose a book of the Iliad, or one of Corneille's tragedies?

NOTE VIII.

OF THE STRENGTH OF THE ARMIES UNDER NAPOLEON AND UNDER LOUIS XIV.

PAGE 75.

"But the Conscription has been made use of to send whole generations to be destroyed in mad expeditions! Well, let us learn to prevent such abuses by setting proper bounds to this mode of recruiting. The two Chambers yearly vote the sums of money to be raised for the expences of the State; why should they not also vote at the same time the numbers of men to be raised for its defence? The latter is still more important than the former."

PAGE 77.

"These calculations will doubtless be thought very cool, when it is considered that they relate to the lives of men; but let me ask, can we, by invoking humanity, induce conquerors to restrain their levies of troops within just limits? Is not this word void of signification to them? Instead of vainly attempting to influence their hearts, is it not better to appeal to their reason, by proving to them, by positive calculations, that beyond a certain extent war only weakens them, by weakening the population of the State which serves as the basis of their power; and that the fabric of their conquests falls to ruin when it is only supported by armies which are daily exhausting, on account of the impossibility of recruiting them? This is what happened to Napoleon towards the end of his career, and what will happen to all conquerors who, listening only to the dictates of blind ambition, rush into enterprises disproportioned to the population of the State which forms the foundation of their power."

The maximum of the number of troops which Napoleon ever had on foot is 600,000 men. The population of his empire was above forty millions of souls, double the population of France under Louis XIV, who long kept 400,000 soldiers in pay? It would be an extraordinary mistake to imagine that all the conscriptions decreed were actually levied: these decrees were stratagems of war employed to deceive foreigners; they were used as a source of power, and it was the constant adherence to this system which always made people

think the French armies more numerous than they actually were.

In Egypt it was agreed amongst all the commanders of corps, to add a third above the actual quantity of provisions, arms, clothing, and other articles distributed, in the orders of the day. Hence the author of the Military Summary * of the campaign of 1799, is surprised that according to the orders of the day issued in that army, it amounted to 40,000 men, whilst all the other authentic information he could procure went to prove that its effective force was considerably below that number. In the reports of the campaigns of Italy in 1796, 1797, and subsequent years, the same means were used for conveying exaggerated ideas of the strength of the French.

No conscription was ever raised during the Imperial reign, without a law drawn up in privy council, presented to the senate by the speakers of the council of state, referred to a committee to examine, deliberated on the report of the committee, and voted for by ballot. These deliberations were perfectly free; the voting was by white and black balls; there were often seven or eight black balls. Nearly

* Précis Militaire.

all the senators, therefore, considered these operations useful; and in this opinion they were supported by the whole nation, which was convinced that in its political circumstances, it ought to be ready to make any sacrifices, as long as England should refuse to acknowledge its rights, and the freedom of the seas; to restore its colonies, and to put an end to the war.

It would be easy to prove, that of all the powers in Europe, France is that which has suffered the least losses since 1800. Spain, which has sustained so many defeats, has been a greater loser in proportion to her population; let it be considered what Arragon alone sacrificed at Sarragossa. The levies of Austria, in 1800, destroyed at Hohenlinden and Marengo; those of 1805 destroyed at Ulm and Austerlitz; those of 1809 destroyed at Eckmuhl and Wagram, were all disproportioned to her population. In these campaigns the French armies had with them a number of foreign troops—Bavarians, Wirtemburghers, Saxons, Poles, Italians, and Russians, who composed one half of the grand army: the other half, under the Imperial eagle, was, to the extent of one-third, composed of Dutch, Belgians, inhabitants of the four departments of the Rhine,

Piedmontese, Genoese, Tuscans, Romans, and Swiss. Prussia lost her whole army, consisting of between 250,000 and 300,000 men, in her first campaign of 1806.

Our losses in Russia were considerable, but not such as people have imagined. Four hundred thousand men passed the Vistula; but only 160,000 went beyond Smolensko to march on Moscow; 240,000 remaining in reserve between the Vistula, the Boristhenes, and the Dwina, that is to say: the corps of Marshals the Dukes of Tarento, Reggio, and Belluno, of Count Saint-Cyr, Count Reynier, Prince Schwartzenburg; Loison's division at Wilna, Dombrowsky's at Borisow, Durutte's at Warsaw. Of these 400,000 men one-half were Austrians, Prussians, Saxons, Poles, Bavarians, Wirtemburghers, people of Berg and Baden, Hessians, Westphalians, Mecklenburghers, Spaniards, Italians, and Neapolitans: one-third of the Imperial army, properly so called, was composed of Dutchmen, Belgians, inhabitants of the banks of the Rhine, Piedmontese, Swiss, Genoese, Tuscans, Romans, inhabitants of the thirty-second military division, Bremen, Hamburg, &c. It contained scarcely 140,000 men who spoke the French language. The campaign of 1812 in Russia did not cost the pre-

sent kingdom of France 50,000 men. The Russian army, in its retreat from Wilna to Moscow, and in the different battles, lost four times more than the French; the burning of Moscow cost the lives of 100,000 Russians who perished in the woods, of cold and want; finally, the Russian army, in its march from Moscow to the Oder, was also affected by the inclemency of the weather. It amounted only to 50,000 men on its return from Wilna, and at Kalitsch not to 18,000; it may be asserted, that on calculating every thing, the losses of Russia in this campaign were six times greater than those of modern France.

The losses which England suffers in India and the West Indies, and those she sustained in her expeditions to Holland, Buenos Ayres, Saint Domingo, Egypt, Flushing, and America, exceed all that can be imagined. The generally received opinion that the English are sparing of their soldiers is absolutely false; on the contrary, they are very prodigal of their lives, constantly exposing them in hazardous expeditions, in assaults contrary to all the rules of the art, and in most unhealthy colonies. It may be said that this nation pays its purest blood for the trade of the Indies. This may suffice to explain how

the population of France has increased considerably since 1800. Empty declamations propagated by malice or ignorance, made Europe believe, in 1814, that there were neither men, cattle, agriculture, nor money left in France; that the people of that country were reduced to the last degree of misery; that nobody was to be seen in the fields but old men, women, and children. Yet France was at that time the richest country in the universe, and possessed more specie than all the rest of Europe together. How ill do such assertions become French officers!

NOTE IX.—BATTLES OF JENA AND EYLAU.

PAGE 377.

"At Eylau, the French army was advancing in three columns, at intervals of two or three leagues between them. The Russians, who were in position behind the town, determined to give battle instead of receiving it, in order to avail themselves of the separation of our columns, and to engage them one by one. They briskly attacked our troops of the centre at break of day, scarcely giving them time to form in line. The encounter was sanguinary and dreadful: both sides fought furiously; and although we succeeded in keeping the field, it was only at the price of much blood, and by the loss of half our soldiers. At length, our column of the

right, which had been retarded by its distance, came up on the left flank of the Russians about one o'clock in the afternoon. The arrival of this fresh corps naturally abated their ardour; and thenceforth we should have gained the battle, if we could still have engaged their army in front: but our centre being almost destroyed by the bloody conflict of the morning, no longer caused them any apprehension. They neglected it, and changed their front to oppose the column which had just taken them in flank; and the action recommenced, with various success. But our column of the left, which had followed the Prussians, reached the field of battle at night, and naturally found itself placed on the right flank and in rear of the army of the enemy, who, at length, resolved to retreat. The distance by which our columns were separated was the only thing that kept the victory so long in dispute, as it prevented them from acting simultaneously at the proper moment. Had the Russians succeeded, according to their hopes, in forcing our corps of the centre, before the arrival of our lateral columns on their wings, they would have defeated us in detail,* and our army would have been destroyed."

PAGE 210.

" Thus I saw, at the battle of Eylau, two French divisions, which were advancing in columns on the centre of the Russian army, dispersed and destroyed by a charge of cavalry, at the moment of deploying; because this manœuvre being executed under the enemy's fire, the soldiers, terrified and

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(*) How could the Russians have defeated us in detail, when they were divided, and not in junction?

scattered by a tempest of bullets, grape-shot, and cannon-balls, could not unite their efforts to withstand the shock of the cavalry."

PAGE 378.

"The French general again tried his favourite manœuvre at Jena—a manœuvre which the Prussians frustrated by attacking the corps which was turning, and which was too much insulated, and too far from the rest of the army, in its march. The Prussian army was assembled at Jena, on the left bank* of the Saale; the French army, which was operating in Saxony, the weak side of Prussia, arrived in three columns on the right bank of that river. Our right column, 30,000 strong, passed the Saale, on the eve of the battle, at Naumburg, a small town seven leagues from Jena, in order to advance on the left flank of the Prussians; whilst the rest of the army directed on Jena, should endeavour to force the passage of the river (†) and their position in front. The enemy, seeing this column engaged alone on the left bank, far from the other corps, resolved to attack it separately, and to overwhelm it by the weight of superior forces before it

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(*) The Prussian army was marching on the Maine; it did not occupy Jena: and the French army had passed the Saale several days before.

(†) The French army could not be intended to attempt to force the passage of that river, because it had passed it several days before; and Napoleon bivouacked, with his army, on the left bank of the Saale, the evening preceding the battle.

could receive any succours: (*) they left only a part of their army in position at Jena; and marched during the night, with more than 60,000 men, to attack the French column. (†) The two corps met in the morning at Averstadt, half way between Naumburg and Jena. (‡) The situation of the

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(*) This column was not seven leagues distant from our main body; for the Prince of Ponte-Corvo had passed at Dornburg, which is two leagues off. The enemy did not resolve to fall on this insulated corps before it could receive succours; for the Prince of Eckmuhl, the evening before the battle, was covered by the Saale, and had only two battalions on the left bank to defend the defile of Kosen; and Naumburg, where the Prussian magazines were, is situated on the right bank, two leagues from Kosen.

(†) The Prussians did not leave part of their army in position at Jena; for Napoleon, with his guard and the whole army, had been encamped on the left bank from the preceding day, and passed the night on the little eminence before Jena.

(‡) The King of Prussia's army, and that of the Prince of Eckmuhl, did not encounter at Averstadt, half way between Naumburg and Jena; but the Prussians arrived at the defile

French corps, attacked by forces of twice its strength, at the moment when it was separated and insulated from the rest of the army by a river and a distance of more than three leagues, became critical. It was probable that it would be defeated before it could receive assistance. (*) Nevertheless, contrary to all calculations of probabilities, which allow the advantage to numbers, it resisted, maintained its ground, and thus gave time to the other corps of the French army to force the passage of the Saale at Jena, under the fire of the Prussians, and to hasten to its succour, which decided the victory. (†) It

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of Kosen. One division only of the Prince of Eckmuhl's had passed, which was that of General Morand: the second was passing the bridge. The Prussians were so far from marching to attack the Prince of Eckmuhl, that they were proceeding in inverse order; and their head battalion having been overthrown by a battalion of the 12th, sixty pieces of cannon immediately fell into the hands of the French army: the action, therefore, took place close to the Saale.

(*) These two lines contain two falsehoods: the Prince of Eckmuhl was not separated from the army by the Saale, for the army had been on the left bank ever since the preceding day, and he had the Prince of Ponte-Corvo two miles off, on his left.

(†) We can only repeat, that ever since the

appears to me that the bold movement of the French general was more successful than judicious: he should have made his turning corps pass the Saale two leagues from Jena, (*) and not seven leagues; because, by this method, he would have obtained the same result, without running the same risks. (†)

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preceding day, Napoleon and all the army had been encamped on the left of the Saale; and the Prince of Ponte-Corvo before Dornburg, close to the Prince of Eckmuhl, who was covered by the defile of Kosen, and could, in case of a check, cover himself by the Saale.

(*) The movement, as it is described in this paragraph, is so absurd, that the result would have been the entire defeat of the French army: the Saale is a river which is very much enclosed.

(†) The Saale is a river which is so much enclosed, that, from Jena to Naumburg, it has no other opening than that of Dornburg, where the Prince of Ponte-Corvo passed. But if the Prince of Eckmuhl had passed, not at two leagues, but even at three, at Dornburg, the King of Prussia would have escaped by Kosen, passed the Saale at Naumburg, found his magazines again, and supported himself on the Elbe. The whole manœuvre would have failed.

After the battle of Pultusk, in December 1806, General Benigsen, commanding the Russian army, marched on the lower Vistula, to attack Marshal the Prince of Ponte-Corvo, who occupied Elbing. Napoleon set out from Warsaw on the 25th of January 1807, collected his army at Wittemburg, and marched on the left flank of the Russians to drive them into the Frisch-Haff; the ground was covered with snow and ice; Benigsen's army was much endangered: the French army was just coming up with its rear, when the Cossacks took an officer of the Prince of Neuchatel's staff. His despatches betrayed the movement. Benigsen was much alarmed, and fell back precipitately on Allenstein, which place he evacuated at night to avoid a battle. He was briskly pursued. On arriving at Deppen, he made General York pass the Passarge, and directed him on Worenditt. The Prince of the Moskowa followed him with the sixth corps. If General York had not been followed, he could have advanced on the left flank and the rear of the French army, which, on the evening of the 7th of February, arrived before Eylau, after several engagements. General Benigsen occupied the town in force; the Duke of Dalmatia attacked

it with the fourth corps, and gained possession of it after an obstinate action.

The Prince of Eckmuhl, with the third corps, proceeded three leagues to the right, to engage a Russian column which was on the Alle, and to turn the left of the enemy's line. Napoleon fixed his head-quarters at Eylau: the fourth corps bivouacked in advance, to the right and left of the town; the guard in the second line, the seventh corps and the reserves of heavy cavalry in the third line. On the following day, the 8th, at daybreak, the Russians began the engagement; they endeavoured to carry Eylau, but were repulsed. In fact, it would have been strange if they had succeeded in taking that town, in the face of the two *corps d'armée* of the Dukes of Dalmatia and Castiglione, the guard and the reserves of cavalry, when they had been unable to maintain it, the day before, against the efforts of one of these corps only. The battle of Eylau cost us much blood, but occasioned still greater havoc amongst the enemy. Our loss on that day amounted to 18,000 men.

Although we had the Prince of the Moskowa two leagues off on our left, and the Prince of Eckmuhl two leagues off on our right, the

Russian general had also detachments of equal force before them. It was not the distance which delayed the third corps, but the resistance of the enemy to whom it was opposed. Our centre was so far from being destroyed, when it reached the level of the field of battle, that the guard, the fourth and seventh corps, and the reserves of cavalry, were there, and the firing was constantly maintained with unabated vigour until night. The Russian army commenced its retreat on the arrival of the third corps on our right. General Benigsen did not change his front; but one of his corps, which had retreated, fighting at the same time, all the way from the Alle, naturally formed *en potence* on his extreme left. The Russians, therefore, could not beat us in detail, because they were not in junction, and because our detachments were all opposite their detachments of equal force. The Duke de Castiglione was never censured as a bad tactician, or as not knowing how to move a force of 14 or 15,000 men; besides, Napoleon was at the church of Eylau, he saw the seventh corps defiling, he made it deploy, nor could it have debouched in column amidst the storm of grape and balls that showered near the church and burial-ground: this *corps d'armée* advanced in

the finest order, and deployed; the wings of each division supported by a column at full distance. The snow fell thick, and for a moment obscured the atmosphere. Augereau took a diverging direction, and his troops alone suffered more than all the rest of the army together.

So the manœuvre of Jena failed! Out of 250,000 Prussians, the finest troops in the world, not a man was saved, except the King and a few squadrons. But, 1st, the Prussian army was not assembled at Jena: 2dly, the column of the right of the French army did not consist of 30,000 men; it was formed of the third corps, commanded by the Prince of Eckmuhl, 30,000 men; the first, commanded by the Prince of Ponte-Corvo, 20,000 men; three divisions of cavalry under the command of the Grand Duke of Berg, 10,000 men; in all, 60,000: 3dly, the rest of the army had no occasion to force the passage of the Saale, which had been effected several days before. In the night of the 13th of October, the corps of the Prince of the Moskowa, Marshals the Dukes of Montebello, Castiglione, and Dalmatia, the guard, Hautpoult's and Nansouty's cuirassiers, joined before Jena. The army was formed in two grand masses; one of 80,000

men on this point, and one of 60,000 men at Naumburg, from which place to Jena the Saale is very steep, and presents but one opening, that of Dornburg, which was occupied by a corps of flankers.

The situation of the Prussian army was critical. Marshal Blucher and the Duke of Weimar had entered Cassel, and were marching on the Maine, when the Duke of Brunswick perceived Napoleon's manœuvre; he recalled those two corps. But it required several days for them to rejoin him; it was too late. On the 13th of October, the Prince of Eckmuhl took Naumburg and all the magazines of the Prussian army; the greatest alarm prevailed at the head-quarters at Weimar. The Prussian general determined to repass the Saale, and to leave Blucher's and the Duke of Weimar's corps to shift for themselves, in order to march on Naumburg, and regain possession of his magazines, which he believed to be occupied by a partisan. On the 14th, 60,000 Prussians began the engagement with the third corps, at the entrance of the gorges of Kosen, and not at Averstadt. But Napoleon had already debouched, three hours before, with 80,000 men, on the heights of Jena, and was repulsing the armies of General Russel and the Prince of Hohenloe. The

60,000 men, commanded by the King in person, were stopped and vanquished by the 30,000 of the third corps alone, because Marshal Bernadotte, not having thought proper to enter the defile of Kosen behind them, had made a retrograde march of two leagues during the night, in order to pass the Saale at the bridge of Dornburg, between Jena and Naumburg; where, on the 14th, in the morning, he was enabled by his position to fall on the flank of the Prussian army, which greatly annoyed them. The Prince of Eckmuhl might undoubtedly have failed to conquer, but he could not have lost the defile of Kosen. With an infantry so excellent as that which he commanded, he did not require above 10,000 men to defend the debouché throughout the day. But if he had lost it, the Prussian army could not pass the Saale in his presence; 6000 French troops and twenty-four pieces of cannon were sufficient to defend the passage: if, therefore, the Prince of Eckmuhl had been forced in the defile of Kosen, and obliged to repass the Saale, that circumstance would not have influenced the result of the battle of Jena; the destruction of the Prussian army would only have been more completely secured. If the Prince of Eckmuhl had debouched by Dorn-

burg, three leagues from Jena, according to this author's suggestion, the Prussian army would have escaped, and arrived, probably, behind the Saale. The retrograde march of the Prince of Ponte-Corvo enabled the Prince of Eckmuhl to acquire immortal glory, and to raise the reputation of the French infantry to the highest pitch; but, at all events, the victory was secured at Jena.

When a writer attempts to treat of a battle in which 200,000 combatants were engaged, would it not be more prudent to study the localities and facts, and to consult those persons who have had opportunities of becoming acquainted with them? If there be some excuse for a mistake respecting the pass of the Alps, by which Hannibal traversed those mountains 2000 years ago, there is none for ignorance of the topography of a modern field of operations, and of events of the present day, when one is disposed to dogmatise about them. The author of "Considerations on the Art of War," who has not the slightest idea of the course of the Saale, is not satisfied with the manœuvre of Jena; but Cæsar, Hannibal, Alexander, Turenne, Eugene of Savoy, or Frederic the Great, would probably have approved of it.

NOTE X.—BATTLE OF ESSLING.

PAGE 333.

"The Austrians, after their defence of Eckmuhl, had retreated by Ratisbon, on the left bank of the Danube. The French army continued its route on Vienna by the right bank, obtained possession of that capital, and also endeavoured to pass the Danube below Vienna, at Ebersdorf. Our bridge of boats on the Danube was scarcely finished, when the Austrian army reached the left bank to engage us. Prince Charles did not oppose the passage of the head of our army; he remained on the bank of the river, a league above our bridge, where he caused large boats, enormous rafts, and a great quantity of fire-ships, to be prepared. When he perceived that nearly half our army was on the left bank, he abandoned all these machines to the wind and tide; they were accordingly dashed against our bridge, carried it away, and totally destroyed it.* Our army then became

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* The bridge was constructed on the 9th of May; Prince Charles was then two marches from Vienna; all the isles of the Danube were occupied by our posts; the passage of the army was effected during the whole of the 19th and 20th. If, then, Prince Charles had actually been encamped a league above the isle of Lobau, where our bridge was, it would have been very difficult for him to judge whether the whole or only part of the French army had

divided into two parts, separated by a river four hundred toises wide, without any communication between the two banks. The enemy then attacked us in this disadvantageous situation, with 100,000 men against 45,000; and after two days' obstinate and sanguinary fighting, deprived of our parks of reserve, which remained on the right bank, hopeless of restoring our communications with the rest of our army, we were compelled to yield to numbers, and take refuge in an isle of the Danube—the isle of Lobau, which has become celebrated by our stay, and by the works we constructed there.

" We lost the battle of Essling through attacking the centre of the Austrian line in column. This centre reduced its extent of ground in proportion as we advanced, whilst the

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passed, for it had had time enough to have passed twice. Prince Charles's army arrived on the 21st; the battle took place on the 22d, the day after the passage commenced, and the van-guard was in the isle of Lobau. May the enemies of France always adopt such able manœuvres as that of taking up a line of battle of twice the extent they can actually occupy, and thus exposing themselves to be pierced in the centre! Had it not been for the breaking down of the bridge, which obliged Napoleon to countermand the movement, and to keep on the defensive, the Austrian army would have been intersected; one-half of it would have been driven into Hungary, and

wings approached our flanks. Through this able manœuvre, we quickly found ourselves in the centre of a half circle of artillery and musquetry, the fire of which converged on our unfortunate columns. Bullets, balls, and grape, crossed us in every direction, and made frightful havoc: every point was assailed; we were overthrown on all sides, and our first columns were entirely destroyed; at length we were compelled to yield to this dreadful storm, and we retreated to place ourselves again in line with the villages of Aspern and Essling, on which our wings were supported."

A writer ought to be consistent with himself. Did we lose the battle of Essling, through attacking the centre of the enemy's line in co-

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the other into Bohemia. Movements of great extent are customary in Austrian tactics, but contrary to the true principles of war. The left of the Austrian army ought not to have gone beyond the level of Essling, the right being supported on the Danube: had its line been thus established, it would have been sufficiently close; but the left, being extended to Enzersdorf, could not advance a step without coming under the fire of the isle of Lobau; the consequence was, that this wing never stirred; whenever an attempt was made to put it in motion, it found itself taken in the rear by the grape-shot from the isle of Lobau, and was compelled to resume its position.

lumn, or did we lose it through the stratagem of Prince Charles, who, after cutting our bridges, attacked us in that disadvantageous situation with 100,000 men against 45,000? But, 1st, We did not lose the battle of Essling, but gained it, since we remained masters of the field of Gros-Aspern at Essling; 2dly, the Duke of Montebello did not attack in column, but in line, being the most expert general in manœuvres that our army possessed; 3dly, it was not Prince Charles who destroyed our bridges, but the Danube, which rose fourteen feet in three days.

After the battle of Eckmuhl, the French army arrived before Vienna; the Archduke Maximilian commanded in that capital, which was fortified and put in a state of defence. The general of artillery, Lariboissiere, placed thirty howitzers in battery behind a house in the suburbs, during the night, and set fire to the town, which opened its gates. In the mean time the Archduke Charles was approaching by the left bank of the Danube; Napoleon resolved to anticipate him, and to pass that great river. The position on the right bank was good only as long as the army had a *tête-de-pont* on the left bank, because the enemy would otherwise be able to take the lead in

moving. This consideration was of such importance that Napoleon would have fallen back on the Ens, had it been impossible for him to establish himself on the left bank. This operation was very difficult; the Danube was five hundred toises wide, and from fifteen to twenty and even thirty feet in depth, and extremely rapid. To pass such a river near a great army required much art, particularly as it was inexpedient to remove to a distance, lest the enemy, who had two pontoon trains, should himself pass the Danube and advance on Vienna. Napoleon wished to pass two leagues above that city; he had remarked there, in 1805, a pretty considerable isle separated from the right bank by the great arm of the Danube, and from the left bank by an arm of fifty toises: if he should take possession of that isle he might establish himself there; and then he would have a river of only fifty toises instead of five hundred to pass: this was clearing the Danube by a regular siege. The Duke of Montebello threw five hundred men into that isle, on the 16th of May; the Archduke's army was yet a march in arrear; but since 1805 a jetty had been constructed between that isle and the left bank, so that it was an isle no longer. General Bubna was at hand with 6000

men; he marched on the five hundred men, and overthrew them; part of them were taken, and part re-embarked under the protection of thirty twelve-pounders and howitzers. This operation having failed, Napoleon proceeded two leagues below Vienna, opposite the isle of Lobau, which is 1800 toises wide; it is separated from the right bank by the great arm of the Danube, five hundred toises wide, and from the left bank by a little arm of sixty toises. He determined to fix himself in this isle, where, once fixed, he would be in an intrenched camp on the left bank of the Danube; would have the advantage of the Archduke; and, if that prince should advance on Krembs, or any similar point, in order to pass the Danube and intersect his line of operations, he might, by starting from the isle of Lobau, fall on his rear, and defeat him to a certainty. Lieutenant-general Bertrand was accordingly ordered to throw a bridge of boats and pontoons over the Danube, on the 19th of May. A van-guard passed, and took possession of the isle; the bridge was finished on the morning of the 20th; the army began its passage; but in the afternoon the Danube increased by three feet, the anchors of the boats drove, the bridge was broken; but in a few hours it was repaired, and the army continued to pass into

the isle. Towards six o'clock, Napoleon had a bridge constructed in the re-entering angle on the little arm of the river. General Lasalle advanced on Essling with 3,000 cavalry, scoured the plain in all directions, and fell in with a division of Austrian cavalry, with which he skirmished; he fixed himself at night between Essling and Gros-Aspern. Napoleon bivouacked on the left bank, at the head of the little bridge. On the 21st, at daybreak, he went to Essling; a battalion was posted in a sort of embattled reduct at the village of Enzersdorf. Part of the cuirassiers of Spain, and Nansouty passed; but at noon the Danube had swelled four feet more. The great bridge was once more carried away; the remainder of the cavalry and the reserves of the park could not pass; twice, on this day, Count Bertrand restored the bridges, and twice they were broken again. At the instant of the evacuation of Vienna, the Austrians had set fire to a number of boats, which, being carried away by the swelling of the flood, were dashed against the pontoons. At four o'clock in the afternoon General Lasalle sent information to Napoleon that the Archduke's army was on its march. The Prince of Neuchatel ascended the steeple of Essling, and made a sketch of the movements

of the Austrian army: the Archduke wished to attack Gros-Aspern with his right, Essling with his centre, and Enzersdorf with his left, thus forming a half circle round Essling. Napoleon gave orders to fall back, and to re-enter the isle of Lobau, leaving 10,000 men in the wood in advance of the little bridge; but at that moment General Bertrand sent to say that the Danube was falling, that he had restored the bridge, and that the parks were passing. It was late; Napoleon determined to remain in position; for if the enemy had occupied the village of Essling, it would have been very difficult, and cost much blood, to have retaken it. At five the skirmishers engaged; the musquetry and cannonade soon became brisk; the cuirassiers made several gallant and brilliant charges; the enemy was repulsed in all his attacks on Gros-Aspern and Essling; and 25,000 men, attacked by 100,000, stood their ground, and maintained their junction for three hours. At night the position of the fires of the bivouacs of both armies, announced that the morrow would prove a decisive day.

The French army on the two banks was on the whole superior to that of the Archduke, by 20,000 men. Victory could not be doubtful. But at midnight the Danube swelled in a

frightful manner. The passage over the bridge was again interrupted, nor could it be restored before daybreak. The guard and the Duke of Reggio's corps then commenced their passage, which they effected in quick time. The Emperor mounted his horse, elate with hope; he thought the fate of the House of Austria was about to be decided. On arriving at Essling, he ordered the Duke of Montebello to penetrate the centre of the Austrian army, and the young guard to debouch from Essling, to attack the left flank of the enemy, which was supported on Enzersdorf, a little town on that branch of the Danube which forms the Isle de Lobau, at the decisive moment. The Duke of Montebello deployed his divisions with that ability and *sang froid* which he had acquired in a hundred battles. The enemy felt the importance of not allowing his line to be penetrated; but it was too much extended, reaching more than three leagues, and all his efforts were vain; the young guard was already advancing on his left flank, when it became necessary to halt the victorious troops; the bridges were again broken, all the boats were carried away by the force of the current to the distance of a league or two; it was now become impossible to repair them for several days. Half the cuirassiers, the Prince of Eck-

muhl's corps, and all the reserves of artillery, were still on the right bank. This was a dreadful disappointment; but the plan of operations had been so prudently and profoundly laid, that the army ran no risk, and, if the worst should happen, could always resume its position in the Isle of Lobau, where it would be unassailable; there never was a stronger intrenched camp; it was covered by a deep ditch sixty toises wide. This disastrous intelligence arrived at seven in the morning; the Emperor sent orders to the Prince of Essling and the Duke of Montebello to halt, and to resume their position by degrees; the former supported his left on the middle of the village of Gros-Aspern, which is upwards of a league in length; the latter was between Gros-Aspern and Essling, supporting his right on that village. This movement was executed as if it had been on the parade; the enemy, in despair and retreating, halted, quite astonished and unable to comprehend this retrograde movement of the French; but he soon learned that their bridges were carried away; his centre resumed its first position; it was then ten in the morning, from which hour until four in the afternoon, that is to say for six hours, 100,000 Austrians and 500 pieces of cannon were engaged in a vain and unsuccessful attack on

50,000 French, who had but one hundred pieces of cannon in position, and were under the necessity of sparing their fire, because they were in want of ammunition.

The success of the battle depended on the possession of the village of Essling; the Archduke did all that was proper to be done; he attacked it five times with fresh troops, took it twice, but was five times driven from it. At length, at three in the afternoon, the Emperor ordered General Rapp and the courageous Count de Lobau, his aides-de-camp, to put themselves at the head of the young guard, to debouch by three columns, and to make a vigorous charge on the enemy's reserves, which were preparing to make a sixth attack. The reserves were routed, which decided the victory; the Archduke having no more fresh troops, took up a position. The firing ceased exactly at four o'clock; at that time of year an engagement may be kept up till ten at night; thus we remained masters of the field of battle during six hours of daylight.

The old guard, with which the Emperor was, remained constantly drawn up in line, a musquet-shot from Essling, with the right to the Danube, and the left towards Gros-Aspern. At six o'clock in the evening, Lieutenant-general Dorsenne, colonel of the grenadiers of

the old guard, sent Colonel Montholon, who was near him, to ask leave to make a charge, in order to decide the day, and oblige the Austrians to retreat. No, replied the Emperor, *it is best that the affair should end thus; without a bridge and without aid, we have certainly done more than I hoped for;* remain quiet. He then went into the Isle of Lobau, and made the circuit of it; he was apprehensive that the enemy would throw a bridge across at the extremity of that isle, and send some of his battalions over. He proceeded next to the great bridge: alas! it had entirely disappeared; not a boat remained in its place; the Danube had risen twenty-eight feet in three days. The lower parts of the isle were inundated; he returned to the little bridge, ordered the army to repass it at midnight, and to encamp in the Isle of Lobau. The Prince of Essling's corps slept on the field of battle, and did not pass until the following day at seven in the morning.

Such is the history of the battle of Essling. Whilst we remained masters of the Isle of Lobau, we had all that was necessary to secure the possession of Vienna, which would no longer have been tenable if we had lost that isle. From this intrenched camp, we had it in our power to act on the offensive, if the enemy should debouch on the left bank; for

a canal of sixty toises is not an obstacle, particularly in that situation. In the course of twenty days General Bertrand established three bridges on piles, a work which was ten times more difficult and costly than Cæsar's bridge on the Rhine. The Viceroy gained the victory of Raab over the Archduke John: the Emperor debouched from the Isle of Lobau, and gained the memorable victory of Wagram in July.

At Essling, and after that battle, the Archduke did every thing that was proper, to the utmost of his power. On that day fell Generals the Dukes of Montebello and Saint-Hilaire, two heroes who were Napoleon's best friends: he shed tears for their loss. These were men who would not have been wanting in constancy in the Emperor's misfortunes; they would never have been faithless to the glory of France. The Duke of Montebello was from Lectoure: when a chief of battalion, he distinguished himself in the campaigns of 1796 in Italy; as a general he acquired immortal glory in Egypt, at Montebello, Marengo, Austerlitz, Jena, Pultusk, Friedland, Tudella, Saragossa, Eckmuhl, and Essling, where he found a glorious death. He was discreet, prudent, and daring; and before the enemy imperturbably cool. He had received little edu-

cation; nature had done every thing for him; Napoleon, who had witnessed the progress of his understanding, often expressed his surprise at it. He was superior to any of the French generals on the field of battle, for manœuvring 25,000 infantry. He was still young, and would have improved; he would probably have become skilful in high tactics, which he did not yet understand. Saint-Hilaire was a general at Castiglione in 1796: he distinguished himself by his chivalric character, was an agreeable companion, a good comrade, an excellent brother, and kind to all his family. He was covered with wounds. He had been attached to Napoleon ever since the siege of Toulon. He was called, in allusion to Bayard, the knight without fear and without reproach.

NOTE XI.—WAR OF SPAIN.

PAGES 449 AND 450.

"When an offensive army rashly plunges into the interior of a great state, without securing the possession of the country over which it is marching, I consider it as lost, like that of Charles XII. in Russia, or that of Napoleon at Moscow. The population, supported by fortresses which supply it with arms, and aided by some regular corps which inspire it with confidence, rises on the flanks and rear of the invaders; intercepts their convoys, ammunition, and recruits; attacks and surprises their detachments, deprives them of provisions,

famishes them in their camp, and destroys them in detail by the sword and by hunger. The French acquired a cruel experience of these truths in the last war of Spain. * * * * * * * * * * * * * They ought to have begun by subduing the provinces on the left bank of the Ebro, and forming establishments there previously to passing that river."

The war of Spain was terminated in 1809. In three months Napoleon had beaten and dispersed the four Spanish armies of 160,000 men, taken Madrid and Sarragossa, and forced General Moore to re-embark, after losing half his army, his stores and military chests; Spain was then conquered. When the war of Vienna obliged Napoleon to return to France, the war of Spain recommenced; King Joseph was not competent to direct it. England made unheard of efforts; her armies obtained some success in Portugal. Spain was environed by the sea on three sides: the English fleets unexpectedly carried new forces into Catalonia, Biscay, Portugal, the kingdom of Valencia, and Cadiz.

The error committed in Spain was not that of going on too rapidly, but that of proceeding too slowly, after the departure of Napoleon. Had he remained there a few months, he would have taken Lisbon and Cadiz, united all parties, and pacified the country: his armies never wanted for military stores, clothing, or provisions. The Duke of Dalmatia's army in

Andalusia, the Duke of Albufera's in the East, and that of the North, were very fine, of great strength, and abundantly supplied. The Guerillas were not formed until two years after, when they arose in consequence of the disorders and abuses which had crept into the whole army, except the corps of Marshal Suchet, which occupied the kingdom of Valencia. The Anglo-Portuguese army became as skilful in manœuvres as the French army; the latter was afterwards defeated through the accidents of war, manœuvres and strategical errors, at Talavera, Salamanca, and Vittoria. Spain was lost after a struggle of five years. The argument on the want of fortresses is extremely misplaced; the French army had taken them all. The Spaniards formerly offered the same resistance to the Romans. The people of conquered nations become the subjects of the victor, only through a mixture of policy and severity, and by being amalgamated with the army. These points were not successfully managed in Spain. If the French had amused themselves, as the author of "Considerations on the Art of War" says they ought to have done, with forming establishments on the Ebro, instead of marching on the Samosiera, on Madrid, Burgos, and Benevento, to drive out the English, after the victories of Vittoria, Espi-

nosa, Tudella, and Burgos, they would have had 200,000 English, Portuguese, and Spaniards, in line against them, within two months after, and the French army would have been driven before them beyond the Pyrenees.

After the re-embarkation of the English army, the King of Spain remained inactive; he lost four months: he ought to have marched on Cadiz, Valencia, and Lisbon; political means would then have done the rest. No one can deny, that if the Court of Austria, instead of declaring war, had allowed Napoleon to remain four months longer in Spain, all would have been over. The presence of a general is indispensable; he is the head, the whole of an army. It was not the Roman army that subdued Gaul, but Cæsar himself: nor was it the Carthaginian army that made the Republic tremble at the gates of Rome, but Hannibal himself; neither was it the Macedonian army which reached the Indus, but Alexander; it was not the French army which carried the war to the Weser and the Inn, but Turenne; nor was it the Prussian army which, for seven years, defended Prussia against the three greatest powers of Europe, it was Frederic the Great.

Note XII.—Moscow.

Page 405.

"The Russians might very well have dispensed with giving him battle at the Moskowa; for whether they gained the

victory or were defeated, their imprudent enemy was sure to be ruined, as the event proved."

The city of Moscow was not worth a battle! The Russians lost the battle, and Moscow was taken; but had they gained it, Moscow would have been saved! 100,000 Russians, men, women, and children, would not have perished for want in the snow, in the woods of the neighbourhood; Russia would not have seen that proud capital, the work of centuries, annihilated in a single week; nor would she have had property to the amount of hundreds of millions buried under its ruins. Had it not been for the burning of Moscow, an event unprecedented in history, Alexander would have been compelled to make peace. The results of the battle of the Moskowa were of immense importance. Never was it more expedient to risk a battle than on this occasion; it was loudly demanded by the court, in despair at the ravaging and burning of the provinces; by the nobility; and by the army, which was fatigued, weakened, and disheartened by so many retreats.

It is not true that the Russians voluntarily retreated as far as Moscow, to draw the French army into the interior of their country. They abandoned Wilna, because it was impossible for them to effect the junction of

their armies before that place: they wished to rally on the intrenched camp which they had constructed on the two sides of the Dwina: but Bagration, with half the army, could not reach it. The Prince of Eckmuhl's march on Minsk, Borisow, and Mohilow, separated Barclay de Tolly's army from that of Bagration, which obliged the former to proceed on Witepsk, and thence on Smolensko, to join Bagration. After effecting this junction, he marched with 180,000 men on Witepsk to give battle to the French army; upon which Napoleon executed that fine manœuvre which was the counterpart of that which he directed under Landshut, in 1809; he covered himself by the forest of Babinoritski, turned the left of the Russian army, passed the Boristhenes, and advanced on Smolensko, which he reached twenty-four hours before the Russian army, which retrograded precipitately; a division of 15,000 Russians, who happened to be at Smolensko, succeeded in defending that place one day, which gave Barclay de Tolly time to reach it on the day following.

If the French army had surprised Smolensko, it would have passed the Boristhenes there, and attacked the Russian army in the rear, whilst it was in disorder and not joined; this grand stroke was missed, but the French gene-

ral derived great advantage from his manœuvre, which gave rise to the battle of Smolensko, in which Poniatowski and the Poles covered themselves with glory. Barclay de Tolly, repulsed beyond the Boristhenes, came to a determination to give battle.

The history of the campaign of Russia will never be well known; because the Russians either do not write at all, or write without the slightest regard to truth; whilst the French are seized with a strange mania for dishonouring and decrying their own glory. The war of Russia became a necessary consequence of the Continental system, the moment the Emperor Alexander violated the conventions of Tilsit and Erfurth; but a consideration of much greater importance determined Napoleon to commence it. It was considered that the French empire, which he had created by so many victories, would infallibly be dismembered at his death, and the sceptre of Europe would pass into the hands of a czar, unless Napoleon drove back the Russians beyond the Boristhenes, and raised up the throne of Poland, the natural barrier of the empire. In 1812 Austria, Prussia, Germany, Switzerland, and Italy, marched under the French eagles; was it not natural that Napoleon should think the moment was arrived for consolidating the

immense edifice which he had raised, but on the summit of which Russia would lean with the whole weight of her power as long as she should be able to send her numerous armies, at pleasure, on the Oder? Alexander was young and vigorous, like his empire; it was to be presumed that he would survive Napoleon. Such is the whole secret of that war. No personal feeling was ever concerned in it, as pamphleteers have pretended. The campaign of Russia was the most glorious, the most difficult, and most honourable to the Gauls, of all that are mentioned in ancient and modern history. The Russians are very brave troops; their whole army was in junction: at the battle of the Moskowa, they had 170,000 men, including the Moscow troops. Kutusow had taken up a fine position, and occupied it judiciously. All advantages were on his side; the superiority in infantry, cavalry, and artillery, an excellent position, and a great number of redoubts; but he was vanquished. Intrepid heroes, Murat, Ney, Poniatowski, it is to you that the glory of the victory is due! What great, what brilliant actions might history collect from these events! She might tell how those dauntless cuirassiers forced the redoubts, and sabred the cannoneers at their guns; she might relate the heroic devotion of

Montbrun and Caulincourt, who met their death in the midst of glory: she might say what our exposed artillerymen performed in the open field against more numerous batteries covered by good epaulments; and how the intrepid infantry, at the most critical moment, instead of needing encouragement from their general, exclaimed: *Be not alarmed; your soldiers have sworn to conquer this day, and they will conquer!* Will some few particles of so much glory reach posterity? or will falsehood, calumny, and crime, prevail?

Note XIII.

Retreat of Russia and Saxony.

Page 464.

"Napoleon is bitterly reproached for not having known how to accomplish his retreat after his disastrous campaigns of Russia and Saxony. But after all, whither was he to retreat, as he had prepared nothing for the purpose of rallying and reorganizing his army in case of defeat? His great error was that of having formed no army of reserve, no plan of operations in which his army might find resources when pursued by the enemy. This extraordinary general, of admirable talents for fighting and conquering on the field of battle, for surprising the enemy on their marches, and attacking and dispersing their columns, knew not how to carry on a methodical war, the only species of war that can establish permanent conquests in Europe. With a head filled with

the brilliant exploits of Alexander, he overran the world like the Greek hero, at the head of a victorious army, without appreciating the difference of circumstances which did not allow him to accomplish the same results by similar means. His fatal campaign of Russia was an invasion in the Asiatic style, in which it is impossible to discover the slightest traces of the precautions prescribed by prudence in our European wars. His base of operations was on the Vistula, where he had places of depôt. He advances, passes the Niemen at the head of 400,000 men, and imprudently penetrates into the interior of Russia, without establishing either places of depôt or armies of reserve on that frontier river *. He pursues

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* The space of four hundred leagues between the Rhine and the Boristhenes was occupied by friends and allies; from the Rhine to the Elbe, by the Saxons; thence to the Niemen by the Poles; thence to the Boristhenes by the Lithuanians. The army had four lines of fortresses; those of the Rhine, the Elbe, the Vistula, and the Niemen; on the latter were Pillaw, Wilna, Grodno, and Minsk; as long as it had not passed the Boristhenes at Smolensko, it was in a friendly country. From Smolensko to Moscow there were a hundred leagues of hostile country; that is to say, Muscovy. Smolensko was taken and armed, and became the pivot of the march on Moscow. Hospitals for 3000 men were established there,

the Russians, who judiciously avoid any serious engagement, in the well-founded hope of destroying his army in detail by disorganization and famine with greater certainty than by battles. In fact, as he made war without hospitals, magazines, or establishments of any description, without securing his communications, or causing the countries he traversed to be occupied by troops, every soldier who was sick, had missed his way, or lingered behind, was a lost man, and famine daily undermined and weakened the army. When he reached the Dwina and Boristhenes, he had already lost half his troops before a sword was drawn *. Upon this, the most prudent of

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with magazines of military stores, which contained more than 250,000 cartridges for cannon, and considerable supplies of clothing and provisions. Between the Vistula and the Boristhenes 240,000 men were left; 160,000 only passed the bridge of Smolensko, to march on Moscow. Of these, 40,000 remained to guard the magazines, hospitals, and depôts of Dorogholowy, Viazma, Ghjot, and Mozajsk; 100,000 entered Moscow; and 20,000 had been killed in the march and in the great battle of the Moskowa, in which 50,000 Russians perished.

* Not one sick soldier or straggler, not a single estafette or convoy, was carried off in this campaign from Mentz to Moscow; not a day passed without intelligence from France, nor was Paris a single day with-

his generals, *terrified at his extravagant proceedings*, represented to him the necessity of halting on these two rivers, to rally his troops, reorganize them, secure his rear, establish places of depôt, magazines, and hospitals, and, in a word, form a base of operations, previously to plunging deeper in a country, all the inhabitants of which engaged in the war. He admitted the justice of these observations, and the next day acted in direct opposition to them; he committed himself on the Moscow-road, and marched on that capital, three hundred leagues from his base of operations on the Vistula.

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out receiving letters from the army. At the battle of Smolensko, above 60,000 cannon shot were fired; double that quantity at the battle of the Moskowa; the consumption in the minor actions was considerable, and yet, on leaving Moscow, every piece was provided with 350 rounds: there was such a superabundance of ammunition and caissons, that 500 were burnt in the Kremlin, where several hundred thousand pounds of powder, and 60,000 musquets were also destroyed. There never was a want of ammunition, which is highly creditable to Generals Lariboissiere and Eblé, who commanded the artillery. Never did the officers of that corps serve with more honour, or evince greater talent than in this campaign. There are as many falsehoods as assertions in the above paragraph.

His ruin thenceforth became inevitable, and even his victories could not save him.*

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* It shews little knowledge of Russia to imagine that the inhabitants take part in war; the peasants are slaves; the lords dreading their revolt, removed them to their lands in the interior of the empire, much as horses or herds of oxen are driven.

The slaves were very friendly to the French, from whom they expected their liberty; the burghers, or slaves who had been enfranchised and inhabited the little towns, were much disposed to put themselves at the head of an insurrection against the nobility, which induced the Russians to adopt the measure of setting fire to all the towns situate on the routes of the army; an immense loss, independently of that of Moscow. They also set fire to the villages, notwithstanding the opposition of the inhabitants, employing for this purpose the Cossacks, who, being extremely hostile to the Muscovites, were delighted with the opportunity of doing them an injury.

It is unnecessary to say, that the generals of the army never made any remonstrance to Napoleon; the assertion is so absurd that it

" Having acted as imprudently as Charles XII, a similar catastrophe awaited him*. He attempted to ascribe his mis-

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merits no serious refutation; these are mere libellous statements.

* 1st, Charles XII. traversed five hundred leagues of the enemy's country; 2dly, he lost his line of operations the day after his departure from Smolensko; 3dly, he remained a year without intelligence from Stockholm; 4thly, he had no army of reserve. — Napoleon, in the first place, marched but a hundred leagues in the enemy's country; 2dly, he always preserved his line of operations; 3dly, he received intelligence and convoys from France daily; 4thly, he placed three-fourths of his army in reserve, between the Vistula and the camp of Moscow: finally, the former acted with 40,000 men, and the latter with 400,000. The two operations are wholly opposed to each other; and in proportion as the one is conformable to rational rules, and founded on means proportioned to its end, the other is ill calculated for its object, and evinces ignorance of strategics.

The march from Smolensko to Moscow was founded on the idea that in order to save that capital the enemy would fight a battle,

fortunes to the inclemency of the season; but, in the first place, it was easy to foresee that it would be very cold in

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that he would be defeated, that Moscow would be taken; that Alexander, to preserve or deliver his capital, would make peace; or that if he should refuse to make it, the immense stores of that great city, and the 40,000 free and wealthy burghers, sons of freed-men or traders, who inhabited it, would furnish the means of forming a national *noyau* for raising an insurrection of all the slaves in Russia, and striking a fatal blow at that empire. The idea of burning a city almost as extensive as Paris, containing 300,000 souls, was not regarded as a possibility. In fact it would have been more reasonable to make peace, than to be guilty of such a piece of barbarity. The Russian army gave battle three days' march in advance of Moscow; it was defeated: the French army entered the town, and was master of all its riches for eight and forty hours; the resources it found there were immense: the inhabitants had remained, the five hundred palaces of the nobles were furnished, the officers and servants of the houses were at the doors. Not even the diamonds and trinkets of the ladies had been removed. The greater

Russia in the month of January; in the next place, had he effected his retreat during the summer, it would have been

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part of the rich proprietors, in quitting the city, had left letters of recommendation for the general who should occupy their house, declaring that in a few days, when the first moments of disturbance should be over, they would return home. It was then that eight or nine hundred persons belonging to the police, intrusted with the watch and fire-engines, took advantage of a violent wind which arose, and at once set fire to every quarter of the town. A great part of it, built of wood, contained warehouses of brandy, oil, and other combustible materials. All the engines had been carried off; the city kept several hundred, the service being very carefully organized, but only one could be found. For some days the army struggled in vain against the fire; every thing was burnt. The inhabitants who had remained in the town escaped to the woods or country-houses; none remained but the lowest rabble, who stayed for the sake of pillage. This great and superb city became a desert, and a sink of desolation and crime. The French might have adopted the plan of marching on St. Petersburg; the Court was

equally disastrous—he would not have brought back 50,000

apprehensive of this, and had sent its archives and most valuable treasures to London; it had also directed Admiral Tchitchagoff's army to cover that capital. Considering that it is as far from Moscow to St. Petersburg, as from Smolensko to St. Petersburg, Napoleon preferred going to pass the winter at Smolensko on the borders of Lithuania, reserving his march on St. Petersburg to the spring. He commenced his movement on Smolensko, by again attacking and defeating Kutusoff's army at Malsioroslawitz, whence he continued it, unimpeded, until the ice, the snow, and the cold killed 30,000 horses in one night, and obliged the army to abandon the waggons, which caused the calamities of that march; for it ought not to be called a retreat, since the army was victorious, and could equally well have marched on St. Petersburg, Kalouga, or Toula, which Kutusoff would in vain have attempted to cover. The army would have wintered at Smolensko, if Prince Schwartzenburg had not abandoned it, and manœuvred on Warsaw, which allowed Admiral Tchitchagoff to proceed to the Beresina, and to menace the grand magazines and depôts of Wilna, where

men the more *. An army which is compelled to retreat over a space of three hundred leagues before it reaches its reserves, depôts, and base of operations, amidst a cloud of the enemy harassing its flanks, and intercepting its communications, whilst it is destitute of provisions and ammunition,

there were provisions for the army for four months, clothing for 50,000 men, horses, ammunition, and a division of 10,000 men to guard them. General Dombrowski, who occupied the fort of Borisow and the bridge of the Beresina, could not defend them: he had only 9000 men, and was dislodged. Admiral Tchitchagoff passed the Beresina to proceed on the Dwina, but attempted nothing against Wilna; he was met by the Duke of Reggio, who defeated him, and drove him back on the Beresina, after having taken all his baggage. In his consternation the Admiral burnt the bridge of Borisow.

* Had it been August instead of November, the army would have marched on St. Petersburg; it was retiring on Smolensko, not because it was beaten, but for the purpose of wintering in Poland: had it been summer, neither Admiral Tchitchagoff's army nor that of Kutusoff would have dared to approach within ten days' march of the French army, on pain of immediate destruction.

becomes disheartened and grows continually weaker, melting away daily; and when it arrives at last is so completely ruined, that the succours it receives are inadequate to its restoration*. Had he established three or four temporary fortresses, *têtes-de-pont*, and an army of reserve, his enemies could not have posted themselves in his rear; he would not have wanted provisions or ammunition, and his army, after losing a battle, would have speedily found a refuge, reinforcements, and a barrier against the pursuit of the enemy. The public, which always sides with fortune, severely censured these two unfortunate campaigns, whilst the trumpets of fame were yet sounding the praises of the brilliant campaign of Austerlitz. But connoisseurs, who rather judge from principles than by events, perceive in that celebrated campaign the very errors which afterwards ruined us. Napoleon is there seen to make war without a base of operations, and with more show than solidity. After surrounding and destroying the Austrian army, at Ulm, by brilliant and active movements, distinguished by method and talent, prudence would

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* 1st, The magazines of the army were not three hundred leagues off; it never wanted for ammunition; it was not harassed in the rear, and the enemy was beaten in every direction. Yet the Romans at Thrasymene and Cannæ, Hannibal at Zama, Scipio at Thapsus, Sextus at Munda, Melas at Marengo, Mack at Ulm, and the Duke of Brunswick at Jena, have been seen to lose their armies, without being able to rally, although in the midst of their fortresses and near their capitals.

have dictated to him the propriety of halting to form a base of operations in Bavaria*. He does not listen to this timid counsel—he pursues his point, and fortune leads him into Vienna; nay, she gives up to him the bridge of that capital over the Danube, which the Austrians might so easily have burnt. The French general is eager to profit by such good fortune; he rashly crosses to the left bank of the river, hastens to meet the Russians in Moravia, and beats them at Austerlitz, where he concludes peace. Certainly, if we consider, without prejudice, his situation, that of the hostile armies, and the state of Europe at that period, it will be difficult to avoid seeing that this expedition into Moravia was merely a desperate piece of folly, in consequence of which almost every chance was against him. The Austrian army of Italy, which was approaching with expedition, was only a few marches off, and might direct its march on Vienna, take possession of that capital, or at least of the isle of the Prater, and consequently of the bridge over the Danube†.

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* Yes, in order to give time to General Kutusoff, the Emperor Alexander, General Benigsen, Prince Charles, and the Austrian army of Vienna, to join on the Inn, to render the striking victory of Ulm useless, and to place all that had been decided by that victory in suspense again. Precious advice to follow, this would have been! Had it been taken, the French armies must have been repulsed to the Rhine and the Alps, before December.

† The Archduke Charles, who had gained some advantages over the Prince of Essling,

The Tyrol was not subdued *, Prussia and all the north of Germany were agitated, and a feeble corps of 15,000 men, which we had at Frankfort, was undoubtedly far from sufficient to arrest the progress of 150,000 men, who appeared likely to march towards the sources of the Danube,

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and had arrived on the Adige, was obliged to retreat precipitately, to come to the succour of Vienna, after the victory of Ulm. He left a strong garrison in Venice and Palma-nuova, a corps of observation in Carniola, and reached the confines of Hungary with 40,000 men. The Prince of Essling, with the army of Italy, 35,000 strong, followed him up closely. General Saint-Cyr had hastened from Otranto, and was blockading Venice; the Duke of Ragusa had marched on the Simmering, with 20,000 men, to join the Prince of Essling. The Duke of Treviso had remained in Vienna with 15,000 men, and the Prince of Eckmuhl was at Presburg on the Danube with 30,000 men. Although two of his divisions reached the field of battle at Austerlitz, it was only by forced marches, when the battle was decided, and there was nothing to fear from Prince Charles, who was harassed with fatigue, and sought refuge in the centre of Hungary.

* The Prince of the Moskowa, with his *corps d'armée*, had been directed on the Tyrol; he

in order to intercept the communications of the French *. The Russians were advancing, with 60,000 men, to the aid of the Austrians, who had escaped the defeat of Ulm; and, finally, Bohemia was in arms. It is unquestionably evident, that in order to effect the destruction of the French, it was

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was more than sufficient to subject that country. In fact, he was master of it at the time of the battle of Austerlitz.

* The King of Prussia had been influenced by the Emperor Alexander's residence at Potsdam; but notwithstanding the famous oath at the tomb of Frederic, that Prince had given France the most lively assurances that he would not commit any act of hostility without previously making proposals; and he had only engaged with Russia by an eventual treaty. But supposing affairs to have stood as the author of the "Considerations" relates, it was evidently advisable to profit by the six weeks which the French had before them, before Prussia could complete her armaments, to defeat the Russian and Austrian armies, deliver Italy, or repass the Rhine and the Alps. For it would certainly have been impossible, if a position had been taken up on the Inn, to make head against Austria, Russia, and Prussia, since that step would have given those powers time to join and combine their forces.

only necessary to temporize, avoid regular engagements front to front, and attack the flanks. Their army, surrounded by enemies, destitute of communications, establishments, and ammunition, would have found itself in as perplexing a situation as that of Moscow. Even the victory of Austerlitz could not have extricated them, if the Allies had shewn resolution, firmness, and energy after that battle, which they were to blame for fighting. What could the French have done after that victory? Nothing at all; or if they had pursued the Russians*, their situation would only have become the more critical, and their destruction the more easy; for their line of operations, the base of which rested on the Rhine, must have weakened as it increased in length. This campaign, in the critical eyes of reason†, is as defective as

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* The Russians were not pursued, nor was there any occasion to pursue them; the Emperor Alexander engaged to retire with his army, without artillery, by way of Hungary, beyond the Niemen; which he accordingly did. After the battle of Austerlitz, Prussia was contemned, and had she not, forthwith, changed her tone, she would have had cause to repent it. The Emperor of Austria, without army or allies, and with his capital in the possession of his enemy, was naturally anxious for peace.

† What reason? that of Alexander, Hannibal, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Eugene, Frederick; or that of the Princes of Clermont, and Soubise?

that of Moscow; yet how different the results! so true it is that fortune is extremely powerful in the affairs of the world!"

In the campaign of Russia, the magazines of the army were not on the Vistula, fifty days' march from Moscow; those of the first line were at Smolensko, ten days' march from Moscow; those of the second line at Minsk and Wilna, eight marches from Smolensko; those of the third line at Kowno, Grodno, and Bialistok; those of the fourth line at Elbing, Marienwerder, Thorn, Plock, Modlin, and Warsaw; those of the fifth line at Dantzic, Bamberg, and Posen; those of the sixth line at Stettin, Custrin, and Glogaw. Out of 400,000 men who passed the Niemen, 240,000 remained in reserve between that river and the Boristhenes; 160,000 passed Smolensko, and marched on Moscow; out of these 160,000 men, 40,000 remained in echelon between Smolensko and Mojaisk. It was therefore the natural course to retreat on Poland. No general ever represented to Napoleon the necessity of halting on the Beresina; they all felt that when once master of Moscow he would put an end to the war. As far as Smolensko, he was manœuvring in a country which was as well disposed towards him as France itself; the population

and authorities were on his side; he was able to obtain men, horses, and provisions; and Smolensko is a fortified town. In his march on Moscow, he never had an enemy in his rear. During the twenty days that he remained in that capital, not one of his estafettes or convoys of artillery was intercepted; not one of his intrenched station-houses, of which there was one at every post, was attacked; the convoys of artillery and military equipage arrived without any accident. If Moscow had not been burnt, the Emperor Alexander would have been compelled to make peace. After the conflagration of Moscow, if the severe cold had not set in fifteen days earlier than usual, the army would have returned to Smolensko without loss, where it would have had nothing to fear from the Russian armies beaten at the Moskowa, and at Malsioroslawitz, which had the greatest need of rest. It was well known that it would be cold in December and January, but there was reason to think, from the rise of the temperature for twenty years preceding, that the thermometer would not fall six degrees below the freezing point during November; the army wanted but three days more to have accomplished its retreat in good

order: but in those three days it lost 30,000 horses; the premature cold affected both armies equally. The event might justify the censure of the Emperor for having remained four days too long at Moscow; but he was induced to do so by political reasons; he thought he should have time to return into Poland; the autumns are very late in the North.

When the army left Moscow, it carried with it provisions sufficient for twenty days, which was more than enough to enable it to reach Smolensko, where it could have obtained abundant supplies to subsist on till its arrival at Minsk or Wilna. But all the teams of the convoys, and most of the artillery and cavalry-horses perished; every department of the army became disorganized; it was an army no longer; it became impossible to take up a position nearer than Wilna. Prince Schwartzenburg's and General Reynier's corps, which were on the Vistula, instead of resting on Minsk as they ought to have done, retired on Warsaw, thus abandoning the army: had they proceeded to Minsk, they would have been joined by Dombrowski's division, which, being unable to defend Borischow alone, could not prevent Admiral Tchitchagoff from occupying that

place. It was the Admiral's plan not to take possession of the Beresina, but to proceed to the Dwina to cover St. Petersburg. It was through this fortuitous circumstance that the Duke of Reggio met with him, beat him, and repulsed him to the right bank of the Beresina. Tchitchagoff was again defeated after the passage of the Beresina: Doumerc's cuirassiers took 1800 of his men in a charge.

Within two days' march of Wilna, the army having no farther dangers to encounter, the Emperor conceived that the urgency of affairs required his presence in Paris; it was there only that he could dictate to Prussia and Austria: if he had delayed proceeding thither, the passage might have been closed against him. He left the King of Naples and the Prince of Neuchatel in command of the army. The guard was then entire, and the army contained more than 80,000 combatants, exclusively of the Duke of Tarento's corps, which was on the Dwina. The Russian army, at the utmost, did not now exceed 50,000 men. Flour, biscuits, wine, meat, dried pulse, and forage, abounded at Wilna. According to the report of the state of the stores of provisions, presented to the Emperor on his passage through

that city, there then remained four millions of rations of flour, three millions six hundred thousand rations of meat, nine million rations of wine or brandy; considerable magazines of clothing and other articles, as well as of ammunition, had likewise been formed. Had the Emperor remained with the army, or delegated the command to Prince Eugene, it would never have passed beyond Wilna: there was a corps of reserve at Warsaw and another at Kœnigsburg; but a few Cossacks intimidated the commanders; Wilna was evacuated by night in a disorderly manner: it is from this period in particular that the great losses of this campaign may be dated; and it was one of the misfortunes of the state of affairs at that time, that the Emperor was, in all great and critical circumstances, required to be with the army and at Paris at the same time. Nothing was, or could be, more totally unforeseen by him than the senseless conduct which was adopted at Wilna.

During the campaign of 1813, 1st, our first line of places and magazines comprised Kœnigstein, Dresden, Torgau, Wittemberg, Magdeburg, and Hamburg; our second line Minden, Leipsic, Merseburg, Erfurth, and Wurtz-

burg; 2dly, our *têtes-de-pont* on the Saale were Merseburg, Weissenfels, and Naumberg; 3dly, the Duke of Castiglione commanded an army of reserve on the right of the Saale; and there was a division of reserve at Leipsic. The position of the army was deteriorated by the accident of the bridge of Leipsic; but, on arriving at Erfurth, the troops would have found considerable magazines of every kind: there they were to halt, and supply their waggons; and, after two days rest, they were to manœuvre against the dispersed forces of the Allies. The arrival of Marshal Wrede's Austro-Bavarian army on the Maine, by forced marches, obliged them to march immediately on Hanau, to re-establish communications with Mentz.

The disasters of the Russian campaign arose from the premature change of the season. Those of the campaign of Saxony were the result of political events: perhaps it will be said that these political events ought to have been foreseen: be it so, but after all, the result of this campaign would have been totally different, had it not been for the defection of the Saxon and Bavarian troops, and the alterations which took place in the policy of several Cabinets.

In 1805, after having taken 80,000 prisoners, and all the *matériel* of the Austrian army, the Emperor thought it expedient to march on Vienna: in the first place to clear Italy, and fall on the rear of the army of the Archduke Charles, who had beaten the Prince of Essling, and had already arrived on the Adige; 2dly, to prevent the Austrian army from joining that of the Emperor Alexander; 3dly, to break, defeat, and intercept the army of Kutusoff. Having entered Vienna, he heard that the Archduke Charles had put himself in full retreat from Italy, followed by the Prince of Essling, and so much weakened by the garrisons he had thrown into Venice and Palmanuova, and by the corps of observation left in Carniola, that he was returning to Hungary with only 35,000 men; and that the Emperor Alexander was at Olmutz. He resolved to pass the Danube at Vienna, to cut off Kutusoff at Hollabrun, who, having been defeated at Amstetten, had passed the Danube at Krems. This movement had succeeded, when Prince Murat suffered himself to be deceived by Prince Bagration, who amused him with talking of peace, and in the mean time escaped from him. Napoleon hastened to the spot by night, commanded an attack at break of day, but Bagra-

tion had extricated himself during the eighteen hours of the armistice. On the 2d of December Napoleon defeated the combined Russian and Austrian armies, commanded by the Emperors of Austria and Russia, at Austerlitz. He had left the Duke of Treviso at Vienna, with 15,000 men; the Duke of Ragusa, with 20,000 men, was on the Simmering, watching the movements of Prince Charles; the Prince of Eckmuhl, with 30,000, was on the borders of Hungary. The Duke of Treviso's 15,000 men, the Duke of Ragusa's 20,000, the Prince of Eckmuhl's 30,000, and the 40,000 of the Prince of Essling, who had already reached Clagenfurth, thus formed a mass of upwards of 100,000 men opposed to the 35,000 of the Archduke Charles.

The movement on Austerlitz, to engage the Russian army and prevent its junction with the army of Italy, was agreeable to all the rules of the art; it succeeded, and ought to have succeeded. The Prince of the Moskowa, with the sixth corps, was in the Tyrol; the Duke of Castiglione, with the seventh corps, was in reserve in Suabia; Marshal Saint-Cyr was before Venice; the King of Bavaria had a reserve at Munich. As to Prussia, we were not at war with that power. The convention

of Potsdam was contingent; it was conditional only on the Emperor's refusal of the proposals which Count Haugwitz was charged to make. He was at head-quarters; and had the Emperor been defeated at Austerlitz, those proposals would have been accepted; and the effect of the loss of that battle would instantly have excited the jealousy of the Court of Berlin against Austria and Russia. Besides, the Prussian army could not have been put in motion in less than six weeks.

If the Emperor of Russia had evacuated Olmutz, plunged into Hungary, and joined the Archduke Charles without giving battle, the army which fought at Austerlitz would then have been reinforced by two divisions of the Prince of Eckmuhl's, which did not engage at Austerlitz, by the corps of the Dukes of Ragusa and Treviso, and the Prince of Essling. The advantage would have been wholly on the side of the French, whose army would have been superior in number to the two Allied armies together.

In this campaign the army had three lines of operations: one on Italy, by the Simmering and Clagenfurth; another likewise on Italy by the Simmering, Gratz, and Palma-nuova; and a third on the Rhine, by Saint-Polten,

Ens, Braunau, Munich, and Augsburg. Ens was fortified, and contained great magazines of provisions and military stores. Braunau, a *tête-de-pont* on the Inn, was a fortified place in a condition to withstand fifteen days open trenches; General Lauriston commanded there, and had magazines, hospitals, and ammunition. Passau, a fortress on the Inn, at its junction with the Danube, contained great magazines. General Moulin commanded at Augsburg, a place of depôts and magazines on the left bank of the Lech, which he had fortified and put in a state of defence against any sudden attack.

During the campaigns of Austerlitz, Jena, Friedland, and Moscow, not a single estafette was intercepted, not one convoy of sick was taken; nor was there a single day on which no news from Paris reached head-quarters. An erroneous idea prevails with respect to Moravia and Russia; provisions are plentiful there.

NOTE XIV.—CAMPAIGN OF 1813.

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"It was through the violation of this principle that Napoleon lost the too famous battle of Leipsic in 1813, which

changed the destiny of Europe. I will therefore take up the thread of events at an earlier period, and notice the movements of the army prior to that terrible catastrophe. I shall, at the same time, have occasion to refer to the battle of Dresden, which seemed to promise the French arms better success."

We have already entered into a particular review of this campaign in notes on a work by a Saxon officer: we shall, therefore, here confine ourselves to the correction of some flagrant errors.

Of the 250,000 men composing the army of the Emperor Napoleon, in this campaign, 50,000 were Saxons, Westphalians, Bavarians, Wirtemburghers, natives of Baden, Hessians, or troops of the Grand Duchy of Berg, who were very ill disposed, and proved rather injurious than serviceable. The remaining 200,000 were young troops, particularly the horse, except the guard, the Poles, two or three regiments of light, and four or five of heavy cavalry. The want of light cavalry prevented our gaining intelligence of the enemy's movements.

We had a bridge over the Elbe at Dresden, one at Meissen, one at Torgau, one at Wittemberg, one at Magdeburg, and one at Hamburg. The movements on Dresden were foreseen; every thing was done to draw the enemy thi-

ther. The Emperor had caused works to be raised, roads opened, and bridges constructed on the Elbe before Kœnigstein, to facilitate the communication between that place and Stolpen.

The victories of Lutzen and Wurtzen, on the 2d and 21st of May, had re-established the reputation of the French arms: the King of Saxony had been brought back in triumph to his capital; the enemy had been driven from Hamburg; one of the corps of the grand army was at the gates of Berlin, and the Imperial quarters were at Breslaw; the Russian and Prussian armies, greatly discouraged, had no choice but to repass the Vistula, when Austria, interfering, advised France to sign an armistice. Napoleon returned to Dresden; the Emperor of Austria left Vienna, and proceeded into Bohemia; the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia stationed themselves at Schweidnitz. The conferences began; Prince Metternich proposed the Congress of Prague; it was accepted, but was only a pretext; the Court of Vienna had already entered into engagements with Russia and Prussia; Austria was to have declared herself in May, but the unexpected successes of the French army compelled her to proceed more circumspectly.

Notwithstanding all the efforts she had made, her army was deficient in numbers, ill-organized, and in no condition to take the field. Prince Metternich demanded the Illyrian Provinces, and a frontier on the kingdom of Italy; the Grand Duchy of Warsaw; and the Emperor Napoleon's renunciation of the Protectorate of the Confederation of the Rhine, of the mediation of the Swiss Confederacy, of the population of the thirty-second military division, and of the departments of Holland. These extravagant conditions were evidently brought forward in expectation that they would be rejected. The Duke of Vicenza, however, proceeded to the Congress of Prague, and the negotiations began; all the means employed to induce the powers to desist from some part of their pretensions, had only obtained some insignificant modifications: the Emperor resolved to make important concessions, and to send them to the Emperor of Austria by Count Bubna, who resided at Dresden. The relinquishment of the Illyrian Provinces, divided from the kingdom of Italy by the Isonzo; of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and of the titles of Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, and Mediator of the Swiss Confederacy, were consented to. As to Holland and the Hanseatic

towns, Napoleon engaged only to retain these possessions until peace, and as means of compensation to obtain from England the restoration of the French colonies.

When Count Bubna arrived at Prague, the term limited for the duration of the armistice had expired several hours before; on this ground Austria declared her adhesion to the coalition, and the war recommenced.

The striking victory gained at Dresden by the French army, on the 27th of August, over the army commanded by the three sovereigns, was followed by the disasters of Marshal Macdonald's corps in Lusatia, and of that of General Vandamme in Bohemia. The superiority, however, was always on the side of the French army, which was supported on the fortresses of Torgau, Wittemberg, and Magdeburg.

Denmark had just concluded, at Dresden, a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance with France; and the Prince of Eckmuhl's army at Hamburg was increased by the contingent of that power. In October Napoleon left Dresden, and proceeded towards Magdeburg by the left bank of the Elbe, in order to deceive the enemy. His plan was to repass the Elbe at Wittemberg, and to march on Berlin. Several corps were already arrived at Wittemberg, and the

bridges of the enemy at Dessau had been destroyed, when a letter from the King of Wurtemberg justified the suspicions already conceived with respect to the fidelity of the Court of Munich, signifying that the King of Bavaria had suddenly changed sides; and that, without any declaration of war, or any previous notice, and in consequence of the treaty of Reid, the two armies, Austrian and Bavarian, cantoned on the banks of the Inn, had joined into a single camp; that these 80,000 men, under the command of General Wrede, were marching on the Rhine; that Wurtemberg, compelled by the force of this army, was obliged to add its contingent; and that it must be expected that 100,000 men would shortly surround Mentz.

On this unexpected intelligence, the Emperor thought it necessary to change the plan of campaign which he had been meditating on for two months, and according to which his fortresses and magazines were arranged. This plan was to throw the Allies between the Elbe and the Saale, and, by manœuvring under the protection of the fortresses and magazines of Torgau, Wittemberg, Magdeburg, and Hamburg, to fix the war between the Elbe and the Oder (the French army possessing the fortresses

of Glogau, Custrin, and Stettin, on the Oder), and, according to circumstances, to deblockade the places on the Vistula—Dantzic, Thorn, and Modlin. Such success was to be expected from this vast plan as would have dissolved the coalition, and confirmed all the princes of Germany in fidelity to their alliance with France. If Bavaria had, as was with reason expected, delayed changing sides only a fortnight, it was considered certain that she would not have changed at all.

The armies met on the field of Leipsic, on the 16th of October. The French army was victorious, and would still have been so on the 18th, notwithstanding the check sustained on the 16th by the Duke of Ragusa, had it not been for the defection of the Saxon army, which, occupying one of the most important positions of the line, passed over to the enemy with a battery of sixty guns, which it turned against the French army. Such an unheard-of piece of treachery might have been expected to produce the destruction of the army, and secure the Allies all the honours of the day. The Emperor hastened up with half his guard, repulsed the Saxons and Swedes, and drove them from their positions. The battle of the 18th terminated; the enemy made a retrograde

movement throughout his line, and fixed his bivouacs beyond the field of battle, which remained in the possession of the French.

At the battle of Leipsic the young guard was engaged, under the Dukes of Reggio and Treviso. The middle guard, commanded by General Curial, attacked and routed the Austrian corps under General Merfeld, who was made prisoner. The cavalry of the guard, with General Nansouty at its head, went to the right, repulsed the Austrian cavalry, and took a great number of prisoners. The artillery of the guard, directed by Count Drouot, was engaged throughout the day. Of all the guards, the old infantry alone remained constantly drawn up in line, posted on an eminence where their presence was necessary, but where they never had to form the square.

In the course of the night the French army began its movement to place itself behind the Elster, in direct communication with Erfurth, whence it expected the convoys of ammunition of which it stood in need. It had fired more than 150,000 cannon-shot in the battles of the 16th and 18th. Owing to the treachery of several German corps belonging to the Confederation of the Rhine, misled by the example set the day before by the Saxons, and to the accident

of the bridge of Leipsic, which a sergeant blew up before he had received orders from his commanding officer; the army, although victorious, suffered, through these fatal occurrences, the losses commonly resulting from the most disastrous actions. It repassed the Saale at the bridge of Weissenfeld; there it was to have rallied, and waited for the ammunition from Erfurth, which place was abundantly supplied; but certain intelligence being received that the Austro-Bavarian army had arrived, by forced marches, on the Maine, it became necessary to meet it.

On the 30th of October, the French army came up with the enemy drawn up in line of battle before Hanau, intercepting the road to Frankfort: although his force was strong and occupied fine positions, it was overthrown, completely routed, and driven from Hanau. The French army continued its movement in retreat behind the Rhine, which it repassed on the 2d of November.

Conferences took place at Frankfort, between Baron Saint-Aignan, Prince Metternich, Count Nesselrode, and Lord Aberdeen. The Allies laid down as the primary basis of peace, that the Emperor Napoleon should renounce the protectorate of the Confederation of the Rhine,

and give up Poland and the departments of the Elbe; that France should remain entire within her natural limits of the Elbe and the Rhine, and that a frontier in Italy should be determined on to separate France from the States of the House of Austria. The Emperor Napoleon agreed to this basis: the Duke of Vicenza set out for Frankfort; but the Congress of Frankfort was merely a stratagem brought forward, like the Congress of Prague, in hopes that France would refuse. A new text was wanted for a manifesto to work upon the public mind; for at the very moment when these conciliatory proposals were making, the Allies violated the neutrality of the Cantons, entered Switzerland, refused to receive the French plenipotentiary at Frankfort, and pointed out Chatillon-sur-Seine as the place for the early meeting of the Congress; they gave it to be understood that the basis of negotiation must be the relinquishment of all Italy, of Holland, Belgium, the departments of the Rhine and Savoy; which would replace France within the limits she was bounded by before 1792; and, by the draft of a treaty handed in on the 15th of February, they required the fortresses of Huninguen, Befort, and Besançon, to be imme-

diately surrendered to them. Such demands were certainly not of a nature to be admitted without discussion. The negotiations were still proceeding, when the Allies declared the Congress dissolved.

NOTE XV.

PAGE 339.

"It is well known how Napoleon succeeded in reaching Paris from the Isle of Elba. Scarce had he become master of that capital, when he saw all the rest of Europe and two-thirds of France itself declare against him; on his side there were only an army of 150,000 men, and the influence of a name still resplendent with the glory of more than thirty victories. Already several royal armies were in motion in the interior, and 800,000 foreigners menaced the country from without at every point. Was he to wait for the combined attack of all his allied enemies, confining himself to defensive operations? or was he to take the lead, in order to disturb their harmony, and strike some important blow before they could all be in line? He determined on the latter course: he assembled his troops, and on the 15th of June commenced his march in three columns, starting from Philipville, Beaumont and Maubeuge, in order to pass the Sambre the same day at Chatelet, Charleroi and Muschienne, at the head of 100,000 combatants. The rest of his forces were occupied in the interior or on the other frontiers. The English army was cantoned from Brussels to Nivelle; the Prussian army in the vicinity of Fleurus and Namur. It was

the French general's plan to place himself suddenly betwixt the cantonments of these two armies, to prevent their junction, and to fall successively on the scattered troops with all his cavalry, which he had for this purpose formed into one body of 20,000 horse. The success of this operation wholly depended on the rapidity of his movements; it was necessary that he should on the same day advance his whole army as far as Fleurus by a forced march of eight or ten leagues; and push his van-guard as far as Sombref, on the road from Namur to Brussels; but, instead of expediting his arrival in the midst of his enemies, he halted at Charleroi; being delayed either by the weather or by some other motive.

"On the following day we put ourselves in motion in three columns; the column of the left, 35,000 strong, took the road from Charleroi to Brussels, and met a party of the English army in march to join the Prussians at Quatre-Bras, where the two roads from Charleroi and Namur to Brussels join. An engagement took place, with various success; but we finally gained the principal object, which was that of stopping the march of the English on the Namur road. Our two other columns were marching, the one on the Fleurus road, and the other half a league to the right of that road. In the mean time the Prussians had mustered with great celerity; and on our arrival at Fleurus, at eleven in the morning, we found their army in position, the left at Sombref, on the road from Namur to Brussels, the right at Saint-Amand, with its front covered by the rivulet of Ligny: we arrived on their right flank. It would have been prudent to attack that town; by which means we should have partly avoided the defiles of the rivulet; we should have approached our corps of the left, which was fighting at Quatre-Bras, so that the two armies might mutually have assisted each other; and finally, we should have forced the Prussians to a great distance from

the English, by obliging them to retire on Namur. But the French general acted differently; he attacked in front; and after several sanguinary engagements he at length forced the defile of Ligny with his reserve, and debouched on the centre of the Prussian army, which naturally retreated, under favour of the night, towards the English, on the side of Brussels, in which direction we drove it. We lay on the field of battle after this bloody and undecisive conflict, which cost us 15,000 men, including our losses at the action of Quatre-Bras.

"On the 17th we marched in two columns; the principal column, after having rallied the troops which had fought the day before at Quatre-Bras, took the Brussels road, and at night fell in with the English army in position at the village of Mont-Saint-Jean. Our right column, 30,000 strong, ordered to follow the movements of the Prussians, and uncertain of their direction, halted at Gembloux, not far from the field of battle of the preceding day.

"On the 18th, in the morning, we perceived the English army in the position it occupied the day before, drawn up in two lines, with a central reserve; its left, a little in the rear, supported on the forest of Soignes; its centre fortified by the village of Mont-Saint-Jean, at the junction of the roads from Charleroi and Nivelles to Brussels, and its right covered by a ravine. Not far from Braine-la-Leud the ground extended in glacis of tolerable uniformity in its front. The English general, having studied the field of battle beforehand, had availed himself of all its heights, in order to place his artillery to advantage; and of all the inequalities of the ground, in order to cover his infantry from our fire. His army appeared to us to be 80,000 strong, judging from the extent of the ground occupied by his lines. We spent the whole of the forenoon in drawing out our army and preparing for

action. We had 55,000 combatants, exclusive of our right column of 30,000 men, which had left Gembloux in the morning to follow the march of the Prussians on the Wavre road. This column, separated from the rest of the army by that muddy river the Dyle, remained near Wavre, more than three leagues from the field of battle; which circumstance was fatal to the fortune of the day. The battle began at noon, at Mont-Saint-Jean, whilst we were deprived of this corps of 30,000 men, which the French general seemed to have entirely forgotten, through unparalleled blindness or presumption; and this column remained stupidly on the right bank of the Dyle, instead of hastening up, on the report of the cannon, to engage in the battle; instead, at least, of marching briskly in pursuit of the Prussians, who passed the Dyle at Wavre, and reinforced the English army. If this lateral column had, according to our principles, placed itself a league nearer the principal column, by crossing the Dyle early in the morning and fixing itself between the high road and the river, it might have been employed, according to circumstances, either in keeping the Prussian army in check, or in striking a decisive blow against the left of the English, and victory would have attended the French army; at least all probabilities are in favour of that supposition. What ruined the French general was the being deprived of part of his army, by having removed it by a false march three leagues from the capital point. As to the battle itself, the principal error laid to his charge by connoisseurs is the premature engagement of his cavalry, which I have already had occasion to notice."

PAGE 230.

"But if we wished it, at the commencement of the battle, to charge untouched and warlike infantry, it would undoubtedly be driven back on the rest of the army, to which it

would communicate its own confusion. I know that the recent example of two illustrious generals, who made their cavalry engage almost at the first onset of the battle of Waterloo, may be opposed to these arguments. The right of the French, composed of four divisions of infantry, each formed in close column by divisions, was marching to attack the left and centre of the English line, when the English general sent a brigade of cavalry from his left to charge those columns on their march; and this charge, contrary to all probability, succeeded. One of our columns, terrified at the mere sight of this cavalry, fled and dispersed, abandoning a battery of thirty pieces of artillery which it was charged to support; but the English cavalry, in retiring after its charge, being taken in flank and rear by the other divisions of infantry and some French squadrons, suffered severely: these two regiments were almost destroyed."

PAGE 233.

"Nevertheless, as his inflexible character would never yield to the force of circumstances, he preferred suffering his cavalry to be uselessly destroyed by the fire of the English, to ordering it to fall back. This injudicious charge was undoubtedly made without his knowledge; but why did he keep himself at too great a distance to see well? why did he not superintend his field of battle, to give his orders and see them executed? Is not every general-in-chief responsible for the errors committed in a field of battle, of half a league in extent? and his was no larger."

What! two-thirds of France were against Napoleon! Several royal armies were manœuvring in the interior!—How was it, then, that after landing, almost alone, on the coast

of France, he seated himself on his throne again in twenty days? How was it, then, that France proclaimed him her sovereign, for the third time in fifteen years, at the *Champ de Mai?* How, then, came 500,000 Frenchmen to flock to his standard at his call? What made so many generals and enlightened officers of all the armies take oaths to him, when they had a few days before received the cross of St. Louis from the hands of Louis XVIII.? Why does his very name still make all the kings of the earth, who combined against him, tremble on their thrones

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Napoleon never assembled 20,000 cavalry, to place them between the Prusso-Saxon and Anglo-Dutch armies, in a country much intersected and full of hillocks: what he did, was what he intended to do. On the 15th, in the evening, his army did not remain at Charleroi; General Vandamme and Marshal Grouchy's corps bivouacked in the woods, a quarter of a league from Fleurus. The Prince of the Moskowa, after having fought throughout the day, slept at Franne, having *vedettes* on Quatre-Bras. It was impossible to occupy Sombref, because, independently of General Zeithen's corps, the second Prussian corps, that of General Thielman, had arrived there from Namur.

The army marched ten leagues, this first day, by cross-roads in an intersected country. The Emperor's intention was, that his van-guard should occupy Fleurus, hiding the troops behind the woods near that town; he would have been very unwilling to allow his army to be seen, and particularly so to occupy Sombref. That alone would have produced the failure of all his manœuvres; for Marshal Blucher would then have been obliged to appoint Wavre as the spot for his troops to assemble at; the battle of Ligny would not have taken place; the Prussian army would not have been forced to give battle, without being assembled, or supported by the English army. The victory of Ligny was so decisive, that it reduced the strength of the Prussian army by 60,000 men; it had decided the question. In what direction were the Prussians to be attacked? By outflanking their right by Saint-Amand, or their left by Sombref; or by penetrating their centre, gaining possession of the heights of Bry, and driving back their whole wing on the side of Charleroi, and reaching the road of Quatre-Bras before the right? It was not an object, in this battle, to separate the English from the Prussians; it was known that the English could not take the field before the following day;

but the object was to prevent that part of Blucher's third corps which, at eleven o'clock in the morning, had not joined, and which was coming up by Namur, and the fourth corps, which was proceeding to Ligny by Gembloux, from joining on the field of battle. By cutting the enemy's line at Ligny, the whole of his right at Saint-Amand was turned and compromised, whilst the possession of Saint-Amand would have produced nothing. *Hence we must conclude that Napoleon's reasoning and that of his hypercritic are two different things; and we must be allowed to give credit, in preference, to the military coup-d'œil of the former.*

If it were true that the English general had studied his field of battle at Mont-Saint-Jean, he could not be considered as having given any proof of talent on that occasion. His ground was bad; his army would have been lost, but for the arrival of Blucher's 60,000 men.

The Duke of Wellington was surprised in his cantonments; the French army had been manœuvring for three days within reach of his advanced posts, had commenced hostilities, and repulsed the Prussian army, whilst the English general at his head-quarters was still ignorant that the Emperor had quitted Paris.

All the cantonments of his army were in full security, occupying an extent of more than twenty leagues; his infantry, cavalry, and artillery were separately cantoned. His infantry was engaged alone, during part of the day, at Quatre-Bras, and suffered enormous loss, being obliged to resist, in close columns or formed into squares, the repeated charges of our intrepid cuirassiers supported by fifty guns. The three descriptions of force cannot dispense with each other; they ought always to be cantoned and stationed so as to be able to render each other mutual assistance. The Duke of Wellington committed another error, in assigning Quatre-Bras, which was already in the possession of the French, as the point of junction for his army; by which he exposed his forces to the danger of being defeated in succession. Waterloo ought to have been his point of junction; he would then have had forty-eight hours to effect the union of his army, infantry, cavalry, and artillery; and the French, when they presented themselves before him, would have found all his forces joined and in position. But was it compatible with the interest of England and her Allies to give battle? No: the Allies' plan of warfare ought to have consisted in acting in a mass, and not

engaging in any partial affair. Nothing could be more contrary to their interest than to hazard the success of the invasion of France in one battle. If the English army had been beaten at Waterloo, what would have been the use of those numerous armies of Russians, Austrians, Germans, and Spaniards, who were arriving by forced marches on the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees?

After the battle of Ligny the Duke of Wellington ought to have assembled his army in the rear of the forest of Soignes, to have made Marshal Blucher join him, defended the approaches of the forest by rear-guards, covered himself by *abattis* and field works, and summoned to his aid all the garrisons of Belgium, particularly the fourteen regiments which had just landed at Ostend. Would the Emperor, with an army of 100,000 men, have dared to cross the forest of Soignes, to attack, at its debouché, the English and Prussian armies, 200,000 strong, and in position? This would, indeed, have been manœuvring just as his enemy would have wished; and would certainly have been the most fortunate thing that could have occurred for the interest of the Allies. If, on the contrary, he had himself taken a position, manœuvring to draw on the

Anglo-Prussian army, his inaction would have proved fatal to him. 300,000 Russians, Austrians, and Bavarians, would in the mean time have arrived on the Rhine, and he would have been obliged to return with all possible speed to the succour of his capital. That alone would have been the proper time for the Duke of Wellington and Marshal Blucher to march against him. They would then have run no risk, but would have been acting agreeably to the true principles of war, and the general plan of the coalition.

The French army did not lose the morning of the 18th in preparing for battle; it was ready to engage at day-break; but it was compelled to wait until the ground was sufficiently dry for the artillery and cavalry to manœuvre. It had rained in torrents all night. The detachment of Marshal Grouchy's 35,000 men on Wavre, was made agreeably to the true principles of war; for, had he approached within a league of the army by passing the Dyle, he would not have followed the march of the Prussian army, which had just been joined, after its defeat at Ligny, by General Bulow's 30,000 men, and which, if it had not been followed, might, after that junction, have returned from Gembloux to Quatre-Bras, on the rear of

the French army. 35,000 men were not too many to direct in pursuit, and to prevent the rallying of an army which the day before had consisted of 120,000 men, and still amounted to 70,000, of which number 30,000 were fresh troops. If Marshal Grouchy had executed his orders, and arrived before Wavre on the evening of the 17th, the battle of Mont-Saint-Jean would have been gained by Napoleon on the 18th before three o'clock in the afternoon: if he had even arrived before Wavre at eight in the morning of the 18th, the victory would have been ours; the English army would have been destroyed, repulsed in disorder on Brussels; it could not sustain the shock of 68,000 French for four hours; it could no longer support it after General Bulow's attack on our right was exhausted: the victory was still ours at that time.

Charges of cavalry are equally good at the commencement, middle, and end of a battle; they ought to be executed as often as they can be made on the flanks of the infantry, particularly when the latter is engaged in front. The English general was very right in directing a charge on the flank of the French infantry, because the squadrons of cuirassiers which were to support it had not come up. General

Milhaud did still better in charging this English cavalry with his cuirassiers, and destroying it. All Hannibal's victories were won by his cavalry; had he waited for the end of his battles to cause it to engage, he would never have been able to make use of it, except to cover his retreat. This part shews the most erroneous ideas of war, and the most perfect ignorance of the power of the combined charges of infantry and cavalry, whether for attack or for defence.

The charge of the cavalry at four in the afternoon of the 18th was made a little too early; but being made, it was necessary to support it; accordingly Napoleon, though extremely dissatisfied, gave orders to General Kellermann, who was in the rear on the left, to hasten to support it. At this moment Bulow's corps was menacing the flank and rear of the army. It was important to make no retrograde movement, and to maintain the position which the cavalry had taken, although prematurely; however, it was not the intention of the Emperor that the cavalry of his guard should proceed to the plain; these troops were his reserve. When he perceived that they were following the movement of Kellermann's cuirassiers, behind whom they formed a second line, he sent them orders to halt; but it was too late when

the orders arrived: they were already engaged; and thus, at five o'clock in the evening, the Emperor found himself deprived of his reserve of cavalry—that reserve which, when well employed, had so often gained him the victory. These twelve thousand chosen cavalry, however, performed miracles, they broke all the English lines, cavalry and infantry, and took sixty guns and several stand of colours. The enemy thought the battle lost: terror prevailed at Brussels.

This brave body of horse, not being supported, were compelled to halt, and confine themselves to maintaining the ground they had so intrepidly won. General Bulow's attack occupied the sixth corps, and the greater part of the infantry of the guard. The Emperor was impatient to see it at his disposal, in order to direct it to the plain to decide the victory. He then felt doubly the want of the division of infantry of his guard which he had been obliged to detach into La Vendée, under the command of the intrepid General Brayer. Only four battalions were disposable, and yet it was of importance that the twelve battalions of the guard should engage at the same time. The unexpected appearance of Blucher's first columns on the

extreme right, made the cavalry fall back, and obliged the Emperor to send General Friant to the plain, at the head of the four disposable battalions; the four battalions followed at an interval of ten minutes. The guard overthrew all it met with. The sun had set. The enemy appeared to be forming his rear-guard to support his retreat. Victory escaped us. The fourth division of the first corps, which occupied La Haye, abandoned that village to the Prussians after a feeble resistance. Our line was broken. The Prussian cavalry inundated the field of battle. The disorder became frightful. The night augmented it, and opposed every expedient. Had it been day, and the troops could have seen the Emperor, they would have rallied. The guard effected its retreat in good order. The Emperor, with his staff, long remained in the midst of his squares. Those old grenadiers and chasseurs, who had been the models of the army in so many campaigns, covered themselves with new glory in the fields of Waterloo. General Friant was wounded; Michel Duhesme and Poret de Morvan met a glorious death. Never had the French army fought better than on this day: it performed prodigies of valour. Had not the first and second Prussian corps come up, at

night, we should have gained the victory, and 120,000 English and Prussians would have been defeated by 60,000 French.

History proves that all libels quickly fall into contempt. Let their writers peruse the heaps of abuse that exist at the *Bibliothèque Nationale*, against Henry IV. and Louis XIV, and they will be struck with a humiliating sense of their impotence. Not a vestige of the effects of these works is left.

Note XVI.—Legion of Honour.

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"Napoleon speedily raised his Imperial throne on the ruins of this shapeless republic. This imperious man was doubtless highly pleased with himself, for having in a few years bent the French nation beneath an iron yoke; he did not perceive that he was labouring against his own interest. Thenceforth France afforded him only spiritless soldiers, devoid of energy, poor substitutes for the ardent soldiers of the Revolution, who had been mowed down by continual wars. Number does not supply the place of quality, and his degenerate armies could no longer perform the same prodigies. By degrees the French separated their own interests from that of the despot whom they began to hate. Weary of their servitude, and of seeing themselves the sport of the insatiable ambition of a single man, they no longer entered into the views of a government which had forfeited their attach-

ment. Such was the origin of his reverses; his despotism led to his fall, and to the humiliation of France."

PAGE 421.

"This was the defect of the order of the Legion of Honour in France; it was wished to make it a civil as well as military reward; and from that moment, a decoration which ought only to have been the recompense of brave men who had bled for their country, being granted to singers and actors, lost part of its lustre in the eyes of the troops."

Nothing can more completely prove the truth of these assertions than the battles of Ulm, Austerlitz, Jena, Pultusk, Eylau, Friedland, Tann, Abensberg, Eckmuhl, Essling, Wagram, Raab, the Moskwa, &c.

Hannibal was a *suffes* at Carthage; Scipio, after his triumphs, accepted places in the civil magistracy; Epaminondas was also a popular magistrate.

No comedian ever received the decoration of the Legion of Honour. Are Gretry, Paësiello, Mehul, and Lesueur, our most celebrated composers, to be compared to singers? Must the proscription be extended to David, Gros, Vernet, Renaud, and Robert Lefebre, our most eminent painters; and even to Lagrange, La Place, Berthollet, Monge, Vauquelin, Chaptal, Guyton de Morveau, Jouy, Baour Lormian,

Fontanes, Sismondi, and Guinguené? The French soldier must entertain sentiments highly unworthy of him before a decoration worn by such men can, on that account, lose any part of its value in his eyes. If the Legion of Honour were not the recompense of civil as well as military services, it would cease to be the Legion of Honour. It would be a strange piece of presumption indeed, in the military, to pretend that honours should be paid to them only. Soldiers who knew not how to read or write, were proud of bearing, in recompense for the blood they had shed, the same decoration as was given to distinguished talents in civil life; and, on the other hand, the latter attached a greater value to this reward of their labours, because it was the decoration of the brave. —But then, Crescentini?—It is true that, in a moment of enthusiasm, just after hearing the fine scenes of Romeo and Juliet, the Emperor gave him the cross of the iron crown. Crescentini, however, was of good birth; he belonged to the worthy citizens of Bologna, a city so dear to Napoleon's heart. He thought it would please the Italians; he was mistaken; ridicule attacked the transaction; had it been approved by public opinion, he would have given the cross of the Legion of Ho-

nour to Talma, Saint-Prix, Fleury, Grandmenil, Lais, Gardel, and Elleviou: he refrained from so doing, out of consideration for the weakness and prejudices of the age; and he was in the wrong. The Legion of Honour was the property of every one who was an honour to his country, stood at the head of his profession, and contributed to the national prosperity and glory. Some officers were dissatisfied because the decoration of the Legion of Honour was alike for officers and soldiers. But if ever it cease to be the recompense of the lowest class of the military, and a medal be instituted, through aristocratical feelings, to reward the soldier, or if ever the civil order be deprived of it, it will be the Legion of Honour no longer.

NOTE XVII.—COMPARISON OF THE MARCH OF NAPOLEON, IN 1800, WITH THAT OF HANNIBAL, IN THE YEAR 218 BEFORE THE CHRISTIAN ERA.

PAGE 471.

"The analogy between the expedition of the French and that of the Carthaginians is striking. After the passage of the Rhone by Hannibal, the Roman consul, Publius Scipio, had retired behind the mountains of Liguria, almost into the same position as the Austrian army occupied; the Carthaginian general, instead of seeking to force the passage of the Alps in front, formed the admirable project of cleaing that

formidable barrier sideways, by passing at an unexpected point. He ascended the Rhone, at first as far as Lyons, and afterwards to the vicinity of Seyssell; there he left that river, turned to the right across the mountains, climbed the chain of the Alps by the path of the Little Saint-Bernard, and then debouched, as the French did, in the valley of Aosta. The dangers he encountered from the mountaineers, who surprised him in several defiles; the trouble he had in effecting the passage of his elephants, and in forming a new road in place of the old one which had given way, may be compared to the fatigue and blood which it cost the French to drag their cannon and force the fort of Bard. Scipio hastily left the mountains of Liguria, on the news of Hannibal's passage, as M. de Melas did; but he was more fortunate than the Austrian general, in having passed the Po at Placenza, and advanced on the Ticino, when he encountered the Carthaginian army. The Austrians, on the contrary, had only reached the height of Alexandria, when the two modern armies met at Marengo. The battle which the Austrian general lost in that situation was decisive, and could not have been otherwise; whilst that which the Roman Consul lost on the Ticino only obliged him to repass the Po, without causing him the loss of his communications with Rome, whence he expected his reinforcements. A glance at the map is sufficient to explain this difference of situation, and to shew, at the same time, that Napoleon, whilst he intersected his adversary's line of operations, preserved his own, and had it in his power to retreat, in case of disaster, by the valley of Aosta, on the Alps, and thence on Geneva."

*There is nothing in common between these two operations; to compare them is to have comprehended neither. 1st, Scipio did not

take up a position behind the Maritime Alps, after the passage of the Rhone by the Carthaginians. He sent his troops into Spain, and joined, in person, the army of the Prætor Manlius, at Placenza. 2dly, Hannibal never formed the plan of clearing the Alps sideways, on a point unforeseen by his enemy; he marched straightforward, crossed the Cottian Alps, and descended on Turin; he neither passed at Lyons, Seyssel, nor Saint-Bernard, nor into the valley of Aosta; and this may be depended upon, because the text of Polybius and Titus Livy is positive, and because it was not expedient for him to do so. 3dly, Scipio, fighting on the banks of the Ticino and Trebbia, had Rome in his rear; Melas, when fighting in the plains of Marengo, had France in his rear; these two operations are perfectly dissimilar, and opposed to each other. But as commentators have for ages reasoned absurdly respecting the expedition of Hannibal, let us enter into a few particulars.

PAGE 327.

"Hannibal being arrived within four days' march of the mouth of the Rhone, nearly even with Montelimart *, im-

* It was not at Montelimart, for that place

mediately collected boats and rafts to pass that river. The Gauls were easily dispersed by a body of troops whom he had detached one march in advance to surprise the passage; and his whole army passed successfully. He immediately detached a party of five hundred Numidian horse to gain intelligence of the Roman army, which had in the same manner sent three hundred cavalry to reconnoitre. The two parties met and charged each other: much blood was spilt in the conflict, the result of which was favourable to the Romans. Such was the first engagement between the two nations. Hannibal then pursued his plan of campaign, which was worthy of his genius. Instead of marching against the Roman army, which would easily have escaped from him, after making him lose several days, by embarking in its fleet *, or by shutting itself up in Marseilles, a strong and opulent town devoted to the Romans; instead of leading his troops into the defiles of the Maritime or Cottian Alps, where the Roman army would certainly have arrived before him, to oppose his passage, (doubtless with success, as numbers are useless in those narrow passes, the steep and difficult rocks of which are unassailable), he resolved to ascend the Rhone, and to take the Alps sideways by the country of the Allobroges, and avoided attempting them in front. This

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is forty-two leagues from the mouth of the Rhone; that is to say, seven marches.

* Scipio encamped under his fleet, at the mouth of the Rhone, twenty-four leagues from the Carthaginian camp. He was unassailable there; and Hannibal was not to turn aside from his principal object to run after him.

admirable plan enabled him to transport his army with ease into the fertile valley of the Po, in the midst of the Cisalpine Gauls, his natural allies, with scarcely any enemies to encounter on the way, but the inclemency of the weather and local difficulties. It was necessary to deceive the Roman army by an unexpected march, in order to steal the passage of the Alps. * Thus the Carthaginian general did not waste his time in pursuing the Romans, but took a contrary road, ascended the Rhone, and in four days reached the confluence of the Saone. † Publius having received information of the departure of the Carthaginians, made a feint of pursuing them, like a man of genius aware of the empire of opinion over soldiers; he advanced as far as their camp, which he reached three days after their departure. He then returned with all possible speed to his vessels, and embarked his army." ‡

PAGE 579.

" Hannibal continued to ascend the river for several days; he then quitted the Rhone, and turned to the left, in the moun-

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* Steal it on whom? Scipio's army was in Spain; and that of Manlius at Placenza, on the Po.

† Lyons is sixty leagues from Orange; that is to say, ten days' march. Hannibal did not go to Lyons.

‡ What genius was shewn in losing ten days, and letting the enemy gain time. What Scipio did was extremely simple: he at first hoped to defend the passage of the Rhone; but as he arrived too late, he returned to his fleet.

tains, to climb that chain of the Alps, which, after his famous passage, the ancients named the *Alpes Pennines*, from the appellation Pœni, which they gave the Carthaginians, and which is now called the Little Saint-Bernard. It was, then, an instance of genius in that great man to direct his march in so extraordinary and unexpected a manner, that the Romans could not be aware of his plan for passing the mountains until it was too late to oppose him." *

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" The infantry descended last, and the whole army debouched into the vale of Aosta, and thence into the plain, where it found provisions in abundance. In the mean time Publius Scipio, who had landed, as we have already mentioned, in Liguria, with part of his army, was waiting for Hannibal by the Maritime or Cottian Alps, to dispute the

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* The Cottian Alps extend from the Col d'Argentière to Mount Cenis. How could Scipio have arrived there before Hannibal, who, setting out from Orange, was three days' march in advance of him. Besides, Hannibal was very soon informed, that after proceeding as far as the Durance, the Romans had retrograded towards their fleet. They could not, therefore, cause him any apprehension. This destroys the theory of the Little Saint-Bernard. But it was under Augustus, in the year 21 before Christ, that the Romans first entered the valley of Aosta, and founded that town.

passage with him. What must have been his astonishment on learning the extraordinary news that the Carthaginians were debouching by the North! He immediately hastened, with the troops he had brought, to join the Prætorian army intended to keep the Gauls in check, which army he found at Placenza; passed the Po over the bridge of that column, threw a bridge of rafts over the Ticino, and passed with his army; whilst Hannibal, having left the valley of Aosta, was advancing, on his side, towards the river." *

In the year 218 before the Christian era, Hannibal, after having crossed the Pyrenees, remained some time at Collioure. He crossed the lower part of Languedoc not far from the sea, and passed the Rhone above the mouth of the Durance, and below the mouth of the Ardeche. He passed above the mouth of the Durance, because he did not mean to direct his march upon the Var; and below the mouth of the Ardeche, because there begins that chain of mountains which commands, almost perpendicularly, the right bank of the Rhone, as far as Lyons; whilst the valley on the left bank is several leagues over, stretching to the foot of the Alps. From the mouth of the Rhone to the confluence of the Ardeche it is twenty-

* Polybius and Livy say that Hannibal arrived on Turin, and not on Ivrea.

eight leagues; it is probable that Hannibal passed four leagues lower, at the height of Orange, twenty-four leagues, or four days' march, from the sea: from Orange he directed his course in a right line on Turin. On the day of his march, he reached the confluence of two rivers, either that of the Isere and the Rhone above Valence, or that of the Drac and Isere at Grenoble. To these two points the text of Polybius and Livy is equally applicable; the road from Spain into Italy, which crosses the Rhone at the bridge Saint-Esprit, the Alps at Mont Génèvre, and which the Emperor Napoleon had constructed, is the shortest communication between the two peninsulas; it runs by Grenoble.

The Consul Scipio had governed in Spain, and his colleague Sempronius in Sicily: the Senate, far from expecting Hannibal's invasion, had adopted the project of carrying the war at once both into Africa and Spain. At that period the Romans communicated with Spain only by sea; Liguria, the Alps, and Gaul were unknown to them, and inhabited by nations hostile to them. Scipio embarked his army at Pisa, the port of the Arno; after a voyage of five days he anchored at Marseilles, where, to his great astonishment, he heard

that Hannibal had already passed the Pyrenees, and was approaching the Rhone; he proceeded to the mouth of that river, landed, and yielding to the entreaties of the inhabitants of the banks of the Rhone, who implored his assistance, he flattered himself, with some reason, that, however strong the Carthaginian army might be, he should be able to defend the passage of so considerable a river as the Rhone; he marched, and arrived at the camp of the Carthaginians, but they had quitted it three days before. They were in operation, ascending the river. He had two alternatives; either to follow them, in which case he would soon have come up with their rear-guard,—but he took care to do no such thing, as Hannibal would have returned and defeated him; or to ascend the valley of the Durance, proceed on the Col d'Argentière, there to be joined by the army of the Prætor Manlius, which was at Placenza, to wait for Hannibal, and attack him with his two combined armies at the moment of his descent into the plain. This project would have saved Rome; but it was impracticable: the Alps were inhabited by a race of barbarians, who from all antiquity had been as hostile to the Roman people as the Gauls of Milan and Bologna; they would have cut off the

communications of Scipio's army, if it had proceeded behind the Cottian Alps. There remained, then, only a third course for him to adopt; that of rejoining his fleet at the mouth of the Rhone, and there embarking his army. This being done, was he to retrograde on Nice, land there, gain the Col di Tende, descend into the vale of the Stura, and thus proceed to the debouché of the Cottian Alps? He would have arrived too late, because he could not have reached his destination, at the earliest, before the twenty-sixth day after his departure from Orange, and Hannibal would have been at Turin by the twenty-second day: but this plan was, moreover, as impracticable as that of marching by land from Orange on the Col d'Argentière, by ascending the Durance; for the heights of the Maritime Alps and the Col di Tende were likewise inhabited by nations at enmity with Rome. The Romans entered Gaul, for the first time, fifty-five years after Hannibal; they did not pass the Alps till 104 years after his time: it was in the year 163 before Christ that the Consul Apinius passed the Var to repress the Ligurians, who annoyed the Marseillese colonies of Nice and Antibes. The Romans next entered Gaul, without crossing the Alps, in the year 125 before Christ, when the Consul

Flaccus, invited by the Marseillese, crossed the Var a second time: in the year 124, when the Consul Sextus founded the city of Aix, the first establishment of the Romans in Gaul; until then they had not passed the chain of the Alps: in the year 122, when the Consul Domitius passed the Cottian Alps, and entered the country of the Allobroges; he was called in by the people of Autun, who thenceforth formed alliances with Rome. The people of Dauphiny and Auvergne occupied a camp near Avignon: Domitius defeated them; he had a number of elephants with him, which greatly terrified the Gauls. Finally, it was in the year 118 before Christ that Marcus founded Narbonne.

Despairing of being able to prevent the passage of the Alps, Scipio placed all his hopes of covering Rome, in the barriers of the Sesia, Ticino, and Po. He went in person into Italy, and sent his army, under the command of his brother, in Catalonia, to cut off Hannibal's communications with Spain. On his arrival at Pisa, he caused all the disposable forces of the republic to join him, and effected his junction with the Prætor Manlius at Placenza. He was there extremely well-stationed for stopping the Carthaginians; in case they should march by

the right bank of the Po, he could take up the position of La Stradella, where the great superiority of the African army would have been useless to it; or he might wait for them on the banks of the Trebbia: if they should manœuvre by the left bank of the Po, he could stop them at the Sesia or Ticino, both wide and deep rivers; and finally, he would always have time to defend the passage of the Po; the course he adopted was, therefore, the best in his power.

In the mean time Hannibal, on reaching the confluence of the Rhone and Isere, or Grenoble, terminated a difference which existed between two brothers respecting the supreme magistracy; then marched on for ten days, and arrived, according to the first supposition, near Mount Melian, where he passed the Isere (a distance of thirty-six leagues), and continued his march through a difficult country, and in nine days traversed the space of forty leagues, which divides Mount Melian from the foot of Mount Cenis on the side of Suza: or supposing he set out from Grenoble, he occupied the six days in marching the twenty-eight leagues from that town to Saint-Jean de Maurienne, whence it must have taken him nine days to march the thirty leagues between Saint-Jean de Maurienne and Suza. Twenty-

two days after leaving his camp of the Rhone, he entered Italy, advanced on Turin, which, as it refused to open its gates to him, he took and sacked; thence he marched on Milan, the capital of the Cisalpine people called Insubrians, who were his allies, and crossed the Doria Baltea and the Sesia without meeting an enemy.

As soon as Scipio was informed that Hannibal was marching on the left bank of the Po, he passed the Ticino, to take up a position on the Sesia; he was unable to reach it sufficiently early, was defeated, and could not defend the Po, which the Carthaginians passed above the mouth of the Ticino. Hannibal's progress excited alarm at Rome; the Consul Sempronius hastened from Sicily to the Trebbia, joined Scipio's army, and gave battle to the Carthaginians. He was defeated.

Hannibal's march from Collioure to Turin was perfectly simple; it was that of a traveller; he took the shortest road; the Romans occasioned him no difficulty whatever, and Scipio's army, which was on its route for Spain, made no part of his calculations. Before he left Carthagena, he was secure of the co-operation of the Cisalpine Gauls, who had some influence over the inhabitants of the Alps; historians

even say that the Gauls of Bologna and Milan sent deputies to him, desiring him to expedite his march, and that he received them at his camp on the Rhone. As to the difficulty of the passage of the Alps, it has been exaggerated; in fact there was none; the elephants alone could have caused him any trouble. From the year 600 before the Christian era, that is to say, from 400 years before Hannibal, the Gauls were in the habit of passing the Alps and pouring into Italy. The Milanese, Mantuans, Veronese, and Bolognese, were Gallic colonies.

Note XVIII.—Conclusions.

Text of the inferences in "Considerations on the Art of War."

"From the observations and arguments scattered through the different chapters of this work, the following conclusions, which arise therefrom as corollaries, may be drawn.

"1. Voluntary enlistments were usually insufficient, with regard both to the number and quality of the recruits; it therefore became necessary to have recourse to compulsory methods, to raise a number of troops proportioned to the forces of the principal European powers.

"2. Of these methods, one of the most favourable to the maintenance of a good national army, and least injurious to the interest of society, is that of annually drawing the recruits deemed requisite out of the whole number of young unmarried men, by lot.

"3. The new recruits will be formed and embodied in battalions or cohorts: the strength of these small corps will be determined by the quantity of troops in line which a commander can cause to move and act at his word of command, with uniformity and precision; it may thus be fixed at six or eight hundred men.

Napoleon's Notes.

2. Allowing no privilege or exemption.

3. The front of a battalion in line should be sixty toises in extent, which requires eight hundred men present under arms, including eighty for fourth-rank-men*, drummers, music, and drivers, adding 160 men for the difference between the effective and present

* Serre files.

Inferences in "Considerations of the Art of War."

"4. The multiplicity of these cohorts, which may be looked upon as the elements of the army, and the extent of ground which they occupy upon the field of battle, do not allow the general-in-chief himself to dispose them all, lead them into action, and form them; hence he is obliged to form them into several divisions, the command of which he entrusts to his lieutenants.

"5. The strength of these divisions, which I call legions, is determined by the quantity of cohorts which one general officer can easily attend to, and keep his eye upon in a field of battle: I estimate it at ten cohorts.

"6. The occasions of war require two kinds of infantry; one to support the shock of the enemy by its union, and repel his efforts; the other to reconnoitre and harass him in skirmishing, and pursue him in a close country. The proportion of the first to the second is as three to one.

"7. The occasions of war require two kinds of cavalry; the one to break and crush, by the weight of its masses, troops which are harassed and thrown into disorder by a long battle; the

strength. This gives a complement of 960 men for the strength of the battalion.

4. One brigadier-colonel is requisite to every three or four battalions, for an effective strength of 2820, or 2780 men present under arms, 2400, or 3200.

5. A division is composed of three brigades of nine or twelve battalions of 8640 or 11,100 men; which makes 7200, or 9600 men present under arms.

6. There never was, nor ever can be more than one kind of infantry, because the firelock is the best weapon for war that was ever invented by man.

7. They require four: troopers*, light cavalry, dragoons, and cuirassiers. In an army in Flanders or Germany, the cavalry ought to

* Eclaireurs.

Inferences in "Considerations of the Art of War."

other to scour the country, gain intelligence for the columns, watch the movements of the enemy, lay ambuscades for him, surprise his convoys, and pursue fugitives in the plain. They will bear nearly the same proportion to each other, and form about a sixth of the army.

"8. To perform such difficult functions, the troops of the line ought to march and fight with order and union, and the light troops to march and fight dispersed and singly; whence it follows that their education and exercises ought to be as dissimilar as their duties.

"9. The legion will contain within itself infantry of the line, light infantry, and light cavalry, in order that the corps may combine lightness and velocity with solidity."

"10. The cavalry of the line, which cannot be of much utility except in large masses, and towards the end of an action, will be all joined and in reserve."

"11. The quantity of artillery ought to be in an inverse ratio to the quality of the infantry. The number of guns may be fixed at the rate of

be equal to a fourth of the infantry; on the Pyrenees or Alps to a twentieth; and in Italy or Spain, to a sixth.

8. Order and tactics are necessary for infantry, cavalry, and artillery; for troopers, chasseurs, dragoons, and cuirassiers. Cavalry stand even more in need of order and tactics than infantry; horse soldiers should be taught to fight on foot, and trained to the exercise of the platoon and battalion.

9. If you attach a handful of troopers to each division of infantry, their number must not exceed a twenty-fifth of the infantry, and they must be mounted on horses of four feet six or seven inches, which are not used by the cavalry.

10. The cavalry of the line ought to be in the van and rear-guards, in the wings and in reserve, to support the light cavalry. It ought to be employed in the beginning, middle, and end of a battle, according to circumstances.

11. It is necessary to have as much artillery as the enemy, and to calculate on four pieces to every thousand of infantry and cavalry.

Inferences in "Considerations of the Art of War."

two pieces to every thousand men, in good troops.

"12. Part of this artillery will be given to the legions, to begin the battle, and the remainder will be kept in reserve."

"13. Since great armies cannot march in a single column without running the risk of having the head of the column defeated by the enemy, before the rear, which is often a day's march behind, can come to its aid, it is necessary to form them into several marching columns.

"14. Every marching column proceeding by a different road ought to have its van-guard and flankers to keep on the look-out. This van-guard will be exclusively composed of light troops, in order that it may not engage in a serious action before the arrival of the army."

Napoleon's Notes.

The better the infantry is, the more care ought to be taken of it by supporting it with good batteries.

12. The greater part of the artillery ought to be with the divisions of infantry and cavalry, and a small part only in reserve. A piece ought to be provided with three hundred rounds to fire, exclusive of the box. This is the consumption for two battles.

13. There are cases in which an army ought to march in a single column, and others in which it ought to march in several columns. An army does not usually proceed in a defile twelve feet wide, the roads are from four to six toises in breadth, and allow of marching with two ranks of waggons, and from fifteen to twenty men. It is almost always practicable to march on the right and left of the roads. Armies of 120,000 men have sometimes marched in a single column, and drawn up in line in the course of six hours.

14. In most cases there ought to be a vanguard in which the general-in-chief should be stationed, to direct from thence the movement of his army. There should be in the vanguard both light and heavy cavalry, picked corps of infantry, and a sufficient quantity of

Inferences in "Considerations of the Art of War."

"15. The length of a marching column depends upon the time it may expect to have for deploying into line, previously to being attacked, from the time it receives intelligence of the enemy, through its van-guard. On this principle the length can never exceed two or three leagues; which will comprise about 30,000 men, with the artillery and baggage, on a high road. Thus the strength of a marching column may commonly amount to 30,000 men."

"16. Hence it may be seen that a marching column ought to be formed of several legions; I here form it of four legions, of sixty guns and 3000 cavalry of the line, and I make it a *corps d'armée* under the command of a general-in-chief, who ought to have at command all that is necessary for fighting, as he will march and encamp singly."

Napoleon's Notes.

artillery, that it may be able to manœuvre, keep the enemy in check, give the army time to come up, and the baggage and parks time to file off.

15. These calculations are erroneous.

16. 1st. There should be but one general-in-chief to an army, one lieutenant-general to a *corps d'armée* or wing, one major-general to a division, and one brigadier-colonel to a brigade.

2nd. It is proper that the *corps d'armée* should not all be of equal strength; but that some should consist of four divisions, some of three, and others of two. Five *corps d'armée* of infantry, at least, are requisite in a grand army.

3d. When the infantry of the army does not exceed 60,000 men, it is best to have only

Inferences in "Considerations of the Art of War."

"17. The different *corps d'armée* are commanded by a generalissimo, who directs all their efforts towards the same end, and makes them march so as to afford each other mutual assistance; they ought not to separate to a greater distance than two leagues from each other, if the enemy be in junction."

"18. When the enemy is divided into several corps too far apart to support each other, it is the talent of a generalissimo to join his columns suddenly, by forced marches, against one of those corps, in order to crush it by the weight of superior forces.

"19. The infantry ought to form in line of battle in three ranks, as well against infantry as cavalry."

Napoleon's Notes.

divisons, and lieutenant-generals to command the wings and detachments.

17. The title of generalissimo conveys the idea of the general command of all the troops of a state.

The distances which *corps d'armée* ought to preserve between them in their marches, depend on local and other circumstances, and on the object in view; the ground must either be every where practicable, and then why march on a front of ten or twelve leagues? or it must be practicable only in a certain number of roads or neighbouring ways, and then the local circumstances govern the proceedings.

What is the use of a maxim which can never be put in practice; and which, if attempted to be carried into effect without discernment, would often cause the destruction of the army?

18. This depends on the object in view, the nature of the troops, and local circumstances.

19. That is the natural order.

Inferences in "Considerations of the Art of War."

"20. The most advantageous fire, particularly against cavalry, is the quickest by successive ranks."

"21. A complete order of battle ought to be composed of a first line to fight; of a second line to encourage and support the first, replace it in the action, and protect its retreat or rallying; and finally of a reserve to guard against the unforeseen and tumultuous accidents of the conflict, to succour the lines, protect their flanks and rear, and at the moment of a favourable opportunity to strike a decisive blow at an enfeebled point of the enemy's line.

"22. The cohorts of the first and second line will belong to the same legions. These latter will be placed out of musquet-shot, in order to keep themselves untouched until the moment of engaging: they will be formed in little columns, which will only be deployed when they replace the first in battle, in order to avoid encumbering the passage of the lines."

"23. The reserve, composed of the cavalry of the line, of half the artillery, and of a corps

Napoleon's Notes.

20. The only fire practicable before the enemy, is that at discretion, commencing by the right and left of each company.

21. This is taken from the tactics of the Romans, who had one invariable order of battle; but since the invention of fire-arms, the manner of occupying a position to encamp, or to give battle, has depended on so many different circumstances, that it has varied according to them; there are even several ways of occupying a given position with the same army, according to the military *coup d'œil*, experience, and genius of the general-in-chief: it is his principal business to regulate these matters. In a great number of cases, an army which should take this order of battle would be defeated and put to flight.

22. Were the second line to be placed eighty or a hundred toises from the first, and to remain formed in column during the battle, it would be destroyed by the enemy's batteries faster than the first line, to the assistance of which it would thenceforth be unable to go. All this was applicable to the Greeks and Romans.

23. An army which should thus paralyze half its artillery, and all its heavy cavalry dur-

Inferences in "Considerations of the Art of War."

of chosen infantry, will keep itself in column behind the centre of the lines, out of the reach of cannon shot."

"24. In this order of battle, the light infantry dispersed as tirailleurs in the front and on the flanks, skirmishes to commence the fight; the legionary artillery, in battery by the side of the cohorts of the first line, opens its fire on the enemy; the first line advances and endeavours to seize a favourable position within musquet-shot, to commence its fire of musquetry; the second line marches to the aid of the first, which, as soon as it is broken, or gives ground, it succeeds in the fight; it stops the enemy, whilst the first line rallies, forms again in the rear, and becomes in its turn the second line; an operation which is repeated several times according to the bravery of the troops; at length, the reserve advances its artillery to play upon one of the weakened wings of the enemy. The infantry of the reserve marches briskly in column to attack this wing, whilst the cavalry of the line turns it rapidly, forms perpendicularly to its order of battle, and charges it in flank and rear. Such is the history of the best conducted actions of the present age.

"25. The column is a marching order, and

ing the whole of a battle, would be almost sure to be beaten. Presumption is the never failing attendant of ignorance.

24. This is taken from the Romans; it is not the way in which the moderns fight. Examine the battles of Gustavus-Adolphus, Turenne, the great Condé, Luxembourg, Prince Eugene, and Frederic, you will find nothing like this. But if you wish to know how battles are fought, read and consider the accounts of the hundred and fifty battles of those great captains.

25. The column is an order of battle when

Inferences in "Considerations of the Art of War."

not an order of battle; but it ought only to be taken when the object is to reach the enemy with rapidity rather than to fight; or to force a defile, when the ground does not allow of deploying.

"26. For instance, if intrenchments or a village are to be attacked, it would be madness to engage in an exchange of musquet-shot with an enemy under cover. It is necessary to reach him with rapidity, in order to contend with him on more equal terms with the bayonet; and then the column is the preferable order, as most favourable for marching, and most commodious for penetrating the narrow defiles of the breaches and streets of the village.

"27. But as a battle is composed of an alternate succession of fighting and marching, it follows that the troops ought sometimes to deploy for the convenience of fighting, and sometimes to fall back into column for the purpose of marching. This successive passage from the one order to the other, according to local and momentary circumstances, requires a rapid and experienced *coup d'œil.*

circumstances require it; it is on that account that our tactics shew the method of passing rapidly from extended to deep order. If cavalry be expected, it is necessary to march in columns, at full distance, in order to be able to form the square battalion by companies to the right and left, in line.

26. Therefore the column is not merely a marching order.

27. It is not because a battle is composed of an alternation of engagements and marches, that it is necessary to be in column or in line; but because the circumstances of the attack or defence require the troops to be in line or in column.

Inferences in "Considerations of the Art of War."

"28. The primitive order of battle ought always to yield to and connect itself with the ground, so as to convert all its accidental peculiarities to the advantage of the attack or defence.

"29. Of the accidents of the ground, some will be favourable and others unfavourable; the art of taking up positions consists in seizing the favourable accidents, and strengthening one's line of battle by means thereof; and in leaving the unfavourable accidents in front and on the flanks, that they may weaken the aggressor's order of battle.

"30. We ought to encamp extended in line of battle, to avoid surprises; and not in masses like the Romans; because we cannot, like them, shut ourselves in safety within fortified inclosures.

"31. It would often be expedient to strengthen our positions and camps by field-works, which might be executed in a single night; this would be possible were we to give up making them ball-proof.

"32. By placing batteries out of the redoubts

Napoleon's Notes.

28. This is oracular; and as far as it can be understood, is false: the circumstances of the ground alone ought not to regulate the order of battle, which ought to be governed by the combination of all the circumstances.

29. This observation goes to prove that no invariable order of battle can be prescribed.

30. The art of fixing a camp in a position is merely the art of taking up a line of battle on that position. All the projectile machines must be in play and favourably placed; the position must neither be commanded, outfronted, nor surrounded; and on the contrary ought, as far as possible, to command, outfront, and surround the enemy's position.

31. Field fortifications are never injurious, but always useful, when skilfully planned.

32. The principles of field fortification have

intended to defend them, behind epaulments, within half musquet shot of those redoubts, much labour may be saved, and more real strength and greater facility for the firing of the artillery would be obtained.

"33. But, after all, whatever talents may be exerted in the choice of positions, and in the disposal of the troops, the ultimate object must be to drive the enemy from the ground he occupies, and this can only be done by brave soldiers.

"34. But to have them brave, they must be rendered so; for bravery is not a quality innate in us.

"35. This is neither to be attained by reasoning, by chastisements, nor even by discipline, but by the working of the passions. Our institutions ought, therefore, to tend to inspire

not been carried to perfection: this part of the art of war is susceptible of great improvement. If the guns are not in the redoubts, they will fall into the power of the enemy, on a successful charge of cavalry. The batteries ought to be placed in the most advantageous positions, and advanced as far in front of the lines of infantry and cavalry as can be done without hazarding their loss. They ought to command the country from the whole height of the platform; and they should not be masked either on the right or left, in order that their fire may be turned in every direction.

33. Not only brave, but practised in manœuvres, and expert.

34. Is cowardice then innate? a theological question; at the sound of the trumpet the horse neighs, draws himself up, and paws the ground with ardour.

35. Discipline fixes the troops to their colours; they are not to be rendered brave by harangues, when the firing begins: the old soldiers scarcely listen to them; the young

Inferences in "Considerations of the Art of War."

our troops with passions; after which it will be the general's business to awaken and exalt the passions, by his harangues, at the moment of battle.

"36. The passions which have most influence over the troops of the different nations are, fanaticism, the love of country, honour, ambition, love, and the desire of wealth.

ones forget them on the first discharge of cannon. Not one of the harangues in Livy was ever really delivered by a general to an army, for not one of them has a striking or *impromptu* character. A gesture by a beloved general, esteemed by his troops, is as good as the finest harangue in the world. If declamations and arguments are of any use, it is in the course of the campaign, to remove the effects of insinuations and false reports, to keep up confidence in the camp, and to furnish materials for the conversation of the bivouacs. The printed order of the day is much more effectual than the harangues of the ancients.

When the Emperor Napoleon used to say, as he rode through the ranks amidst the fire, "*Unfurl those colours!* the moment is at length arrived!" his gesture and manner filled the French soldiers with ardour and impatience.

36. The Greeks, in the service of the great king, were not passionately attached to his cause! The Swiss, in the service of France, Spain, and the Italian princes, were not enthusiastic in the cause of their employers! It was not passion that inspired the troops of Frederic the Great, which were in great measure composed of foreigners! A good general, good

Inferences in "Considerations of the Art of War."

"37. In glancing at the grand offensive operations of war, we find that two species of warfare may be carried on; a war of invasion, and a methodical war.

"38. The former kind is successfully employed to conquer the despotic states of Asia, where the enslaved people, indifferent to its masters, takes no part in the defence; but the second only can succeed against republican states, where the patriotism of the citizens opposes obstacles which are incessantly renewed against the progress of conquest.

officers, and a judicious organization; able instructions, good and severe discipline, make good troops, independently of the cause for which they fight. It is, however, true that fanaticism, the love of their country, and the national glory are useful to animate young troops.

37. Every offensive war is a war of invasion; every war conducted according to the rules of the art is a methodical war. Plans of campaign may be infinitely modified, according to circumstances, the genius of the commander, the nature of the troops, and the topography. There are two sorts of plans of campaign, the good and the bad; the good sometimes fail through fortuitous circumstances, and the bad occasionally succeed through the caprice of fortune.

38. Were Russia and Spain republican States? Were the governments of Holland and Switzerland despotic?

The wars of Gengis-Khan, and Tamerlane, were methodical, because they were carried on according to rule; and rational, because their enterprises were proportioned to the strength of their army: the coat of a giant is not that of a pigmy.

Inferences in "Considerations of the Art of War."

"39. In Europe, where the patriotism of the people, who have some share in public affairs, and the system of policy adopted by the sovereigns, incessantly tending to establish an equilibrium of power amongst them, equally oppose rapid conquests, a methodical war alone can obtain permanent and solid success.

"40. This kind of war requires two armies: an active army, to win battles; and an army of reserve, to occupy and preserve the conquered countries, draw reserves from them, support the active army, provide for its subsistence, and recruit it.

"41. The army of reserve ought to choose and prepare a definitive line, which I call base of operations; where the active army, in case of reverses, may recruit, reform, reorganize,

Napoleon's Notes.

39. Every war ought to be methodical, because every war ought to be conducted conformably to the principles and rules of the art, and with an object: it should be carried on with forces proportioned to the obstacles which are foreseen. There are therefore two sorts of offensive war: that which is well understood, and agreeable to the principles of the science; and that which is ill understood, and which violates those principles. Charles XII. was beaten by the Czar, the most despotic of men, because he conducted the war in an ill-considered manner; Tamerlane would have been defeated by Bajazet, if his plan of war had resembled that of the Swedish monarch.

40. There should be only one army, for unity of command is of the first necessity in war: the army must be kept in junction; the greatest possible number of forces must be concentrated on the field of battle, and the favourable opportunity must be seized; for fortune is a female: if you balk her to-day, you must not expect to meet with her again to-morrow.

41. Make offensive war like Alexander, Hannibal, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Prince Eugène, and Frederic: read again and again the history of their eighty-eight campaigns;

Inferences in "Considerations of the Art of War."

recover itself, and stop the enemy, by the aid of artificial and natural obstacles.

"42. It is on this base of operations that the depôts of military stores and provisions necessary for the subsistence of the army ought to be fixed. They will be placed in security against the enterprises of the enemy, by walled inclosures, with bastions in mixed fortification, which can be raised in a short time, and answer, for the moment, the purpose of permanent fortifications.

model yourself upon them; that is the only way to become a great commander, and to attain the secrets of the art: your genius, when thus enlightened, will lead you to reject maxims contrary to the principles of those great men.

42. This was the system of the war of Hanover, from 1758 to 1763. Mixed fortifications of earth, raised in a fortnight or three weeks, would not be secure from a *coup-de-main*. How much time would be requisite for building vaults, to place the magazines of the army out of danger from howitzers and bombs.

After the battles of Thrasymene and Cannæ, the Romans lost their armies, which could not rally; scarce could a small number of fugitives reach Rome, and yet these battles were fought in the midst of their fortresses, only a few days' march from their capital itself. If Hannibal had experienced the same fate, it would have been said that it was because he had advanced to too great a distance from Carthage, from his depôts and fortresses: but when routed at Zama, at the gates of Carthage, he lost his army, as the Romans had lost theirs at Cannæ and Thrasymene. After the battle of Marengo, General Melas lost his army: yet he

Inferences in "Considerations of the Art of War."

"43. These temporary places will be disposed on a definitive line, at the junctions of the principal roads, so as to strengthen the most essential parts, and contribute to the defence.

"44. In taking a rapid view of the grand operations of defensive war, it is easily per-

did not want for fortresses: there were Alessandria, Tortona, Genoa, Turin, Fenestrella, and Coni; he had them in all directions; Mack's army on the Iller was in the midst of its own country, yet it was compelled to lay down arms. And that old army of Frederic, with so many heroes at its head, Brunswicks, Mullendorfs, Russels, Bluchers, &c., when defeated at Jena, could effect no retreat; in the course of a few days 250,000 men laid down their arms; yet they did not want for armies of reserve; they had one on Halle, and one on the Elbe, aided by fortresses; they were in the centre of their country, not far from their capital! Take every possible chance of success, when you think of fighting a grand battle, especially if you have to contend with a great commander; for if you are defeated, were you surrounded by your magazines and near your fortresses, woe to the vanquished!

43. Unless there is shelter for the magazines, the howitzers will destroy every thing. These field-works, unless they are covered by inundations, will require enormous garrisons. It is much better to fortify the towns.

44. Fortresses are useful in defensive as well as in offensive war. Undoubtedly they cannot

Inferences in "Considerations of the Art of War."

ceived that they ought to rest on fortresses. In this species of warfare, fortresses are serviceable in several ways, which it is of primary importance to understand thoroughly, in order to avoid falling into the various errors of neglecting them unseasonably, multiplying them unnecessarily, or disposing them without discrimination.

"45. First, they contain in safety the depôts of arms and stores prepared for the occasions of war, which may be regarded as the military wealth of a nation.

"46. Next, they bar the principal passes of the mountains, and facilitate the passage of rivers by the army, where they form *têtes-de-pont*.

"47. And finally, they afford a refuge and asylum beneath their walls to defensive armies —an asylum which the aggressor is obliged to respect without being able to proceed beyond it; because the theory of war forbids him to leave an army in his rear.

"48. But, in order to enable them to accomplish this latter object, it is indispensable that they should be surrounded by a vast intrenched camp, prepared beforehand, of which they ought to form the redoubt. This intrenched

Napoleon's Notes.

alone supply the place of an army; but they are the only means we have for delaying, encumbering, weakening and harassing a victorious enemy.

47. According to circumstances.

48. This system of fortification seems to have been laid down by an officer of hussars.

Inferences in "Considerations of the Art of War."

camp will consist of four small forts disposed in a square about them, at two or three thousand toises distance from each other.

"49. It is, however, useless, and even disadvantageous, to multiply fortresses on a frontier to such an extent as to weaken the active forces by detaching the garrisons necessary for preserving them. Instead of accumulating them on the frontiers, it is preferable to disperse them through the provinces of an extensive state, in order to avoid being deprived of their depôts and their aid, whenever fortune may remove the theatre of war into the interior.

"50. A defensive army, instead of opposing the march of the assailant, front to front, ought to place itself on his flanks, ready to cut his line of operations, if he leave it in his rear to penetrate into the interior; or to take refuge in the intrenched camp of the nearest fortress, if he march towards it. This manœuvre produces the failure of the enemy's enterprise, or obliges him to submit to the procrastinations of a war of sieges.

Napoleon's Notes.

49. The garrisons of fortified places ought to be drawn from the population, and not from the active army; provincial regiments of militia were intended for this service; it is the noblest prerogative of the national guard. Vauban's system may be defective; but it is preferable to that which is here proposed. It is better to centralize, unite, and draw together our forces, guns, and engines of war, than to disperse them.

50. Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Prince Eugene, or Frederic the Great, would have been much perplexed to make up their minds on this question, a problem of transcendental geometry, which admits of a great number of solutions. None but a novice can think it simple and easy. Euler, Lagrange, or Laplace, would have spent many nights upon it before they could have brought it to an equation, and freed it from all unknown quantities.

FORTY-FOUR NOTES

ON THE WORK ENTITLED,

MANUSCRIPT TRANSMITTED FROM ST. HELENA BY AN UNKNOWN CHANNEL.

Printed at London. John Murray, 1817.

THIS pamphlet of 151 pages has been translated into all languages, and read throughout Europe; many persons believe it to be from the pen of Napoleon himself; yet nothing can be more false. Who, then, is its author? The English journals have named Madame de Staël: but that is improbable; she could not have failed to impress it with a character not to be mistaken. This book is the work of a counsellor of state, who was in the ordinary service in the years 1800, 1801, 1802, and 1803, but who was not in France in 1806 and 1807, and who has paid particular attention to the affairs of Spain. He is not a military man; he never was present at a battle; and he has the most erroneous *ideas* respecting war.

Note I.

Page 4.

"I obtained a lieutenancy at the commencement of the Revolution. I never received any title with more pleasure than that."

Every one knows that Napoleon entered as a second lieutenant in the artillery regiment of La Fere, and that he joined his regiment at Valence, in Dauphiny, in October 1785, four years before the commencement of the Revolution.

Note II.

Page 5.

"I was employed in the army of the Alps."

Napoleon never was employed in the army of the Alps; he never was on Mount Genevre.

Note III.

Page 7.

"Because it procured me the rank of captain."

Napoleon was made a captain of artillery in 1789, four years before the commencement of the war. He then quitted the regiment of La

Fere, No. 1, and entered that of Grenoble, No. 4.

NOTE IV.

PAGE 9.

"I was wholly occupied in examining the position of the enemy and our own. I compared their moral means with ours. I saw that these were all on our side, and that they possessed none. Their expedition was a wretched scheme, (Toulon,) of which they ought to have foreseen the catastrophe; and he must be weak, indeed, who can foresee his own total defeat."

The taking of Toulon was not a wretched scheme; to take thirty ships of war, the second arsenal of the Republic, with all its well-stored magazines, and the strongest fortified place in Provence, cannot be called a wretched scheme.

At the end of August 1793, when the allied troops entered Toulon, Lyons had displayed the white flag; the civil war in Languedoc and Provence was but half extinguished. The victorious Spanish army had passed the Pyrenees, and poured into Rousillon; the Piedmontese army had cleared the Alps; it was at the gates of Chambery and Antibes. The Allies were not fully sensible of the importance of the conquest they had made. If 6000 Sar-

dinians, 12,000 Neapolitans, 6000 Spaniards, and 6000 English, had joined the 12,000 federates in Toulon, this army of 40,000 might have reached Lyons, connecting itself, on its right, with the Piedmontese, and on its left, with the Spanish army.

Napoleon, then twenty-four years of age, was chief of a battalion of artillery; the Committee of Public Safety selected him to be second in command of the battering train; he arrived at the beginning of September. On the 15th of October, a council of war was summoned at Ollioules, at which the conventional Gasparin presided; a memorial was read, which had been approved by the committee of fortifications, on the conduct of the siege of Toulon. The celebrated D'Arçon had drawn it up. Napoleon opposed its adoption, and proposed a more simple plan; he said that a battery of sixty guns placed at the extremities of the promontories of Eguillette and Balagnier, would throw howitzers and bombs on every point of the road and roadstead, which would oblige the English and Spanish squadrons to evacuate them and stand out to sea; that Toulon would then be blockaded both by land and sea; and that the enemy would undoubtedly evacuate it rather than leave a garrison, which might,

at the utmost, defend itself there for thirty days, after which it would be obliged, in order to obtain an honourable capitulation, to relinquish all the advantages it might derive from a voluntary evacuation; but that the capes of Eguillette and Balagnier were commanded by the heights of Caire, of which it would be necessary to gain possession in the first instance; that a month before the enemy fixed themselves in that position, he had proposed to the general-in-chief to enable him to enter Toulon in a few days, by occupying those heights with 3000 men, in order, under their protection, to establish batteries for firing red hot shot at the extremities of the two capes; that the general had thought proper to send thither only 400 men, under the command of General Laborde; and that forty-eight hours afterwards the English had landed 4000 men, dislodged General Laborde, taken possession of the heights of Caire, as far as the outlets of the village of Seine; and that they had now constructed there fort Murgrave, armed with forty pieces of cannon in battery; that it would be necessary to establish strong batteries to batter the fort, and then carry it by assault; and that in seventy-two hours after, Toulon would be taken. This scheme was adopted.

Napoleon's predictions were exactly fulfilled. Such is the history of this event, which so greatly astonished Europe, and has never been well understood.

NOTE V.

PAGE 10.

"But battles are not to be gained by experience alone. I persisted; I explained my plan to Barras: he had been a seaman; those brave men understand nothing of war, but they possess intrepidity. Barras approved of it, because he wished to bring matters to a conclusion. Besides, the Convention did not hold him responsible for the legs and arms, but for the success."

Napoleon, who was a chief of battalion of artillery, and second in command in that branch of the service at the siege of Toulon, had nothing whatever to do with Barras, who, at that period, was on a mission to Marseilles and Nice. The representative of the people who first distinguished him, and supported, by his authority, the plans which produced the fall of Toulon, was Gasparin, deputy for Orange, a very warm conventional, and formerly a captain of dragoons, an enlightened and well-educated man. It was this deputy who guessed the military talents of the commandant of artil-

lery. Napoleon formed no connexion with Barras until the 13th of Vendemiaire.

NOTE VI.

PAGE 11.

"Being now a general, but without employment, I went to Paris, because that was the only place to obtain it. I attached myself to Barras, because I knew no other person."

Napoleon was never unemployed. After the siege of Toulon he was appointed general commandant-in-chief of the artillery of the army of Italy, and joined that army which was commanded by the brave veteran General Dumerbion. He laid down the plan which caused Saorgio, the Col di Tende, Oneglia, and the sources of the Tanaro, to fall into the power of France. In October of the same year, he directed the army in its movement on the Bormida, at the action of Dego, and at the taking of Savona. In February 1795, he commanded the artillery of the naval expedition prepared at Toulon, destined at first for Corsica, and afterwards for Rome. He was of opinion that the squadron ought at first to issue from the port without the convoy, and drive off the English Mediterranean squadron; this plan

was adopted, and gave rise to the naval action of Noli, where the *Ca ira* was taken. The French squadron returned, and the expedition was countermanded. The same year he appeased an insurrection at the arsenal, by his influence over the gunners of the land and sea services, and saved the lives of the representatives Mariette and Chambon. In May 1795, he was, on the report of Aubry, placed on the list as a general of infantry to serve in the army of La Vendée until there should be vacancies in the artillery. He went to Paris, and refused to serve in the army of La Vendée. In the mean time, Kellermann having been defeated on the coast of Genoa, and the army of Italy forced to retreat, Napoleon was required by the Committee of Public Safety, then composed of Sieyes, Le-Tourneur, and Pontécoulant, to draw up instructions for that army. A short time afterwards he obtained, through the affair of the 13th of Vendemiaire, the chief command of the army of the interior at Paris, which he held until the month of March 1796.

Note VII.

Page 12.

"To guard the hall of the Manège, we had but a handful of men, and two four-pounders. An unlucky column of sec-

tionaries attacked us. I fired my guns, the sectionaries ran away; I had them pursued, they got on the steps of Saint-Roche's church. The street was so narrow that only one piece could be brought up. It fired on this crowd, which dispersed, leaving a few killed; the affair was over in ten minutes."

On the 13th of Vendemiaire, the Convention was defended by 6000 men, troops of the line, and thirty pieces of cannon. It did not sit at the Manège, but at the Tuileries, in the theatre there.

Note VIII.

Page 15.

"The command of the army of Italy was a disgrace, because that army had received no destination. I thought of putting it in motion to attack Austria on the point where she thought herself most secure, that is to say, Italy."

Napoleon was called to the chief command of the army of Italy by the wishes of the officers and soldiers who had gathered laurels in executing his plans at Toulon in 1793, and in the county of Nice, and on the coast of Genoa, in 1794 and 1795. As it has already been said, this army was costing considerable sums, and the treasury was empty. A strange disgrace! the chief command of a frontier and of a grand army!

Note IX.

"This expedition was calculated to give a grand idea of the power of France, to draw attention to its leader, and to astonish Europe by its boldness. These motives were more than sufficient for undertaking it, but I had not then the slightest inclination to dethrone the Grand Turk, or to become a Pacha."

There were three objects in the expedition to Egypt: 1st, to establish a French colony on the Nile, which would prosper without slaves, and serve France instead of the republic of Saint-Domingo, and of all the sugar islands. 2dly, To open a market for our manufactures in Africa, Arabia, and Syria, and to supply our commerce with all the productions of those vast countries. 3dly, Setting out from Egypt, as from a place of arms, to lead an army of 60,000 men to the Indus; to excite the Mahrattas and oppressed people of those extensive regions to insurrection: 60,000 men, half Europeans and half recruits from the burning climates of the equator and tropics, carried by 10,000 horses and 50,000 camels, having with them provisions for fifty or sixty days, water for five or six days, and a train of artillery of a hundred and fifty field-pieces, with double

supplies of ammunition, would have reached the Indus in four months. Since the invention of shipping, the ocean has ceased to be an obstacle; and the desert is no longer an impediment to an army possessed of camels and dromedaries in abundance.

The first two objects were fulfilled, and notwithstanding the loss of Admiral Brueys's squadron at Alexandria, the intrigue by which Kleber was induced to sign the Convention of El-Arisch, the landing of from 30 to 35,000 English commanded by Abercrombie at Aboukir and Cosseir, the third object would have been attained; a French army would have reached the Indus in the winter of 1801-1802, had not the command of the army devolved, in consequence of the murder of Kleber, on a man who, although abounding in courage, talents for business, and good-will, was of a disposition wholly unfit for any military command.

The Koran ordains that idolaters shall be exterminated or subjected to tribute; it does not allow of obedience and submission to an infidel power; in which it is contrary to the spirit of our religion: "*Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's,*" said Jesus Christ; "*my king-*

dom is not of this world; obey the powers that be." In the 10th, 11th, and 12th centuries, the Christians reigned in Syria; but religion was the object of the war; it was a war of extermination, and cost Europe several millions of men.

If a similar spirit had animated the Egyptians in 1798, it would have been impossible to sustain such a struggle with 25 or 30,000 Frenchmen, who were not heated with fanaticism of any kind, and were already disgusted with the country. After taking Alexandria and Cairo, and defeating the Mamelukes at the pyramids, the question of conquest was still undecided, unless the ulmas and all the ministers of the Musulman religion could be conciliated. Ever since the Revolution, the French army had exercised no worship; even in Italy it never attended church. Advantage was taken of this circumstance: the army was presented to the Musulmans as an army of converts, disposed to embrace Mahometanism. The Coptic, Greek, Latin, and Syrian Christians were numerous; they wished to avail themselves of the presence of the French army to elude the restrictions imposed on their worship. The general-in-chief opposed this proceeding, and took care to keep religious affairs

on the footing on which he found them. Every morning at sun-rise, the sheiks of the Grand Mosque of Gemil and Azar (a sort of Sorbonne) used to come to his levee; he caused all possible respectful attentions to be shewn them; he discoursed with them at length on the various circumstances of the prophet's life, and on the chapters of the Koran. It was after his return from Salhieh that he proposed to them to publish a fetam, by which they should order the people to take an oath of obedience to the general-in-chief. This proposal startled them, and perplexed them much; after some hesitation, Sheik Cherkaoui, a respectable old man, replied: "Why should not you and your whole army become Musulmans? In that case a hundred thousand men would flock to your standard; and when they were disciplined in your manner, you would re-establish the Arabian nation, and subdue the East." He objected the necessity of circumcision, and the prohibition of wine, a beverage indispensable to the French soldier. After some discussions on this point, it was agreed that the grand sheiks of Gemil and Azar should endeavour to find out some way of removing these two obstacles. The disputes on the subject were animated; they lasted three weeks; but the

report which was spread throughout Egypt, that the grand sheiks were engaged in making the French army Mahometans, filled all the faithful with joy. The French already perceived the amelioration of public spirit; they were no longer looked upon as idolators. When the ulmas were agreed, the four muftis published a fetam, by which they declared that circumcision, being only a perfection, was not indispensable to being a Musulman: but that in that case Paradise must not be expected in the other world. Half the difficulty was thus removed; and it was easy to make the muftis comprehend that the second decision was not reasonable. This became the subject of six weeks' additional debates. At length they declared that it was possible to be a Musulman and drink wine, provided the fifth of one's income, instead of the tenth, were employed in acts of benevolence. The general-in-chief then had a plan drawn for a mosque larger than that of Gemil and Azar; he declared that he intended to have it built, by way of a monument, to commemorate the period of the conversion of his army; but in fact, he only wished to gain time. The fetam of obedience was issued by the sheiks, and Napoleon was declared a friend of the prophet, and under his

special protection. It was generally reported, that before the end of a year, the whole French army would wear the turban. This was the line of conduct which Napoleon constantly endeavoured to observe, reconciling his determination to remain in the religion in which he was born, with the occasions of his policy and ambition. During the whole stay of the army in Egypt, General Menou was the only person who became a Musulman, which was useful, and had a good effect. When the French left that country, only five or six hundred men remained behind, who enlisted with the Mamelukes, and embraced the Mahometan religion.

Note X.

Page 22.

"On my passage, I was obliged to destroy the system of those Maltese gentry, because it was serviceable only to the English. I was apprehensive that some leaven of ancient glory might induce these knights to defend themselves, and delay me; fortunately they surrendered more shamefully than I had flattered myself they would."

Malta could not withstand a bombardment of twenty-four hours; the place certainly possessed immense physical means of resistance, but no moral strength whatever. The

knights did nothing shameful; nobody is obliged to perform impossibilities.

NOTE XI.

PAGE 23.

"On returning into Egypt, I received some journals by way of Tunis. By these I was informed of the deplorable state of France, the degradation of the Directory, and the success of the coalition."

After the battle of Aboukir, on the 3d of August, 1799, the English commodore sent to Alexandria the English papers, and the French Gazette of Frankfort of the months of April, May, and June, which communicated the news of the reverses sustained by the armies of the Rhine and of Italy. The commencement of the war of the second coalition had been heard of at the camp of Saint-Jean d'Acre. Besides, it was not by way of Tunis that news from France reached Egypt.

NOTE XII.

PAGE 24.

"Any general was sufficient to sign a capitulation which circumstances rendered inevitable; and I departed without any other intention than to place myself at the head of the armies, to restore victory to our arms."

Napoleon returned to France, 1st. Because his instructions authorized him to do so; he had *carte-blanche* in all respects; 2dly. Because his presence was necessary to the Republic; 3dly. Because the army of the East, which was victorious and numerous, could not, for a long time, have any enemy to contend with, and because the first object of the expedition was accomplished; the second could not be attained so long as the frontiers of the Republic should be menaced, and anarchy should prevail in its interior. The army of the East was victorious over two Turkish armies, which had been opposed against it during the campaign; that of Syria, defeated at El-Arisch, Gaza, Jaffa, Acre, and Mount Tabor, and which had lost its park of forty field-pieces, with all its magazines; and that of Rhodes, defeated at Saint-Jean d'Acre and Aboukir, where it had lost its train of thirty-four field-pieces, and its general-in-chief, the vizier with three tails, Mustapha Pacha. The army of the East was numerous; it comprised 25,000 fighting men, of whom 3500 were cavalry; it had a hundred field-pieces of horse artillery, and 1400 other pieces of artillery of all calibres, well supplied. It has been said that Napoleon left his army in distress, without artillery, clothing, or bread,

and reduced to 8000 effective men. These false reports deceived the English ministry: on the 17th of December, 1799, that Government determined to break the capitulation of El-Arisch, and ordered its admiral in the Mediterranean to suffer no capitulation to be carried into execution, which should allow the army of the East to return to France; but to stop the ships carrying the troops, and bring them to England. Kleber then comprehended his situation; he shook off the yoke of intrigue, and became himself again, turned on the Ottoman army, and defeated it at Heliopolis. After such a criminal violation of the law of nations, the Cabinet of Saint-James's perceived its error, and sent into Egypt 34,000 English, under the command of Abercrombie, who, joining 26,000 Turks under the grand-vizier and the capitain-pacha, succeeded in making themselves masters of that important colony in September 1801, twenty-seven months after the departure of Napoleon; and not until after a very brisk campaign of six months, which would have ended in the overthrow of the English, if Kleber had not been assassinated, and if Menou, than whom a less military man never commanded, had not been at the head of the army. But after all, this campaign of 1801

cost the English government several millions sterling, 10,000 picked soldiers, and the commander-in-chief of its army. General Belliard obtained at Cairo, on the 27th of June, 1801, and General Menou at Alexandria, on the 2nd of September in that year, the same capitulation which intriguing persons had made Kleber sign, at El-Arisch, twenty months before, on the 24th of January, 1800; that is to say, that the French army should be carried to France at the expense of the English, with its arms, cannon, baggage, and colours, and without being made prisoners of war. The reports of its state on arriving at the lazarettos of Marseilles and Toulon, prove that it consisted of 24,000 French; its losses in 1800 and 1801 had amounted to 4000 men. When, therefore, Napoleon left the command to Kleber, it must have been 28,000 men, of whom 25,000 were in a condition to take the field. It is notorious, that when he left Egypt in the month of August 1799, he thought that country for ever secured to France, and hoped to be one day able to realize the second object of the expedition. As to the ideas he then entertained on the affairs of France, he communicated them to Menou, who has often repeated them; he projected the revolution of the 18th of Brumaire.

NOTE XIII.

PAGE 30.

"Such was my plan, but I had neither soldiers, cannon, nor musquets."

How! neither soldiers, cannon, nor musquets! Three months after the 18th of Brumaire, Napoleon marched 160,000 men into Germany, the finest army which France ever had, and an army of reserve into the plains of Marengo! Is it imagined that all the men in these armies were recruits? If this were true, a standing army might be dispensed with; the national guard would be more than sufficient. Brune's victories rendered the army of Holland disposable; the pacification of La Vendée, the respect and popularity which the government enjoyed, and the love of France by which it was surrounded, placed at its disposal the army of the West, and all the battalions, which the directory maintained in the interior to keep up its authority, and overawe the various parties: all these troops were united; they were better managed and paid, and the cavalry was remounted; the levies of conscripts, in these three months, amounted only to 80,000 men. The First Consul did several excellent things, he gave a judicious direction to every

thing; but he performed no miracles; the heroes of Hohenlinden and Marengo were not recruits, but good old soldiers. Of the army of reserve, a third consisted of conscripts; and it contained a great number of veterans who had not served in the previous campaign, and who decided the victory in the fields of Montebello and Marengo.

NOTE XIV.

PAGE 31.

"We were all young at that time, both soldiers and generals. We had our fortune to make."

At the time of the passage of the Saint-Bernard, in May and June 1800, Napoleon had gained twenty pitched battles, conquered Italy, dictated peace to the King of Sardinia, the King of Naples, the Pope, and the Emperor of Germany, within twenty leagues of Vienna; negotiated at Radstadt with Count Cobentzel for, and obtained the surrender of, the fortress of Mentz to France; created several republics; raised two hundred millions in contributions, which he employed in the subsistence, clothing, and maintenance of his army for two years, and in paying the army of the Rhine, and the squadrons of Toulon and Brest: he had en-

riched the national museum with four hundred masterpieces of the arts of ancient Greece, and the age of the Medicis; conquered Egypt, and established the French sway there upon solid foundations, having overcome what, in Volney's opinion, was the greatest difficulty, by conciliating the principles of the Koran and Mahometan religion with the presence of an army from the West: he had been for six months at the head of the Republic, which elevation he owed to the spontaneous choice of three millions of citizens; he had restored the finances, appeased factions, and eradicated the war in La Vendée. How, then, can it be said that he had his fortune to make, when he had secured so many honourable pages in history!

NOTE XV.

"Dessaix's division came up; the whole line rallied; Dessaix formed his column of attack, and carried the village of Marengo, on which the centre of the enemy rested."

Dessaix formed his column in front of Saint-Giuliano; he was killed a league and a half from the village of Marengo.

NOTE XVI.

PAGE 33.

"The factions seemed to be struck dumb; so much glory stifled them."

Between the battle of Marengo and the affair of the infernal machine, that is to say, during the last six months of 1800, the factions were more active than ever. Napoleon had certainly nothing to fear from the chiefs of the Revolution, or from those of La Vendée, but the Brutus-Septembrizers, and Chouans, talked of nothing but assassinating him.

NOTE XVII.

PAGE 42.

"In the interval which the truce of Amiens left me, I hazarded an imprudent expedition, for which I have been justly censured; it was perfectly futile.

"I endeavoured to retake Saint-Domingo. I had good reasons for making the attempt.

"The hatred of the Allies was too violent against France to allow her to remain inactive during the peace. It was necessary to furnish food for the curiosity of the idle, and to keep the army constantly in motion, to prevent its going to sleep. I was also glad of an opportunity of trying the seamen."

The party of the colonists was very powerful in Paris; public opinion required the possession of Saint-Domingo; on the other hand, the First Consul was not sorry to dissipate the apprehensions of the English, by sending 15,000 men to Saint-Domingo; this sufficiently proved his confidence in the con-

tinuance of the peace, and that a maritime war was far from his intention: these 15,000 men would have succeeded, had it not been for the yellow fever. If Toussaint, Dessalines, and Christophe, had chosen to submit, they would have secured their liberty, rank, and fortune, as well as those of the people of their colour; the freedom of the blacks would have been sincerely confirmed.

NOTE XVIII.

PAGE 46.

"There happened, unfortunately, at this decisive moment, one of those accidents which overturn the best resolutions. The police discovered some petty royalist plots, the focus of which was beyond the Rhine. An august individual was implicated in them. All the circumstances of this event concurred, to an incredible degree, with those which induced me to attempt a grand stroke of policy. The death of the Duke d'Enghien would decide the question which agitated France. It would irrevocably decide my own course. I gave the order."

The Duke d'Enghien suffered because he was one of the principal actors in the conspiracy of Georges, Pichegru, and Moreau.

Pichegru was arrested on the 28th of February, Georges on the 9th of March, and the Duke d'Enghien on the 18th of March, 1804.

In March 1803, the speech from the throne

to the British parliament announced the commencement of a new war, and the rupture of the peace of Amiens. The French government manifested an intention to carry the war into England. During 1803 and 1804, it covered the cliffs of Boulogne, Dunkirk, and Ostend, with camps; it fitted out formidable squadrons at Brest, Rochefort, and Toulon; it put praams, sloops, gun-boats, great and small pinnaces, on the stocks throughout France; it employed thousands of hands in digging to form ports on the Channel for its numerous flotillas. England, on her side, promptly took up arms. Pitt abandoned the peaceful labours of the exchequer, put on regimentals, and dreamed only of warlike engines, battalions, forts, and batteries; the good and venerable George III. left his royal mansions, and daily reviewed troops; camps were pitched on the downs of Kent and Sussex; the two armies were in sight of each other, and nothing but the Straits divided them.

England, however, omitted nothing that was adapted to stir up the powers of the Continent; but Austria, Russia, Prussia, and Spain, were allies or friends of France, which country commanded all Europe; the attempts made to rekindle the war in La Vendée were equally un-

successful. The Concordat had rallied the clergy round Napoleon, and the disposition of the inhabitants of that province was much improved; they witnessed with gratitude the progress of his administration; the great public works he had ordered occupied thousands of hands; a canal was forming to join the Vilaine and the Rence, which would enable the French coasters to come from the coast of Poitou to that of Normandy without doubling the cape of Ushant; a new town was rising in the midst of the department of La Vendée, and eight new grand roads were to be made in the West; lastly, considerable sums were distributed to the Vendeans, in the form of premiums for rebuilding their houses, churches, and chapels, burnt or destroyed by the orders of the Committee of Public Safety.

The Cabinet of Saint-James's had often been led into error by the royalists, who, self-deceived, had involved it in disastrous expeditions; but it formed a grand idea of the power and means of the jacobins; persuaded itself that a great number of them were discontented, and disposed to join their efforts to those of the royalists; that they would be seconded by dissatisfied generals; and that, by combining the strength of opposite parties, united by a

passion common to them all, a faction might be formed sufficiently powerful to operate an effectual diversion.

The First Consul had, for four years, united the various parties which divided France; the list of emigrants had been closed; all who were willing to return to their country had first had their names erased from it, and afterwards received an amnesty; all their existing property, which had not been sold, had been restored to them, except woods, the revenue of which, however, the law secured to them. None now remained on the list except persons attached to the princes, or declared enemies of the Revolution, who had not chosen to profit by the amnesty; but thousands of emigrants had returned, and were subjected to no conditions but an oath of obedience and fidelity to the Republic. Thus the First Consul had the sweetest consolation a man can enjoy, that of reuniting more than thirty thousand families, and restoring to their country all that remained of the descendants of the men who had most contributed to the glory of France at different periods; even those who continued emigrants often obtained passports to visit their families. The altars were again raised up; the deported and exiled priests were replaced

over dioceses and parishes, and paid by the Republic. These various laws had produced a great amelioration in public affairs, but yet they had the inevitable disadvantage of emboldening, by this system of extreme indulgence, the enemies of the consular government, the royalist party, and the hopes of foreigners.

Between 1803 and 1804, there had been five conspiracies; all the emigrants in the pay of England had received orders to assemble at Brisgaw, and in the duchy of Baden. Mussey, an English agent, the medium of correspondence with the ministers, Drake and Spencer Smith, resided at Offemburg, and profusely supplied the money necessary for all these plots.

The Duke d'Enghien, a young prince of the most distinguished bravery, resided within four leagues of the frontier of France. * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Note XIX.

Page 48.

"For want of better employment, I brought forward the scheme of an invasion of England. I never expected to realize it, for it would have failed; not that the landing would have been impracticable, but because there would have been no possibility of retreat."

The invasion of England was always regarded as practicable; and, if once the descent

had been effected, London must infallibly have been taken. The French being in possession of that capital, a very powerful party would have arisen against the oligarchy. Did Hannibal look behind him when he passed the Alps? or Cæsar, when he landed in Epirus or Africa? London is situated only a few marches from Calais; and the English army, scattered for the purpose of defending the coasts, could not have joined in time to have covered that capital after once the descent had been actually made. This invasion could not, undoubtedly, have been effected by a *corps d'armée*, but it would certainly have succeeded with 160,000 men, if they could have presented themselves before London five days after their landing. The flotillas were the only means of landing these 160,000 men in a few hours, and of occupying all the shallows. The passage would have been effected under the protection of a squadron assembled at Martinique, and coming thence full sail to Boulogne; if the plan of this rendezvous should fail one year, it might succeed another time. Fifty ships, sailing from Toulon, Brest, Rochefort, L'Orient, and Cadiz, assembled at Martinique, would have arrived before Boulogne and secured the landing in England, whilst the English squadrons

would have been traversing the seas to cover the Indies.

NOTE XX.

PAGE 52.

"Pichegru was found strangled in his bed. People did not fail to say that it was done by my orders. I was a total stranger to this event. I do not even know what can be imagined to have been my reason for withdrawing this criminal from his trial; he was of no more consequence than the others, and I had a tribunal to try him, and soldiers to shoot him. I never did any thing useless in my life."

Napoleon never committed crimes. What crime could have been more advantageous to him than the murder of the Count de Lille, and the Count d'Artois. It was proposed to him several times; for instance, by * * * and * *. It would not have cost two millions. He rejected it with contempt and indignation. No attempt was ever made, under his reign, against the lives of these two princes.

When the Spaniards were in arms in the name of Ferdinand, that prince and his brother Don Carlos, the only heirs to the throne of Spain, were at Valençay, at the extremity of Berry: their death would have settled the affairs of Spain; it would have been useful, nay, it was necessary. Napoleon was advised to it by * * * *, but it was unjust and crimi-

nal. Did Ferdinand and Don Carlos die in France?

Ten other instances might be quoted: but these two are sufficient, because they are the most striking. Napoleon's hands, accustomed to gain victories by the sword, were never stained with guilt, even under the empty pretext of the public good; a dreadful principle which has, in all ages, been the maxim of weak governments; but which the religion, honour, and civilization of Europe disclaim.

Napoleon reached the summit of human greatness by direct paths, without having ever committed an action which morality could reprobate. In that respect his elevation is unparalleled in history. In order to reign, David destroyed the house of Saul, his benefactor; Cæsar kindled a civil war, and overthrew the government of his country; Cromwell caused his master to perish on the scaffold: Napoleon was a stranger to all the crimes of the Revolution. When his political career began, the throne had crumbled to dust; the virtuous Louis XVI. had been put to death; France was torn by contending factions. It was by the conquest of Italy, by the peace of Campo-Formio, which secured the greatness and independence of the country, that Napoleon

began his career; and in 1800, when he attained the supreme power, it was by dethroning anarchy. His throne was raised by the unanimous wishes of the French people.

Ferdinand VII. resided at Valençay, in the château of Prince Talleyrand, one of the finest situations in France, in the midst of an extensive forest; his brother and uncle were with him; there was no guard set over him; he had all his officers and servants, and received what visits he pleased; he was at liberty to make excursions of several leagues, either for the purpose of hunting, or in his carriage. Besides the 72,000 francs which the French treasury annually paid as the rent of Valençay, Ferdinand received for his maintenance 1,500,000 francs per annum. He wrote every month to Napoleon, who answered his letters. On the 15th of August, and on the Empress's birthday, he never failed to illuminate the château and park of Valençay, and to distribute alms; he several times asked Napoleon's leave to go to Paris, which was successively adjourned; he solicited him to adopt him as his son, and to marry him to a French princess. He had the enjoyment of a very fine library, often received visits from the gentlemen of the neighbourhood, and from the merchants

of Paris, who were eager to carry novelties to him. He long had a theatre, and a company of comedians; but at length his confessors inspired him with scruples, and he dismissed the troop.

King Charles IV. his father, and the Queen his mother, were, for a considerable time, at the palace of Compiegne; thence they went to Marseilles, and afterwards to Rome, where they resided in the palace of the Princess Borghese. They enjoyed an allowance of three millions. The Queen of Etruria, Maria Louisa, sister to Ferdinand, was one of those who had the greatest share in the Spanish Revolution; her correspondence with Murat, then commanding in Spain, is very curious. She was of her mother's party, and took a very active part in the events of Madrid. She resided a long time at Nice, where she opened a secret correspondence with the English commanders in the Mediterranean. Napoleon, being informed that she was anxious to leave France, caused it to be signified to her, that he should be very glad if she would retire to England, Sicily, or any other country in Europe. In fact, this princess was of no importance, and her departure would have saved the treasury 500,000 francs.

Ferdinand always shewed the greatest aversion to the Cortes. The Spaniards will long regret the Constitution of Bayonne. Had that Constitution triumphed, they would not now be under an ecclesiastical jurisdiction in secular matters; they would be subject to no feudal services, no interior tolls. Their national domains would not continue uncultivated, and useless to the government and the nation. They would have a secular clergy; a nobility without feudal privileges, or exemption from taxes and public burthens; and they would now be quite another people.

Ferdinand often said he would prefer remaining at Valençay, to reigning in Spain with the Cortes; nevertheless, when Napoleon, in 1813, proposed to him to reascend his throne, he did not hesitate. Count Laforest was sent to him to negotiate this business. The treaty was soon drawn up; no condition was imposed on Ferdinand; for the engagement he entered into to ratify the sales of national domains made during his absence, and not to prosecute any of those who had filled offices, can scarcely be called conditions. Ferdinand then earnestly declared his determination to take matters in Spain as he should find them, and to reign as a constitutional King. As soon as the treaty

was concluded, he again proposed to contract a closer alliance with Napoleon, by a marriage. This proposal was neither rejected nor accepted. The answer given was, that the moment for consenting to it was not yet come; and that, when Ferdinand should be reestablished on his throne, if he should renew his request from Madrid, it would be received with the attention due to it.

The treaty of Valençay had been negotiated with the greatest secrecy. It was important that the English should not be acquainted with it; they would have endeavoured to thwart an operation in Spain, the result of which was to render the army disposable, so that it might reach the plains of Champagne in time for the campaign of 1814. The plans which were then in progress at Paris produced a different result. The party which was exerting itself to overthrow Napoleon succeeded in discovering this negotiation, and attempted to persuade the Emperor that his glory would be implicated in renouncing Spain, and to induce him not to sign the treaty of Valençay. Failing in this attempt, this party promulgated the existence of the treaty, and employed all the resources of intrigue to retard Ferdinand's departure, in order to delay the return of the army from

Spain into France. Ferdinand was to quit Valençay in the course of Nov. 1813, yet he did not cross the Pyrennees until March 1814.

Note XXI.

Page 59.

"The Russians were only debouching. The wreck of the Austrians took refuge beneath their colours. The enemy attempted to make a stand at Austerlitz, but was beaten. The Russians retreated in good order, and left the empire of Austria to me."

The Russians, on the evening after the battle of Austerlitz, did not retreat in good order. Their whole park of artillery was taken; the wreck of their army which escaped threw away their arms and knapsacks. The Emperor Alexander, being surrounded at Hoelich, would have been taken prisoner, had he not engaged to evacuate Hungary by the daily marches prescribed to him by the armistice.

Note XXII.

Page 60.

"The campaign recommenced. I followed the retreating Russians, and entered Poland. A new theatre opened to our arms. I went to behold that ancient land of anarchy and liberty, bent beneath a foreign sway; the Poles only waited for my arrival to throw it off."

The campaign did not recommence. The French did not follow the Russians into Poland; the Russians retreated with great precipitation into their own country. Peace was concluded at Presburgh with Austria, and a convention was entered into at Vienna with Prussia. Napoleon returned to Paris; his army repassed the Danube and the Inn; and although it did enter Poland, it was not in consequence of the battle of Austerlitz, but after the campaign of Jena; it was not by way of Vienna, but by way of Berlin. Here is an anachronism of a twelvemonth: the battle of Austerlitz was on the 2nd of December, 1805; that of Jena, on the 14th of October, 1806; that of Eylau, on the 8th of February, 1807; that of Friedland, on the 14th of June, 1807; and the peace of Tilsit was concluded on the 7th of July, 1807. What ignorance of facts!

Napoleon wished to restore the kingdom of Poland, because it was the only way to erect a barrier against that formidable empire which threatened sooner or later to subjugate Europe. If Alexander do not, like Paul, turn his attention to India, to acquire wealth and furnish employment for his numerous nations of Cossacks, Calmucks, and other barbarians, who have acquired a taste for luxury in France and

Germany, he will be obliged, in order to prevent a revolution in Russia, to make an irruption into the South of Europe. Should he succeed in thoroughly blending Poland with Russia, and in reconciling the Poles to the Russian government, all must bend beneath his yoke. Every country in Europe, and England in particular, will then regret their having neglected to reestablish the kingdom of Poland independently of Russia, and their having made it a Russian province at the Congress of Vienna; but the English ministers were then blinded by their hatred of Napoleon. All they did was impolitic. Had the Congress of Vienna made peace with Napoleon, Europe would now have been in a state of tranquillity, and the revolutionary spirit would not be undermining every throne. In France, it would have been repressed and satisfied by new institutions.

NOTE XXIII.

PAGE 62.

" Had the Russians attacked us on the following day, we should have been defeated; but, fortunately, their generals have none of these inspirations."

The Russians could not attack the day after the battle of Eylau, that is to say, on the 9th of

of the Grand Duchy of Berg. It was his intention to reinstate Joachim there, on his leaving Naples.

NOTE XXV.

PAGE 65.

"The youngest of the brothers was young enough to wait."

The youngest was Jerome, who, at the time of which the author is speaking, was King of Westphalia: he had, therefore, no need to wait. But this writer, who does not want for genius, loses himself in the dark: he wishes to erect a fabric of unsubstantial vapours; he always places the peace of Tilsit before the battle of Jena; an anachronism of thirteen months.

NOTE XXVI.

PAGE 69.

"I instituted an intermediate caste. It was democratical, because it was accessible to all, and at all times: it was monarchical, because it could never die."

The institution of a national nobility is not contrary to equality, and is necessary to the maintenance of social order. No social order can be founded on agrarian laws. The princi-

ple of property, and its transmission by sale or donation between the living, or by testamentary devise, is a fundamental principle which does not militate against equality. From this principle is derived the usage of transmitting from father to son the remembrance of services rendered to the state. Fortune may sometimes be acquired by shameful and criminal means. Titles gained by services rendered to the state always spring from a pure and honourable source; their transmission to posterity is but an act of justice. When Napoleon proposed to a great number of partizans of the Revolution, most tenaciously attached to the principle of equality, the question whether the establishment of these hereditary titles would be contrary to the principles of equality, they all answered in the negative.

Napoleon had three objects in view in establishing an hereditary national nobility. 1st, To reconcile France to the rest of Europe; 2dly, To reconcile ancient with modern France; 3dly, To banish the remains of the feudal system from Europe, by attaching the idea of nobility to services rendered to the state, and detaching it from every feudal association.

All Europe was governed by nobles who had strenuously opposed the progress of the French

Revolution; this was an obstacle which on all sides counteracted the influence of the French; it was necessary to remove it, and for that purpose to invest the principal personages of the empire with titles equal to theirs. This plan was completely successful; the nobility of Europe thenceforth ceased to oppose France, and saw with secret joy a new nobility, which, by the very circumstance of being new, appeared inferior to the old; without foreseeing the consequence of the French system, which tended to uproot and depreciate the feudal nobility, or at least to compel it to renew its constitution on a new foundation.

The old French nobles, on recovering their country and part of their wealth, had resumed their titles, not legally, but actually; they more than ever regarded themselves as a privileged race; all blending and amalgamation with the leaders of the Revolution was difficult; the creation of new titles wholly annihilated these difficulties; there was not an ancient family that did not readily form alliances with the new Dukes; in fact, the Noailles, the Colberts, the Louvois, and Fleurys, were new houses; from their origin, the most ancient families in France had sought their alliance; thus the families which had arisen through the

Revolution were strengthened, while ancient and modern France were united. It was not without design that Napoleon bestowed the first title he gave on Marshal Lefebvre, who had been a private soldier, and whom every body at Paris remembered a sergeant in the French guards.

Napoleon's project was to reconstitute the ancient nobility of France. Every family which counted amongst its ancestors a cardinal, a great crown officer, a marshal of France, or a minister, &c. would on that account have been entitled to solicit from the Council of the Seals the title of Duke; every family which should have had an archbishop, ambassador, first president, lieutenant-general, or vice-admiral, the title of Count; every family which could reckon a bishop, marechal-de-camp, rear-admiral, counsellor of state, or president *à mortier*, the title of Baron. These titles would only have been granted on condition of the applicants settling a revenue of 100,000 francs for each Duke; 30,000 francs for each Count; and 10,000 francs for each Baron. This rule was to apply to the past, the present, and the future. Hence arose an historical nobility, connecting the past, present, and future, and constituted, not on dis-

tinctions of blood, which are an imaginary nobility, since there is but one race of men, but on services rendered to the State. As the son of an agriculturist might say, I shall some day be a cardinal, marshal of France, or minister; he might also say, I shall some day be a duke, count, or baron: just as he might say I will engage in commerce, and accumulate so many millions which I will leave to my children. A Montmorency would have been a duke, not because he was a Montmorency, but because one of his ancestors had been constable, and done the State service. This vast idea altered the plan of the nobility, which was merely feudal, and erected on its ruins an historical nobility, founded on the interests of the country, and on services rendered to the people and their sovereigns. This idea, like those of the legion of honour, and of the university, was eminently liberal; it was calculated at once to confirm social order, and to annihilate the empty pride of the nobility; it destroyed the pretensions of the oligarchy, and maintained the dignity and equality of man inviolate. It was an idea fertile in important results, and highly liberal: it would have become a distinguishing feature of the new age. Napoleon did not hurry the execution of his schemes;

he thought he had sufficient time before him. He often said to his Council of State, "I want twenty years to accomplish my plans." Of this number five were denied him.

NOTE XXVII.

PAGE 74.

"Her neutrality (that of Prussia) had been particularly essential to me in the last campaign; and in order to secure it, some overtures were made to her respecting the cession of Hanover."

How had Prussia remained neutral? Had she not, in September, whilst the French army was marching from Ulm to Vienna, signed the famous convention of Potsdam, conditionally siding with the coalition of Russia, Austria, and England? Had not her monarch sworn enmity to France on the tomb of Frederic the Great? Two days before the battle of Austerlitz, in December 1805, Count Haugwitz, the King of Prussia's prime minister, repaired to Brunn in Moravia; he had two audiences of Napoleon; but the French and Russian advanced posts were engaged: Napoleon told him to go and await the result of the battle at Vienna. "*I shall beat them,*" said he; "*tell me nothing to day; I do not wish to know any thing.*" Haugwitz, who was no novice in business, did

not wait to be told this a second time. The battle of Austerlitz took place on the 2d of December, and on the 15th, Prussia, by the convention of Vienna, renounced the treaty of Potsdam and the oath of the tomb; she yielded Wesel, Bareuth, and Neuchatel to France; who, in return, consented to Frederic William's taking possession of Hanover, and uniting that country to his dominions. How could Prussia ask for Hanover at Tilsit, when it had already been ceded to her by the convention of Vienna? By the treaty of Tilsit, she was wholly a loser; she gave up what she possessed in Poland, and her dominions on the left of the Elbe, and abandoned the Elector of Hesse-Cassel. This error in dates renders all the author's reasoning on this period absurd.

Note XXVIII.

Page 75.

"I refused all, and Hanover was otherwise disposed of."

By virtue of the convention of the 15th of December, 1805, Prussia was entitled to take possession of Hanover, but that convention was only conditionally ratified at Berlin; its definitive ratification gave rise to discussions which were continued during part of 1806. However, Prussia at length occupied Hanover,

and every thing appeared settled, when she declared war. She was not provoked to this step by France, but drawn in by the ardent passions of the young people of Berlin, and deceived by a despatch of the Marquis de Lucchesini, her minister at Paris, who asserted, that by the treaty signed at Paris at that time by Count Oubril, engagements contrary to the interest of Prussia were entered into between France and Russia. In the first moment of alarm, Prussia hastily took up arms. What! to make head against the Russians and French? Why not? In the Seven Years' War, did not Prussia maintain her ground against France, Russia, and Austria? But the Cabinet of Berlin was very soon perfectly satisfied with respect to the Emperor of Russia, who disclaimed his plenipotentiary Count Oubril, and did not ratify the treaty of Paris, in which, moreover, Prussia was not mentioned. After preparing to struggle against these two powers, the King, finding he had only France to contend with, and being, on the other hand, assured of the aid of Russia, felt no doubt but that he should be victorious. A few weeks afterwards (on the 14th of October, 1806) the battle of Jena decided the war. One cannot help asking whether the

author of this work was in Asia, Africa, or Siberia, at the time of these transactions.

NOTE XXIX.

PAGE 79.

"I wished, at least, to correct what I had done in Prussia, by organizing the Confederation of the Rhine, because I was in hopes to keep the one in check by means of the other."

The Confederation of the Rhine was formed three months before the battle of Jena. History is not metaphysics; it is not to be written from the imagination, and built up at pleasure; the first thing necessary is to learn it.

NOTE XXX.

PAGE 87.

"With such soldiers, what general would not have delighted in war? I loved it, I confess, and yet, after the battle of Jena, I never felt that fulness of confidence in myself to which my first successes were owing."

The battles of Pultusk and Eylau, the taking of Dantzic, and the battle of Friedland, were in 1807; the battles of Espinosa, Burgos, Tudela, and Samosiera, and the taking of Madrid, as well as the operation of the army against General Moore, took place in 1808. The battles of Tann and Abensberg, the manœuvre of Landshut, the battle of Eckmühl,

the taking of Vienna, the battles of Essling and Wagram, and the peace of Vienna, in 1809, were three years subsequent to the battle of Jena. The battle of Abensberg, the manœuvre of Landshut, and the battle of Eckmühl, were the boldest, the finest, and most scientific manœuvres Napoleon ever executed. The battle of the Moskowa was the most brilliant of all his deeds of arms; it was fought in 1812, six years after the battle of Jena. The battles of Lutzen and Wurschen were in 1813; those of Champ-Aubert, Montmirail, and Vauchamp, in 1814. The twenty days' march from Canne to Paris, the battles of Ligny and Mont Saint-Jean, took place in 1815!

Note XXXI.

Page 91.

"I felt the necessity of a separation from a woman from whom I could no longer expect posterity; I felt a reluctance to this measure, owing to the pain of parting with the person I loved best: it was long before I determined; but she resigned herself to this sacrifice of her own accord, with the devotedness she always evinced towards me, and I accepted it, because it was indispensable."

The divorce of the Empress Josephine is an event unparalleled in history. It did not, in any respect, alter the union of the two families. It was a painful sacrifice, equally distressing to

both consorts, but endured for the interest of the state. Marriage is considered in France as a civil act, and a religious sacrament; in order to effect its dissolution, the double intervention of the civil authority and of the church is requisite. The Senate was the civil authority competent to pronounce the dissolution of Napoleon's marriage. The two consorts declared their consent to the divorce in a family assembly. This ceremony took place in the grand apartments of the Tuileries: it was extremely interesting; all the spectators were in tears. The consent being certified by the Arch-Chancellor, the dissolution of the marriage was pronounced by the Senate. The Empress left the Tuileries and proceeded to Malmaison. All the furniture of Napoleon's apartments, in that small but delightful country seat, remained in its place. She had, besides, the estate of Navarre, and a revenue of two millions per annum, the greater part of which she employed in encouraging the arts and relieving the unfortunate. Malmaison is three leagues from Paris, and one from Saint-Cloud. She constantly resided there. In the course of five years, she received three or four visits from Napoleon. The whole court regularly went thither. When the Allies entered Paris, the Emperor Francis, the Emperor

of Russia, and the King of Prussia, paid her frequent visits.

The prince who had been adopted by Napoleon to succeed to the crown of Italy after him, in default of legitimate children of his own, was considered as an Italian prince of the blood. He enjoyed a landed property in Italy, valued at twenty-five millions. In 1806, he married the eldest daughter of the King of Bavaria, a beautiful and accomplished princess.

A cousin of the Empress Josephine, Stephanie Beauharnais, was married, in 1806, to the Grand Duke of Baden; she is now reigning at Carlsruhe; she has several children, is handsome and intelligent, and possesses all the various graces of her sex.

Another cousin of the Empress Josephine married the Prince of Aremberg, one of the first houses in Belgium, enjoying a sovereign principality. This marriage was not so fortunate as the former; but it was not the fault of the princess. The prince commanded a regiment of chasseurs; he distinguished himself in the war in Spain, where he was made prisoner by the English army. Napoleon attached some importance to this marriage. He had an intention of making the Prince of Aremberg Governor-general of the Netherlands, and of establishing his court at Brussels,

in order to give Belgium a new proof of his solicitude. It was owing to this idea that he purchased the château of Lacken, with his own money, of the Prince of Saxe-Teschen, and had it magnificently furnished. Another cousin of Josephine was asked in marriage by Ferdinand VII, to reign over the Spaniards.

The civil marriage of Napoleon being annulled by the decision of the Senate, the officiality of Paris took the informations usual in the Catholic Church, and pronounced the dissolution of the marriage. The Court of Rome set up a claim to the cognizance of the matter; but the French clergy declared such claim to be contrary to the privileges of the Gallican church; that a sovereign was but a man in the sight of God, and ought to be subject to the jurisdiction of his parish and of his bishop. The archiepiscopal authorities at Vienna had to examine this question before the solemnization of Napoleon's marriage with the Archduchess of Austria. The judgment of the officiality of Paris was communicated to the ecclesiastical court at Vienna, which acquiesced therein.

Napoleon's divorce excited great attention. His throne, the most elevated in Europe, was the object of the ambition of every reigning family; three princesses, in particular, seemed

to be called to it by political considerations; one from the house of Russia, another from that of Austria, and a third from that of Saxony.

Negotiations on the subject were immediately opened with Russia. Something of the kind had already been hinted by the Emperor Alexander at Erfurth.

The Count de Narbonne wrote to Fouché, the minister of the police, stating that some insinuations had been made to him, on his passing through Vienna, relative to Napoleon's choice; and that he had thence drawn the inference that an alliance with an archduchess might suit the views of Austria. Napoleon could take no direct step without knowing how the Emperor Alexander stood disposed. He had Prince Schwartzenberg, the Austrian ambassador at Paris, sounded, and this private negotiation was conducted in such a manner, that the ambassador should be engaged without Napoleon's being so, in case any difficulties should arise respecting his marriage with the sister of the Emperor Alexander. These difficulties did, in fact, arise; there were differences of opinion on the subject in the Russian Imperial family. It appears, however, that the Emperor Alexander did not hesitate; but it was required that the princess,

who was to become Napoleon's bride, should have a Russian chapel in the interior of the palace of the Tuileries, with her papas and clergy, and the free exercise of her religion. Negotiations had taken place on this subject: the answers from Petersburg were expected, on receipt of which a decision was to be made. The answers arrived. It had been ascertained that the Austrian ambassador would, at a proper time, whether he had received instructions or not, give a full consent to the projected alliance. Prince Schwartzenberg was absent on a hunting-party; a courier was despatched to him: he hastened to Paris to await the event.

An extraordinary privy-council was summoned for four o'clock in the afternoon, and the question of the choice to be made having been laid before them, after the perusal of the despatches from Saint-Petersburg, opinions were divided between a Saxon, Russian, and Austrian princess. The last opinion was that of the majority, and was dictated by the weighty consideration of the maintenance of general peace. It was remarked that of all the powers in Europe, Austria was that which would conceive the greatest apprehensions with respect to the intentions of France to-

wards her; that the alliance proposed to be formed with her would disperse all those jealousies, furnish an indisputable ground of confidence, and be the pledge of a permanent peace. These considerations were decisive, and the marriage with the Archduchess was preferred. At six in the evening, Napoleon instructed Prince Eugene to repair to Prince Schwartzenberg with a formal demand: at the same time he gave to his Minister for foreign affairs power to sign, with that ambassador, his marriage-contract with the Archduchess Maria Louisa, taking that of Louis XVI. with Marie-Antoinette for a precedent. At seven o'clock, Prince Eugene had reported the success of his mission, and in the course of the evening the marriage-contract was signed. The Prince of Neufchatel was sent to Vienna to make the demand in the solemn accustomed forms, and the Archduke Charles married the Archduchess Maria Louisa, as Napoleon's representative, whose authority had been transmitted to him for that purpose. Archduke the Grand Duke of Wurtzburg, now Grand Duke of Tuscany, represented the Emperor of Austria on the occasion of the marriage at Paris.

Napoleon went to receive the Archduchess at Compiegne. The civil marriage was cele-

brated at Saint-Cloud, the religious marriage in the grand saloon of the Musée Napoleon. Five or six cardinals, after having assisted at the civil marriage at Saint-Cloud, declared that they could not assist at the religious marriage, from respect for the Holy See, which ought to be concerned in the marriages of sovereigns. The French bishops, and the majority of the cardinals, rejected this claim with indignation; the Pope himself censured these cardinals, who were exiled from Paris, and called the Black Cardinals, because they were, for a certain period, prohibited by the Holy See from wearing red.

Splendid fêtes were given on this occasion. Prince Schwartzenberg, the Austrian ambassador, gave one in the name of his master. For this purpose he had a ball-room erected in the garden of his hotel. In the midst of the ball, some gauze draperies caught fire, and the apartment was instantly in a blaze. Napoleon retired leisurely, holding the Empress by the arm; Prince Schwartzenberg constantly kept near her; she set out for Saint-Cloud. The Emperor remained in the garden until the morning. Nothing could stop the progress of the conflagration: several persons perished. The Princess Schwartzenberg, of the family of

Aremberg, wife to the ambassador's brother, had succeeded in escaping from the ball-room; but being alarmed for the safety of one of her children, she returned, and was stifled in attempting to escape through a door which led into the interior of the hotel. In the morning, the remains of this unfortunate lady were found consumed to ashes. Prince Kurakin, the Russian ambassador, was severely hurt.

In 1770, at the fête given by the City of Paris in celebration of the marriage of Louis XVI. with Marie-Antoinette, 2000 people were precipitated into the ditches of the Champs Elysées, where they perished. When Louis XVI. and Marie-Antoinette afterwards suffered death on the scaffold, this terrible accident was recollected, and people looked upon it as an omen of what afterwards took place: for it is chiefly to the insurrection of that great capital that the Revolution is to be attributed. The unfortunate result of the entertainment given by the Austrian Ambassador, on a similar occasion, in honour of the alliance of two houses in the persons of Napoleon and Maria-Louisa, seemed a sinister omen. The misfortunes of France are wholly to be attributed to the change of policy in the Austrian Cabinet. Napoleon was not superstitious, yet, on this occasion, he himself expe-

rienced a painful presentiment. The day after the battle of Dresden, when in pursuit of the Austrian army, he was informed by a prisoner that it was reported that Prince Schwartzenberg had been killed; upon which he said, "He was a brave man; but there is this consolation for his death, that it is now evident "that the threatening omen of his ball pointed "at him and not at me." Two hours after, it was known at head-quarters that it was Moreau, and not Prince Schwartzenberg, who had been killed the day before.

NOTE XXXII.

PAGE 100.

"The Archduke, in return, made a very judicious move. He guessed my plan, and got the start of me. He advanced rapidly on Vienna, by the left bank of the Danube, and took up a position at the same time as I did. This, as far as I know, was the only fine manœuvre the Austrians ever executed.

"My plan of campaign was defeated."

During this campaign the Archduke Charles was defeated, although his army was four times as numerous as that of his enemy. He did not march on Vienna, but took up a position facing Vienna, on the opposite bank of the Danube, which is a very different thing. It was Napo-

leon's plan to make himself master of Vienna, and of all the right bank, for the purpose of extricating his army of Italy and joining it. He completely succeeded, occupied Vienna, outflanked the army of the Archduke John, which obliged him to abandon Italy, and enabled Prince Eugene to debouch on the Danube by Carniola, Carinthia, and Styria. This was the way in which the plan of campaign was defeated! Whither will the *mania* of wit lead men, in spite of the best intentions? They will injure their country's glory for the sake of forming an antithesis!

NOTE XXXIII.

PAGE 100.

"By an unhoped-for piece of good-fortune, the Archduke John, instead of keeping the Viceroy in check, at all events, suffered himself to be defeated. The army of Italy repulsed him to the other side of the Danube. We had the right side entirely to ourselves."

The Viceroy's arrival on the Danube was signalized by the battle of Raab, which was subsequent to the battle of Essling, and not prior to it, as the author seems to think. The battle of Essling took place on the 22d of May, 1809; that of Raab on the 14th of June, the anniversary of the victory of Marengo: it was

therefore subsequent to the former by twenty-two days. It was not the Prince of Essling who first debouched at the battle of Essling, but Marshal Lannes. The army was formed in the Isle of Lobau on the 21st. The bridges were thrown over in the evening of the 20th, and on the 21st the vanguard occupied Essling; about two o'clock in the afternoon a slight action took place, and on the 22d the battle was fought. The French, on both days, remained masters of the field of battle. The enemy repeatedly attacked and carried the village of Essling, but was constantly dislodged again.

At four in the evening the battle ceased, and the village remained in the possession of General Rapp and the Count de Lobau, who, by their personal bravery, decided the battle.

In the mean time, Marshal Davoust's corps still remained on the right bank; the bridges, having been carried away by the sudden swelling of the Danube thrice in forty-eight hours, were as often repaired by the care and activity of General Bertrand. Marshal Davoust's corps and the parks of artillery had not yet effected their passage, when the bridges were carried away, for the fourth time, at two o'clock in the afternoon; the Danube continuing to rise

with great rapidity, Marshal Bertrand declared it to be impossible to restore the bridges, upon which Napoleon ordered the army to resume its position in the isle of Lobau, by repassing that arm of the Danube which is sixty toises wide, and of great depth. The isle of Lobau is very large, and separated from the right bank by the great arm of the Danube, 500 toises wide. In this position he could not be attacked. The same evening boats laden with stores reached the island. The old guard remained in reserve throughout the battle of the 22d, before the *tête-de-pont;* it did not lose above 100 men by the fire of the cannon, and returned entire into the isle of Lobau. Prince Charles and the Austrian generals did their duty, and all that could be expected of them on that day. Had they attempted to pass into the isle of Lobau, they would only have completed the destruction of their army, which had already suffered immense loss.

NOTE XXXIV.

PAGE 101.

"The English tried an expedition against Antwerp, which would have succeeded, but for their unskilfulness. My situation daily grew worse."

Antwerp was surrounded by ramparts lined

with artillery; its garrison consisted of 3000 men: in the naval arsenal there were two battalions of military artificers, and 2000 civil artificers. The squadron, which contained 9 or 10,000 seamen, anchored under the walls of the town. Antwerp was therefore in no danger from any sudden attack, having from 15,000 to 18,000 men to defend it. A short time after, a great number of battalions of the national guard hastened thither; thenceforth Antwerp could only be taken by siege; and this place is, by the nature of its situation, very difficult to invest. The English could not have taken this town unless they had surprised it; and therefore they ought not to have lost so much time before Flushing.

They should have landed a body of 6000 men in the Meuse, and marched them to Fort Batz, which they should have taken, as well as the whole isle of South Beverland; the French squadron, which was anchored before Flushing, would then have been cut off from Antwerp; which would have occasioned its destruction and the fall of the city: but the moment Admiral Missiessis' squadron anchored under the walls of Antwerp, Lord Chatham's expedition was frustrated: he should have re-embarked, whereby he would have saved 5 or

6000 men, whom he lost by remaining in the marshes of Walcheren.

NOTE XXXV.

PAGE 102.

"I superintended this passage myself (that of the Danube in 1809), because I felt some anxiety about it."

General Bertrand constructed three bridges on piles over the Danube: the French army, instead of passing in one night, passed leisurely into the isle of Lobau, where it formed.

NOTE XXXVI.

PAGE 102.

"The intrepidity of our troops, and a bold manœuvre of Macdonald's, decided the day (that of Wagram)."

Macdonald had established himself in the centre of the enemy's position the day before the battle; but, not being supported by his right, this important advantage did not produce its proper result. On the day of the battle he manœuvred with skill, and obtained well deserved praises from Napoleon: but it was the change of front, the left wing to the rear, executed by order of Prince Eugene, the fire of the guard's battery of 100 pieces of cannon, directed by General Lauriston, Napoleon's aide-de-camp, and the movement of Marshal

Davoust's corps, which turned the whole left wing of the enemy, that decided the victory.

NOTE XXXVII.

PAGE 102.

"The Austrian army defiled in a long plain, in a disorderly manner."

This passage is evidently written by a man who is unacquainted with the ground, and with the movement by Zuaini which Napoleon caused General Marmont and Marshal Davoust to execute.

NOTE XXXVIII.

PAGE 118.

"The Court of Austria began by frustrating my plans on Poland, refusing to restore what it had taken."

The Court of Austria did not frustrate Napoleon's plans in the war of 1812; it cordially espoused the cause of France. By the secret articles of the treaty of Paris, it engaged to furnish a contingent of 30,000 men to the French army destined to act in Russia. Independently of the ostensible stipulations of that treaty, the engagements of the two powers with respect to the struggle about to be commenced, were specified by secret articles; all chances were provided for; and these secret

articles will form the best answer to the erroneous assertion of the author of the Manuscript from Saint-Helena.

Art. 1. Austria shall not be bound to furnish the aid stipulated by article 4 of the public treaty, in the wars which France may carry on either against England, or beyond the Pyrenees.

Art. 2. In case war should commence between France and Russia, Austria shall furnish the succours stipulated by the said articles 4 and 5 of the treaty of this day. The regiments intended to form it shall be forthwith marched and cantoned in such a manner as to be able, in less than a fortnight from the first of May, to join at Lemberg.

The said corps of troops shall be provided with a double supply of artillery ammunition, as well as with military carriages sufficient for carrying twenty days' provisions.

Art. 3. His Majesty the Emperor of the French will on his part make all his arrangements to be able to operate against Russia, at the same period, with all his disposable forces.

Art. 4. The body of troops furnished by his Majesty the Emperor of Austria shall be formed in three divisions of infantry, and one

division of cavalry, commanded by an Austrian general chosen by his Majesty the Emperor of Austria.

It is to act on the line which shall be prescribed to it by his Majesty the Emperor of the French, and under his immediate orders. It shall not, however, be divided, but shall always form a distinct and separate body. In the enemy's country its subsistence shall be provided for, in the same manner as shall be determined with regard to that of the French army; without, however, introducing any alteration in the rules and customs established by the military system of Austria, with regard to the subsistence of the troops. The trophies and booty which this corps shall take from the enemy, shall belong to itself exclusively.

Art. 5. In case it should happen, that in consequence of the war between France and Russia, the kingdom of Poland should be re-established, his Majesty the Emperor of the French shall especially guarantee, as he now guarantees, to Austria, the possession of Galicia.

Art. 6. In the case aforesaid, if it should suit the convenience of the Emperor of Austria to give up part of Galicia to be reunited to the kingdom of Poland, in exchange for the Illyrian provinces, his Majesty the Emperor of the

French now engages to consent to such exchange. The part of Galicia to be given up shall be determined according to the united considerations of its population, extent, and revenue, so that the estimation of the two objects to be exchanged may not be formed merely according to the extent of territory, but according to the actual value.

Art. 7. In case of a successful termination of the war, his Majesty the Emperor of the French engages to procure his Majesty the Emperor of Austria indemnities and accessions of territory, which shall not only compensate the sacrifices and expenses of his said Majesty's cooperation in the war, but remain a monument of the close and permanent union which exists between the two sovereigns.

Art. 8. If, through jealousy of the connexion and engagements contracted by Austria with France, Austria should be menaced by Russia, his Majesty the Emperor of the French will consider the attack as directed against himself, and will immediately commence hostilities.

Art. 9. The Ottoman Porte shall be invited to accede to the treaty of alliance this day made.

Art. 10. The above articles shall remain secret between the two powers.

Art. 11. They shall have the same force as if inserted in the treaty of alliance; they shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at the same time and place as those of the said treaty.

Done and signed at Paris, March 14, 1812.

A treaty of the same nature had been signed on the 24th of February, 1812, between France and Prussia. How then can it be said that Napoleon's plans on Poland were frustrated by diplomatical combinations ?

Note XXXIX.

Page 127.

" I retired leisurely."

The author of this work has not the slightest idea, either of war, or of this campaign.

After the brilliant victory gained at Dresden, the French army made no movement in retreat; it manœuvred, in order to carry the war to the right bank of the Elbe, supporting itself on its fortresses, particularly on Magdeburg, and placing itself in communication with Marshal Davoust's corps. The defection of Bavaria compelled Napoleon to change his plan. It was not until after the battle of Leipsic that the Allies became masters of the operations of the campaign.

Note XL.

Page 132.

"I have accused General Marmont of having betrayed me; I now do him justice: no soldier violated the fidelity he owed to his country."

Would to God that such an assertion could be made with truth! Marshal Marmont was not guilty of treachery in defending Paris. The army, the national guard of Paris, the brilliant youth of the schools, covered themselves with glory on the heights of Montmartre; but history will say that had it not been for the defection of the sixth corps, after the Allies had entered Paris, they would have been forced to evacuate that great capital; for they would never have given battle on the left bank of the Seine with Paris in their rear, which they had only occupied for two days; they would never have thus violated every rule and principle of the grand art of war. The calamities of that period arose from the defection of the chiefs of the sixth corps and army of Lyons, and to the intrigues which were carrying on in the Senate.

Note XLI.

Page 135.

"I was a prisoner (at Fontainebleau), and I expected to be treated as such."

At Fontainebleau Napoleon still had 25,000 of his guards with him. There was nothing to prevent his rallying the 25,000 men of the army of Lyons, the 18,000 whom Lieutenant-general Grenier was bringing back from Italy, Marshal Suchet's 15,000, and Marshal Soult's 40,000; and thus taking the field once more at the head of upwards of 100,000 combatants. He was master of all the fortresses of France and Italy. He could still have maintained the war for a long time, and many chances of success might be reckoned on; but his enemies declared to Europe that he was the only obstacle to peace, and he did not hesitate to make the sacrifice which seemed to him requisite for the interest of France. After having laboured for twenty years to promote the happiness and glory of the French people, he voluntarily yielded himself up, and restored to the nation the crown it had bestowed upon him.

When he afterwards learned, in his retreat at the isle of Elba, that factions were busy in France, that parties were forming, and civil war impending, and that all its horrors were once more about to burst upon our beloved country, he felt that his hopes had been disappointed. Faithful to his motto, *Every thing for the French people,* he resolved to return to

France, not for the ambitious purpose of regaining his throne, but to place himself between the factions. He had always thought that France wished only for equality, and he had given her perfect equality. He had now learnt from events, that she was likewise desirous of liberty, and he had resolved to render the French people the most free nation in the world.

At the end of February 1815, the Congress of Vienna had determined to transfer Napoleon to Saint-Helena, and to violate all the stipulations of the treaty of Fontainebleau. The Cabinet of the Tuileries had already proved that it did not intend to fulfil any of the engagements it had contracted by that treaty; but these circumstances had no influence on Napoleon's resolutions; it was not his interest that was in question in the measure he resolved on. A conspiracy existed, but his return was not its object. He was not recalled by any conspiracy; it was with the imagination and opinion of great masses that he constantly acted. He reckoned on the love of the French people and the French army; his march, and the acclamations which attended him from the gulf of Juan to Paris, surprised every one but himself.

Marshal Soult served the King with sincerity;

he was at that time accused of treason, by a party which has always been in extremes; but the movements of troops for which he was censured, and the manner in which they were placed, so favourably, as it turned out, for Napoleon's march, had been executed by the King's particular order, and upon the repeated solicitations of the French plenipotentiaries at the Congress of Vienna. When he heard of the landing of Napoleon at Cannes, he thought the gens d'armes would settle that affair, unless Napoleon's object was Italy. Duke Cambaceres, the Duke of Rovigo, the Duke of Otranto, and Count Carnot, often confessed to Napoleon during the hundred days, that such had also been their opinion; that they never imagined he would reach Paris; and that the events which had just taken place had revealed to them the secret sentiments of the people and army.

NOTE XLIII.

"My pacific attitude lulled the nation to sleep."

Napoleon, who, during these three months, constantly worked fifteen or sixteen hours every day, cannot say that he was asleep. Never, at any period of history, were more things done in three months. He armed and provisioned a hundred fortresses; re-

pressed the civil war in Marseilles, Bordeaux, and La Vendée; recruited the army, caused arms to be manufactured, clothes made, and horses levied.

In the last six months of 1814, the French army had been newly organized. In March 1815, it was composed of a hundred and five regiments of infantry, fifty-seven regiments of cavalry of the line, and four regiments of cavalry of the ancient guard. The effective strength of each infantry regiment was 900 men, of which number 600 were disposable for war; the effective strength of the cavalry was 25,000 men and 16,000 horses. France could only bring 80,000 men into the field, a force scarcely sufficient to guard the fortresses and principal naval establishments. All the fleets were dismantled and the crews dismissed. The only troops which the marine had on foot were eight battalions of cannoneers. There were artillery stores enough to supply the occasions of the greatest armies, and repair the losses they might sustain in several campaigns. But, the arsenals contained only 100,000 new musquets, and 300,000 to be repaired; and this number was far from sufficient. All the fortresses had been disarmed, and the palisades and stores sold off.

Eight hundred thousand men were deemed

necessary to maintain the war against all Europe. Napoleon created the establishments of the 3d, 4th, and 5th battalions of the infantry regiments; of the 4th and 5th squadrons of the cavalry regiments; those of thirty battalions of the train of artillery; of twenty regiments of the young guard; ten battalions of military equipages; and twenty regiments of marines. Two hundred battalions of chosen national guards, each 560 strong, were put in requisition. All old soldiers were recalled to their colours; they all left their occupations, and put on their old uniforms: this appeal was calculated to produce two hundred thousand men. The Conscription of 1815 was called forth; and this was expected to produce one hundred and forty thousand men. A call of two hundred and fifty thousand men was to be proposed to the Chambers in the course of July; this levy would have been completed in September. The number of retired and reduced officers, non-commissioned officers, and privates, amounted to upwards of 100,000; 30,000 were fit for service, and were called to their colours.

But fire-arms were the most important object: the ordnance department took the necessary steps, and succeeded in getting manufactured, in one month, what, on ordinary

occasions, it would have required six months to complete. There was greater activity in the capital in 1793; but with this difference, that there was then nothing but waste, anarchy, and disorder; and that, in 1815, every thing was conducted with the greatest economy, on the principles of a good administration.

The manufactories of cloth fit for the clothing of troops were numerous in 1812 and 1813; they were adequate to the supply of all the wants of the armies; but in 1815 they had ceased to exist. In April, the treasury advanced several millions to the cloth manufactories, in order to reinstate them.

Before the first of June, the contractors had delivered 20,000 horses for the cavalry: 10,000 more, completely trained, had been furnished by the gens d'armes, who were dismounted; the value of them was paid down in money to the gens d'armes, who, in the course of eight days, were remounted on other horses purchased at their own discretion. It was intended to take half these last horses in the course of July; 14,000 more had been bargained for; in short, by the first of June, there were 46,000 cavalry and 18,000 artillery horses. It was necessary to carry on every branch of the service with

ready money; most of the contractors even required advances; yet the public debt and the pensions were discharged with the greatest punctuality: all the expenses of the interior, far from being diminished, were increased; the grand system of public works was resumed throughout France. The treasury negotiated four millions of *rentes* of the *caisse d'amortissement*, at 50 per cent., which it replaced by a credit on the national woods; this produced, net, forty millions of francs in ready money, which were collected with incredible rapidity.

By the first of October, France would have had a military establishment of 8 or 900,000 men, completely organized, armed, and clothed. Her independence depended, therefore, on her being able to avert hostilities until the first of October. The months of June, July, August, and September, were requisite, but they would have sufficed. By that time the frontiers of the empire would have been barriers of brass, which no human power could have passed with impunity.

On the first of June, the effective strength of the French troops under arms was 559,000 men: thus the ministers at war had in two months levied 414,000 men, or nearly 7000 per day. Out of this number, the effective force

of the army of the line amounted to 363,000 men; and that of the army extraordinary to 196,000 men. Of the effective force of the army of the line, 217,000 men were present under arms, clothed, armed, and trained, and disposable to take the field. They were formed into seven corps d'armée, four corps of reserve of cavalry, four corps of observation, and the army of La Vendée, spread along the frontiers, covering them all; but the principal part of the forces were cantoned in the vicinity of Paris and of the frontier of Flanders. The first corps took up its cantonments in the environs of Lille; the second was cantoned about Valenciennes; the third was assembled in the neighbourhood of Mezieres; the fourth in the environs of Metz; the fifth was in Alsace; the sixth assembled at Laon; and the seventh at Chambery. The first corps of observation, called that of the Jura, was formed of a division of infantry, two divisions of chosen troops of the national guard, a division of light cavalry, and five batteries; the second corps of observation, called that of the Var, was composed of a division of infantry, a regiment of cavalry, and three batteries; the third corps of observation, or of the Eastern Pyrenees, was assembled at Toulouse; it consisted of one

division of infantry, one regiment of cavalry, sixteen battalions of chosen troops of the national guard, and three batteries; the fourth corps of observation, composed in a similar manner, was at Bordeaux.

La Vendée, after having displayed the Imperial eagle during the month of April, had revolted in May. General Lamarque commanded the Imperial army in that district, which was composed of eight regiments of the line, two regiments of cavalry, ten squadrons of gendarmerie, and twelve battalions of the line. Four corps of reserve of cavalry were cantoned between the Aisne and the Sambre.

The Imperial guard was increased to twenty-four regiments of the young guard, four of the middle, four of the old guard, and four of cavalry, with ninety-six pieces of cannon.

The artillery department was preparing a new train of five hundred field-pieces, with men, stores, horses, and double supplies. Independently of the two hundred chosen battalions of national guards, one hundred and fifty of which acted as garrisons in the ninety fortresses or forts on the frontiers of the Empire, there were forty-eight battalions of national guards raised in Languedoc, Gas-

cony, and Dauphiny, to reinforce the third and fourth corps of observation, and thus complete the defence of the Pyrenees.

But, notwithstanding all the care and activity employed in forming the army anew, and reorganizing the defence of the frontiers, there was still room to apprehend that in case hostilities should commence before autumn, the armies of the combined powers of Europe would be much more numerous than the French armies; and, in that case, it would be under Paris and Lyons that the fate of the Empire would be decided. These two great cities had formerly been fortified, like all the great capitals in Europe; and, like those, they had long ceased to be so. Napoleon had often—for instance, on his return from the campaign of Austerlitz—had thoughts of fortifying the heights of Paris: the fear of alarming the inhabitants, and the successive events which afterwards took place with incredible rapidity, prevented his carrying his plan into execution. He thought that a great capital is the native place of the flower of the nation, the central point of public opinion, the general depôt; and that it is the greatest of all absurdities to leave so important a point destitute of immediate defence. In

times of great misfortunes and adversity, states are often destitute of soldiers, but they are never without men for their internal defence. Fifty thousand national guards, and two or three thousand cannoneers, will defend a fortified capital against an army of 300,000 men. These 50,000 men in the open field, if they are not complete soldiers and commanded by experienced officers, will be thrown into disorder by a charge of a few thousand cavalry. Paris had ten or twelve times been indebted to her walls for her safety: had she been in 1814 a fortified place, capable of holding out but for eight days, what influence would not that circumstance have had on the affairs of the world? If Vienna had been fortified in 1805, the battle of Ulm would not have decided the war; if Berlin had been fortified in 1806, the Prussian army would have rallied at that city, after its defeat at Jena, and the Russian army might have joined it there; if Madrid had been fortified in 1808, the French army, after the victories of Espinosa, Tudela, Burgos, and Somo-Sierra, would not have marched on that capital, leaving the English and Spanish armies behind Salamanca and Valladolid.

Napoleon ordered General Haxo to fortify

Paris. That officer had the heights of Montmartre, and the lesser eminences of the mills, as well as the level from the Butte-Chaumont to the heights of Père-la-Chaise, intrenched. He had the canal of Ourcq finished, from Saint-Denis to the basin of La Villette; the earth was thrown up on the left bank, to form a rampart; demi-lunes were raised on the right bank, to cover the causeways; works were constructed at L'Etoile, under the cannon of Vincennes; and redoubts were formed in the park of Bercy. The barrier du Trône was connected with the redoubt of L'Etoile by a caponnier of eight hundred toises. By the 1st of June these works were lined with seven hundred pieces of cannon: those of the left bank of the Seine, from Bercy to the barrier of the Military School, were traced out, but a fortnight's work was still necessary for their completion. The works for the defence of Lyons had been intrusted to General Lery of the engineers: by the 25th of June they were constructed and lined. Considerable magazines of stores had been formed in that great city, whose well-known courage and patriotism inspired confidence in its defence.

Never, at any period, was France less

chargeable with lethargy; never did she manifest more enthusiasm to defend her independence. If a nation that is asleep can put a fiftieth part of her population under arms, what would she do when awake?

NOTE XLIV.

"I deceived myself in supposing that the pass of Thermopylæ could be defended by *charging in twelve motions.*"

The very night of his arrival at Paris, Napoleon considered whether he should, with 35 or 36,000 men, the only troops he could muster in the North, commence hostilities on the 1st of April, by marching on Brussels and rallying the Belgian army to his standards. The English and Prussian armies, cantoned on the banks of the Rhine, were weak and dispersed, destitute of leaders and instructions. The Duke of Wellington was at Vienna, and Blucher at Berlin. There was room to hope that the French army might be at Brussels early in April; but hopes of peace were entertained; France was desirous of peace, and would have loudly censured any premature offensive movement. Besides, these 35 or 36,000 men could not be assembled without leaving the twenty-three fortresses between

Calais and Philipville, which form the triple line of the North, to themselves. If the public spirit of this frontier had been equal to that of the frontiers of Alsace, Vosges, the Ardennes, or the Alps, the fortresses might have been safely abandoned; but opinions were divided in Flanders, and it was impossible to intrust the care of fortified places to the local national guards; it required a month to raise battalions of picked national guards in the neighbouring departments, and to bring them to the fortresses, to replace the troops of the line: finally, the Duke of Angoulême was marching on Lyons, and the Marseillese on Grenoble. The first news of the commencement of hostilities would have given them some chance of success; it was of primary importance that the tri-coloured flag should wave in every part of the Empire.

In the course of May, when France had rallied, and all hopes of peace were at an end, Napoleon meditated on the plan of campaign he was to pursue. Several plans suggested themselves: the first was, to remain on the defensive, leaving the Allies to take upon themselves all the odium of the aggression, and to involve themselves amongst our fortified places, to penetrate to Paris and Lyons,

and there to commence upon those two bases a brisk and decisive war. This plan had many advantages; 1st, The Allies could not be ready to open the campaign before the 15th of July; they could not arrive before Paris and Lyons before the 15th of August; the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th corps, the four corps of heavy cavalry and the guard, might be drawn together under the walls of Paris; these corps consisted, on the 15th of June, of 140,000 men under arms, and by the 15th of August they would have amounted to 240,000. The first corps of observation, and the 7th corps, concentrated themselves under Lyons; they composed, on the 15th of June, 25,000 men under arms; on the 15th of August they would have been 60,000 strong. 2dly, The fortifications of Paris and Lyons would have been completed by the 15th of August. 3dly, By that period there would have been sufficient time for the organization and arming of the forces intended for the defence of Paris and Lyons, and to increase the Parisian national guard to 60,000 men. The battalions of fusileers, having officers of the line, would have been very serviceable, and added to 6000 cannoneers of the line, of the navy and national guard, and to 40,000 men from the depôts of

the seventy regiments of infantry and the guard, unclothed, belonging to the several corps d'armée under Paris, would have increased the force intended to guard the intrenched camp of Paris to upwards of 100,000 men. At Lyons the garrison would have been composed of 4000 national guards, 12,000 fusileers, 2000 cannoneers, and 7000 men from the depôts of the eleven infantry regiments of the army under Lyons; in all 25,000 men. 4thly, The hostile armies which might have penetrated towards Paris by the North and East, would have been obliged to leave 150,000 men before the forty-two fortresses of those two frontiers: taking the strength of those hostile armies at 600,000, they would have been reduced to 450,000 on their arrival before Paris. The armies which might penetrate towards Lyons, would have been under the necessity of observing the ten fortresses of the frontier of the Jura and the Alps; supposing the force of the Allies at this point 150,000 men, scarcely 100,000 would have arrived before Lyons. 5thly, In the mean time the danger of the nation reaching its most critical height, great energy would have been excited in Normandy, Brittany, Auvergne, Berri, &c. Numerous battalions would have

arrived daily before Paris. On the side of France, every thing would have proceeded in a progressive increase; on that of the Allies, in a progressive diminution. 6thly, 240,000 men directed by Napoleon, manœuvring on the two banks of the Seine and Marne, under the protection of the vast intrenched camp of Paris, guarded by above 100,000 local troops, would have come off victors from a contest with 450,000 of the enemy. 60,000 men, commanded by Marshal Suchet, manœuvring on the two banks of the Rhone and Saone, under the protection of Lyons guarded by 25,000 local troops, would have defeated the enemy's army. The sacred cause of the country would have triumphed.

The second plan was to anticipate the Allies, and to commence hostilities before they could be ready. Now the Allies could not begin hostilities before the 15th of July; it was, therefore, necessary to take the field by the 15th of June, and defeat the Anglo-Dutch, and Prusso-Saxon armies, which were in Belgium, before the Russian, Austrian, Bavarian, and Wurtemberg armies could reach the Rhine. By the 15th of June an army of 140,000 men could be assembled in Flanders, leaving a *rideau* on all the frontiers, and good garrisons

in all the fortresses. And 1st, If the English and Prussian armies should be defeated, Belgium would rise, and her troops would recruit the French army. 2dly, The defeat of the English army would be followed by the fall of the English ministers, who would be replaced by the Opposition, the friends of the liberty and independence of nations; and this circumstance alone would have concluded the war. 3dly, If this should not be the case, the victorious army would proceed from Belgium to rally the 5th corps remaining in Alsace, and these forces united, would proceed on the Vosges against the Russian and Austrian armies. 4thly, The advantages of this second plan were numerous; it was conformable to the genius of the nation, and to the spirit and principle of this war; it afforded a remedy for the terrible objection attached to the former scheme, that of abandoning Flanders, Picardy, Artois, Alsace, Lorraine, Champagne, Burgundy, Franche-Comté, and Dauphiny, without firing a shot. But was it possible, with an army of 140,000 men, to defeat the two armies which covered Belgium; that is to say, the Anglo-Dutch army of 100,000 men under arms, and the Prusso-Saxon army of 120,000 men, in all 220,000? The strength of these

armies was not to be estimated by the numerical relation of 220,000 to 140,000; because the allied armies were composed of troops of different qualities, cantoned under the command of two generals-in-chief, and formed of nations divided in interests and sentiments.

The month of May passed in these meditations. The insurrection of La Vendée deprived the army of Flanders of 20,000 men, and reduced it to 120,000; this was a most fatal event, and diminished the chances of success; but the war of La Vendée might extend itself; the successes of the Allies, and their march on Paris and Lyons would be favourable to it. Belgium and the four departments of the Rhine loudly called on the French for deliverance. Napoleon resolved to attack the English and Prussian armies on the 15th of June; and in case of failure in his plan of separating and defeating them severally, to fall back on Paris and Lyons and proceed with the execution of the former plan. Undoubtedly if the French armies should be unsuccessful in Belgium, they would arrive in a weakened condition before Paris; undoubtedly the Allies, who, if waited for, would not commence hostilities before the 15th of July, would be ready by the 1st of July, if provoked

to action on the 15th of June; undoubtedly their march on Paris would be more rapid after a victory; and the army of Flanders, reduced to 120,000 men, would be inferior, by 90,000 to those of Marshal Blucher and the Duke of Wellington. But Napoleon had, in 1814, made head against the allied armies with only 40,000 men, and often defeated the 250,000 of Schwartzenberg and Blucher. At the battle of Montmirail the corps of Sacken, Yorck, and Kleist, were 40,000 strong; they had been attacked, beaten, and driven beyond the Marne by 16,000 French, whilst Marshal Blucher, with 20,000 men, was at the same time held in check by Marmont's corps of 4000 men; and Schwartzenberg's army of 100,000 men was likewise held in check by the corps of Macdonald, Oudinot, and Gerard, which did not, together, amount to 18,000 men.

Not Carthage, when exasperated at having been deceived by Scipio, not Rome when anxious to avert the dangers of Cannæ, not the French Legislature when excited by the Duke of Brunswick's manifesto, not the Mountain faction in 1793, ever evinced greater activity and energy than Napoleon in these three months. Let the author of the Manuscript from Saint-Helena point out three

months in ancient or modern history better employed; six weeks in restoring the throne of the Empire, and six weeks in raising, clothing, arming, and organizing, 400,000 men; is this amusing one's self, *charging in twelve motions?* Activity, order, and economy, were what distinguished the hundred days' administration; but time is a necessary element; when Archimedes proposed to lift the earth with a lever and a point of support, he required time also. The Almighty took seven days to create the universe!

No doubt can remain of the ignorance of the author of the Manuscript from Saint-Helena, with respect to the history of the last twenty years. It would be tedious to refute all the false principles with which his work abounds; a few instances will suffice.

PAGE 3.

1st. "I never comprehended what advantage I could derive from study."

What! are history, geography, and eloquence of no utility? These cannot be the principles of the man who created the university and founded so many colleges.

PAGE 4.

"But I soon had enough of it, for the material system is narrow and confined."

What would Newton, Lagrange, Berthollet, Prony, Vaùban, or Laplace, say to this?

PAGE 6.

"I never possessed the power of exciting the populace."

What can be more truly the populace than an army? A general who should not know how to excite and electrify them, would be destitute of the most important quality requisite for his station.

PAGE 7.

4thly. "I perceived that it is easier than people think to beat the enemy, and that this great art consists in never trifling in action."

This then is the art of war! It is, however, probable that Napoleon had far other secrets than this, and could have given us more interesting information.

PAGE 9.

5thly. "Battles are not gained by experience."

PAGE 10.

"My artillerymen were brave and inexperienced; this is the best possible disposition for a soldier."

According to these principles there would be no occasion for an army of the line; the national guard would be sufficient. That the author of the Manuscript from Saint-Helena is

a man of talent is not disputed; but he certainly is no soldier, and he has conceived erroneous ideas of every battle, campaign, and military operation he has mentioned; it is evident that he is so totally unacquainted with military affairs, that he never forms a just notion of them, and is therefore unable to express them.

NOTES

ON THE WORK INTITLED

MEMOIRS OF THE PRIVATE LIFE, RETURN, AND REIGN OF NAPOLEON, IN 1815.

Published at London in 1820, by Baron Fleury de Chaboulon, Ex-master of Requests, and Secretary to Napoleon.

THE author, who was auditor to the Council of State in 1814, was named secretary to the Cabinet on Napoleon's arrival at Lyons. He was full of ardour and merit. On his return from a mission to Bâle, which was intrusted to him, and in which he acquitted himself with honour, he was appointed master of requests to the Council of State. In this work he brings forward speeches, an opinion, and a line of policy, which, however good they may appear in his eyes, may have hurt Napoleon, and may be contrary to his opinion and his policy.

PAGE 1.

"Up to that time various opinions had prevailed respecting the motives which had determined Napoleon to quit the Isle of Elba. Some imagined he had acted from his own impulse; others, that he had conspired with his partisans to overthrow the Bourbons. These two suppositions were equally false; and the world will learn with surprise, perhaps with admiration, that this astonishing revolution was the unparalleled work of two men and a few words."

Napoleon formed the resolution of re-entering France, as soon as it was proved to him that the Royal government wished to evade the execution of the treaty of Fontainebleau, and to continue the third dynasty; which, alone, was declaring the governments of the republic and empire illegitimate and usurped. The strict consequence of this system was, that the ancient bishops should claim their sees, suppressed by the Concordat of 1801; that the clergy should require the restoration of their effects, the catholic church become once more predominant in the state; the ancient lords and privileged persons protest against the republican spoliations, and demand the restitution of their privileges, and of the property which they had lost for the cause of legitimacy; all services performed against the republic and empire, all the treasonable plots

to deliver Toulon and Brest to the English, deserve rewards.

It was considered that such pretensions would be inadmissible; that the restoration, powerful as it was, would start back with horror from them; that it would be impossible to satisfy all the fallacious hopes of the ancient clergy, the emigrants, the ancient privileged classes, and the Vendeans; they would all, necessarily, be discontented, and yet the nation would be agitated, and would seek guarantees against these vain pretensions.

PAGE 3.

"It had been thought that the decree, by which Prince Talleyrand and his illustrious accomplices were brought before the tribunals, had been made at Lyons, in a fit of revenge; it will be seen that it was the result of a simple political calculation."

The decree of exception to the amnesty of Lyons, as it stands inserted in the Bulletin of the Laws, was drawn up at Paris by a committee of the Council of State.

PAGE 4.

"But Napoleon, unconquered by injustice and calamity, assembled the feeble remnant of his armies, and publicly declared, that he would go to seek death or victory at their head, &c. He set out, he performed prodigies, but in vain. *The national energy was extinct;* from step to step the people

had arrived at that extreme so fatal to princes, in which the discouraged mind remains insensible to their dangers, and abandons them to their fate, &c. Napoleon, reduced by the public inertness to the incapability of making either peace or war, consented to resign the crown."

The national energy was not extinct; but to repel the aggression of 800,000 men, the months of January, February, and March were requisite, to complete the grand means of defence which Napoleon had organized. If the Allies had not crossed our frontiers until April, they would have been driven back beyond the Rhine.

If France, in 1792, repulsed the aggression of the first coalition, it was because she had had three years to prepare herself, and to raise 200 battalions of national guards; and because she was attacked by armies which, at most, did not exceed 100,000 men. If 800,000 men had marched under the command of the Duke of Brunswick, Paris would have been taken, in spite of the energy and enthusiasm of the nation.

How can it be said that Napoleon could make neither war nor peace? With 50,000 men he fought 300,000, who would not have entered Paris, or at least would have been driven from that city in twenty-four hours after

entering it, but for the aid of treason. He always had it in his power to make peace on the basis of the ancient limits of France, and he would have obtained a peace honourable to himself and the nation, but for the defection of the senate and of part of the army.

PAGE 6.

"The senators called the brother of Louis XVI. to the throne; and this choice, although, &c. . . . . met with little opposition, because the recall of Louis seemed to be a pledge of peace, and peace was the principal wish of the nation; on the other hand, the Bourbons, being judiciously advised, had hastened to obviate the repugnance and fears inspired by their return, by appropriate proclamations: we guarantee, said they, &c."

The French revolution was a general movement of the nation against the privileged classes; its principal object was to destroy all privileges, abolish signorial jurisdictions, suppress feudal rights, as a remnant of the ancient slavery of the people, and proclaim equality in taxation and in rights. The kingdom was composed of successive additions made to the domain of the crown, either by inheritance or by conquest. The provinces had no natural boundaries between them, but were unequal in extent, population, and privileges; they were governed by local laws and customs, in civil and administrative affairs. France was not so

much a state, as an union of several states, adjacent to each other, but not amalgamated. The Revolution, essentially guided by the principle of equality, destroyed all the remains of feudal times, and created a new France, with an homogeneous division of territory, consistent with local circumstances; an uniform judicial and executive organization; universal civil and criminal laws; an uniform system of taxation. The convulsion produced by the effects of the Revolution, both on persons and property, was as great as that immediately resulting from the principles of the Revolution itself. All that was the result of the events which had succeeded each other since the establishment of the monarchy, ceased to exist. Regenerated France presented the spectacle of 25,000,000 of souls, forming only a single class of citizens governed by one law, one regulation, and one system of order. All the alterations were conformable to the good of the nation, its rights, and the progress of civilization.

The whole population of France was attached to the interests acquired during twenty-five years of sacrifices and of triumph. If the nation calmly beheld the throne of the third dynasty restored, it was because peace was

felt to be necessary, and the presumptive heir to the crown declared, that "*nothing was changed in France, except that there was one Frenchman more.*" This conduct was not new; Henry IV., after conquering his subjects, had given them guarantees, abjured his religion, surrounded himself with members of the league, and carried the wish to inspire confidence so far, as to remove from about him the very men who had conquered for him at Coutras, Argues, and Ivry. He knew that the love of mankind cannot be extorted by the bayonet, and that a king who does not reign over the hearts of his subjects is nothing; yet Henry IV. had not to respect the rights acquired by a Revolution attended by victories which had enforced its acknowledgement throughout Europe. There can be no doubt but that if Cardinal Richelieu had held the reins of the state in 1814, his vast genius would, at a single glance, have comprehended the situation of his king, reigning, by right of birth and the rules of the feudal hierarchy, over a nation proud of so many victories, and happy in the laws it had established for itself since 1789. He would have said to himself that the counter-revolution, if effected, could only be operated through the constant will of the coalition, and the presence and em-

ployment of hostile armies in France; that the moment the foreign bayonets should quit the country, the nation would resume the enjoyment of its independence, the sentiment of its true interests and rights would revive with new strength, the desire of equality and liberty would be stronger than ever, and then none but a national throne, that is to say, a throne really constitutional, would be compatible with the interests of the king and the people.

PAGE 15.

"Finally, if the distinguishing characteristic of Napoleon's government had been, as was pretended, arbitrary power and force, the characteristic of the Royal government ought to have been justice and moderation."

Justice? but towards whom? towards the proprietors whom the laws of the Revolution have violently deprived of their effects, merely because they were faithful to their lawful sovereign, and to the principles of honour which they derived from their ancestors? or towards the purchasers, who, confiding in the laws made by an illegitimate authority, have acquired property under their provisions. *Justice?* but towards whom? towards those soldiers, mutilated in the fields of Germany, la Vendée, and Quiberon, who under the banner

of the Lilies, marched with the Austrian Eagle and English Lion, in the firm conviction that they were serving the cause of their king against an usurped authority? or towards those millions of citizens, who, forming a brazen wall on the frontiers of the country, so often saved it from the mistaken fury of its enemies, and raised the glory of the French Eagle to so lofty a pitch? *Justice?* towards whom? that clergy, the example and model of Christianity, stripped of all its wealth, the fruit of the labours of fifteen centuries? or the purchasers who have converted convents into workshops, and churches into warehouses; thus profaning all that had been venerated and holy throughout so many ages?

PAGE 16.

"And unfortunately the ministerial posts to which it belonged to exercise an influence over persons and things, had been confided to men who seemed to make it their business to irritate and heat people's minds, ... &c."

Make Soult, Saint-Cyr, and Davoust, war ministers; will the army have ceased to be the army of the empire, the sons of the Sambre and Meuse, of the Rhine and Moselle, of Italy, Egypt, and the grand army? Let the ministers be those of the republic or of the empire, will the people be the less alarmed at the pre-

tensions of the *ancien regime*, less apprehensive of the loss of their rights? No! miserable creatures as we are, we can do nothing against the nature of things; the only power we have is that of observation.

PAGE 20.

"The first steps of the government had been marked by errors, &c. By virtue of the free will of the royal authority an ordinance of reformation had been granted to France instead of the constitution, &c. . . . . ."

"Every abuse of power, every violation of the charter, &c."

Common place—fashionable rhodomontade, which has no real signification! The charter is not a contract with the nation . . . . it is an emanation from the royal power. It is a manner of governing, as well as any other; and France ought to have thought herself happy, at the moment when the Revolution was overcome by the coalition of Europe, to receive from the royal power a concession so important to her liberties.

If Henry IV. had been acknowledged King of France by the league, without having abjured, how many guarantees would have been requisite for the faithful of the Catholic apostolic Roman church, that is to say, nearly the whole of the nation, to place their conscience and religion in safety. A heretic on the throne

would have been the enemy of the pope, the bishops, and the religious ceremonies.

Henry IV. overcame all these difficulties. He acquired the love of the French by his abjuration and return into the bosom of the church, and by scrupulously submitting to all the practices of its worship.

The position of France in 1814 was somewhat analogous: Louis XVIII. had not to encounter the spirit of religion, but he had to satisfy the nation with respect to the preservation of its new rights, interests, and laws. When Sully and the wiser part of the Huguenot party deliberated, at Beauvais, upon the line of conduct to be pursued by Henry IV. "There are but two courses to be adopted," said they: "either to abjure, and return into the bosom of the church, or to destroy the Pope's authority in France by force of arms, and to substitute sermons for masses in every parish." Now, as the latter measure was impracticable, and could not be adopted with any hope of success, or even if it could have succeeded, it must have been after several years' civil war, and by marching over the dead bodies of part of the generation then existing, Henry IV. abjured.

PAGE 23.

"They were alienated (the troops) by the breaking up of their old organization, and by the introduction of strange officers into their ranks, &c. . . . ."

"They were humiliated by ill treatment; by being obliged to present arms to the body guards, against whom they had conceived an aversion; and it is well known that the self-love of the French is never humbled in vain."

Was it not a natural consequence of the Restoration, to see officers of la Vendée and of Condé's army appointed to military commands? What humiliation was there in presenting arms to the body guard from the moment the King acknowledged them as officers, and they wore the distinction of that rank?

PAGE 24.

"Self-love is in the soldier the vehicle of glory.—It was by humbling this self-love, by disdain of the national victories, by airs of haughtiness and pride, by the vain display of the superiority of birth and rank, that the new chiefs placed over the army lost its confidence and affection."

How, upon the principles of legitimacy, can superiority of birth be called vain? While Louis XVIII. reigns over France by right of birth, how is birth to be denied that priority of rank which it has been allowed for so many ages? The nobility are exclaimed against, and might justly be so, if, as formerly, they monopolized all places, dignities, &c.; but mere precedence.—Had the convention reign-

ed twenty years, where is the son of one of its members that would not have taken place of any other person?

PAGE 27.

"The triumphal arches destined to commemorate the exploits of our armies were menaced with sacrilegious destruction, and it was eagerly proposed to raise a monument to the memory of the Vendeans, and of the emigrants who fell at Quiberon. No doubt those misled Frenchmen merited our regret and our tears; but had they not landed on their native shores in arms? were they not the auxiliaries or in the pay of our implacable enemies? &c."

The emigrants of Quiberon landed on the sacred shores of their country in arms—but they did so in the cause of their King . . .

. . . . . .

. . . . . .

They were, it is true, in the pay of our enemies; but they were or ought to have been so, for their sovereign's cause. France gave them death for their conduct, and tears for their courage; all self-devotion is heroic. Lamentable effects of political commotions, which displace the supreme power in society! Virtue and honour are thrown down from their pedestals; each party furiously devotes itself to the worship of its gods, and whilst it sacrifices human victims to them, imagines itself innocent. Who is to be pitied? The nation. Who is to

blame? A very few; if we reflect that in these universal conflagrations, the most minute circumstances sometimes force us along in our destined course, independently of our will, our character, and the resolutions we have taken on the eve of an unexpected event.

PAGE 27.

"The titles of nobility, which our brave warriors had acquired by shedding their blood for their country, were publicly degraded, whilst Georges Cadoudal was publicly ennobled in the person of his father, for having slaughtered Frenchmen, and attempted to commit a parricide."

"Georges, in seeking to attempt the life of Napoleon, &c."

Georges, in seeking to attempt the life of Napoleon, acted under orders; he deserved a reward, as those did who murdered the Duke of Guise, or Marshal d'Ancre, or as Jacques Clement deserved one from the league. It was proper that Georges should be justified, his memory cleared, and his family ennobled. His execution excited no regret, because assassination, from whatever cause, will always be odious in the eyes of the French. The action of Judith needs all the influence of the scriptures, not to shock our feelings.

PAGE 29.

"They began at first, in contempt of the most sacred promises, by stripping the Legion of Honour of its privileges, &c."

The apparent protection given to the institution of the Legion of Honour was a necessary measure of amnesty imposed by circumstances and policy. . . . In fact, who instituted the Legion of Honour? a man invested with an usurped authority. What was the object of the institution? Self-devotion to the protection of the interests acquired by the laws which had despoiled the devoted servants of the third dynasty; to the defence of the territory, that is to say, of the conquests gained from monarchs who were punished, by victory, for having, through policy or generosity, embraced the cause of unfortunate princes. Of whom was the Legion of Honour composed? Of men from the popular classes, who had raised themselves in the Revolution; a great number of whom had even distinguished themselves among the jacobins, those enemies of all order and legitimacy. How many ancient members of the revolutionary committees might be enumerated among them! This institution, a true model of equality, placed princes, marshals of France, and drummers, all in the same rank. Circumstances rendered it necessary to tolerate it; but reasonably and sincerely, it can never be adopted in France as long as proofs of nobility shall continue to be

required by the statutes of the first order in the state, the order of the Holy Ghost.

PAGE 30.

"At length the government in its subversive fury did not even respect the old soldiers whom death, less cruel, had spared on the field of battle; without regard or pity for their white hairs, their glorious wounds, it deprived 2500 of these unfortunate beings of the asylum and benefits which the national gratitude had bestowed on them."

Why blame the government for removing from the Hotel des Invalides at Paris, which has so great an influence over the people of that capital, two or three thousand veterans whose memory was full of the laurels of the Sambre and Meuse, the Rhine and Moselle, of Italy, Egypt, and the Grand Army; and most of whom had seen the white flag flying before them in the plains of Germany! The government ordered, and was bound to order, that particular care should be taken of the aged veterans still remaining of Fontenoy, Lauffen, Raucon, Bergen, &c. This conduct was very natural.

PAGE 75.

"Napoleon, then, was silently awaiting the moment for reappearing in France, when an officer, disguised as a sailor, landed at Porto-Ferrajo, &c."

In the course of six months, upwards of a hundred French and Italian officers arrived at

the Isle of Elba, with their uniforms and swords, with regular passports, and coming direct from France, Corsica, Genoa, Leghorn, Piombino, Civita-Vecchia, or Naples; they each had more or less conversation with Napoleon; they all tried to make him recollect them, by mentioning the acts of bravery by which they had been distinguished; and they brought him news of what was passing in France and Italy.

PAGES 75 and 76.

"'I intrust you,' said he, 'with my history, and that of the 20th of March.' Napoleon being at Malmaison asked me what was become of M. Z .... 'He was killed,' said I, 'on the plain of Mont Saint-Jean.' 'He was very fortunate!' replied he; then continued, 'did he tell you that he came to the Isle of Elba?' 'Yes, Sire, he even left with me the account of his voyage, and of the conversations he had with your Majesty.' 'You must give me that account, it will be of use to me for my Memoirs,' &c."

Napoleon never had any knowledge of this history of the 20th of March.

The whole of this note about M. Z . . . is a romance.

PAGE 79.

"I presented myself at M. X . . . 's, &c."

This narration would lead to the belief that there was some intelligence between the Isle of Elba and Paris, which is essentially false, as

has already been observed; there was no conspiracy to effect the return from the Isle of Elba; and when history shall be able to speak out without reserve, it will prove that the conspiracy which was then forming at Paris, and the ramifications of which extended all over France, had no reference to the 20th of March, but a totally different object.

PAGE 102.

"A favourable breeze swelled our sail, and I soon forgot my anxieties and dangers when I perceived the rock on which I was about to see Napoleon the Great once more."

The Isle of Elba is situate two leagues from the coast of Piombino; the smallest boats easily reach it, coming from the coast of Italy or Corsica. It has seven ports or landing-places, where a great number of French and Italian ships are daily seen arriving and departing. Above four hundred vessels, from seven to a hundred and fifty tons burthen each, belong to the islanders, and are employed in carrying wines and ore for the use of the salt-pits and fisheries, or in supplying the isle with provisions. Besides these, hundreds of Neapolitan and Genoese feluccas, pinks, &c., station themselves in these seas for the purpose of fishing; and, in short, there is not a week passes, but a great number of Barbary, Spanish, Portuguese, French, Genoese, Tuscan, or Neapolitan ships

cast anchor at Porto Ferrajo or Porto Longone, where they put in on account of the weather. The communications were therefore easy, and they always have been frequent and free between all the ports of the Mediterranean and the Isle of Elba. Ships were sent direct thither from Toulon, Marseilles, Genoa, Leghorn, Civita-Vecchia, &c. travelling clerks from Lyons, Marseilles, or the cloth factories of the South arrived there daily, going, on the business of their houses, to Naples or the Levant, and induced by the desire to see Napoleon, or by stress of weather, to put into Porto Ferrajo.

PAGE 105.

"The English sloop commanded by Captain Campbell."

The English sloop on this station was not commanded by Captain Campbell. Colonel Campbell was an officer of infantry. He had been appointed a commissioner by Lord Castlereagh, and had received a diplomatic commission.

PAGE 110.

"Peace is easy on such conditions. Had I been willing . . . . But I would sooner have cut off my hand."

Napoleon wished for peace, but he would never have consented to conditions derogatory to the national honour, and it was only in this sense that he could have said he would sooner

have cut off his hand. He must have wished for peace; for immediately after the battle of Brienne, when the conferences were about to open, he wrote from Troyes to his plenipotentiary at Chatillon, that he gave him all necessary powers and authorities, in short *carte blanche*, for concluding peace, in order to stop the progress of the enemy, so fatal to our provinces, to save the capital, and to avoid a great battle, the loss of which would ruin all the hopes of the nation. These absolute full powers, this blank signature, he gave on the 4th or 5th of February; he did not revoke them until after his victories; thus, during upwards of a fortnight, peace might have been concluded and signed at Chatillon, if the Allies had wished it, without any necessity for the French plenipotentiary to take new instructions from Napoleon, who would not then have been strong enough to refuse to ratify a treaty already signed. But peace was not the object of the Allies; they wanted to wreak their revenge for the triumphs of France; they remembered those days of mourning when they had beheld the French eagle hovering over their capitals. The propositions of Chatillon, like those of Dresden and Frankfort, were a mere bait held out to

delude their own people, and to sow division in France.

The French plenipotentiary required precise instructions respecting the sacrifices to which he might consent. Napoleon was at Nogent-sur-Seine. The grand Marshal Bertrand, and the Duke of Bassano, who were near him, pressed him to accede to the request of the Duke of Vicenza, still leaving him at liberty to depart from those instructions, and to use the *carte blanche* which had been given him. Napoleon had a long conference, which lasted during a great part of the night, with this minister in his closet. It was decided that we ought not to hesitate to abandon Belgium and even the left bank of the Rhine, if peace could only be obtained at this price; but if a treaty could be entered into by means of one of these concessions only, Belgium was to be abandoned first, however desirous Napoleon was to preserve that fine province, because the English ministry, whose principal object would have been attained, would have feared to risk such a national advantage by supporting the demand of other concessions; and besides, Belgium might again be conquered at a more prosperous period, at the expense of a maritime war only, which would not compro-

mise the safety of the empire, whilst no attempt could be made to reconquer the left bank of the Rhine, without exciting a continental war. The instructions to the plenipotentiary were drawn up on these principles: to offer first to give up Belgium, and next the left bank of the Rhine, if declared indispensable. Italy, Piedmont, Genoa, and the state of possession to be established in Germany, were sacrifices made in advance.

Napoleon was to have signed this despatch at seven o'clock in the morning; but at five he received a report on the movements of the Russian and Prussian army, which induced him to think that the face of affairs would shortly be changed by glorious events; he deferred his answer to the Duke of Vicenza, and set out for Champ Aubert. A series of unexpected triumphs raised his hopes: instead of the great battle he had wished to avoid, he gained five memorable victories; the enemy's army lost upwards of 90,000 men in ten days. Instead of having to save his capital by peace, he thought he had saved it by arms. The state of affairs was altered, and he changed his determination. He wrote to Nangis to his plenipotentiary to withdraw his absolute powers, and desired him to take his orders in

future respecting every point of the negotiation, which thenceforth proceeded in the usual forms. Napoleon no longer had to anticipate the demands of the Allies by concessions, but to ascertain, by means of the negotiations proceeding at Chatillon, what were the real intentions of the Allies, and the sacrifices which might be avoided, by means of the advantages which had recently been obtained.

Towards the end of February, Napoleon received the minutes of a preliminary treaty given in by the Allies at Chatillon. No ultimatum could be discerned in this assemblage of revolting proposals. Napoleon thought he had a right to sacrifice all that he had conquered, but, as to abandoning all that republican France had conquered, he did not think he had a right to do it; nevertheless he would have done it, for the safety of the state imposes duties paramount to all other considerations, if a definitive treaty of peace would have been the immediate result of so many painful sacrifices; but it was not a definitive treaty that was proposed to him, but merely preliminaries of peace, an armistice sword in hand; or rather an armistice by which France would have laid down arms, whilst her enemies would have occupied the part of her territories which they

had invaded, and the fortress of Huninguen, Befort, and Besançon, the surrender of which they required. Such a treaty appeared to him nothing but a dishonourable capitulation. He wrote to his plenipotentiary. "Why do not the Allies require us to give up our musquets and cannon to them? Come and take them, would be the only answer to make to such proposals of peace." At the end of the third Punic war, the Romans had at first required the Carthaginians to surrender their ships, and destroy their military engines; Carthage obeyed, and the Roman Senate soon afterwards ordered the inhabitants to abandon the city, because they had been pleased to decide that it should be reduced to ashes.

Instructions were despatched to the Duke of Vicenza for drawing up a counter-proposal. That of the Allies was sent to the Empress, with directions to submit it to an extraordinary council, summoned for the purpose, and chiefly composed of the men who had exercised influence at the different periods of the Revolution, and been raised to the high functions of the empire. One alone rejected the proposal with indignation, as the most insulting of all that are mentioned in the history of France, and as a disgraceful law to which honour it-

self would not allow the French to remain subject; the others were of opinion that it was proper to submit to necessity.

Napoleon, who had never yet been able to discover the true ultimatum of the Allies, sent from Rheims, a few days after the battle of Craonne, new powers to his plenipotentiary, to conclude peace, with this single restriction, that he would sign no treaty of which the evacuation of the territory, and the return of the prisoners made on both sides, should not be the immediate result. This courier met the Duke of Vicenza a few leagues from Chatillon. The Allies had assigned, as at Prague, an absolute limit to the continuance of the negotiations, and they were broken off accordingly.

PAGE 104.

"An English sloop, &c."

There was an English sloop cruising between Genoa, Leghorn, Civita-Vecchia, and the Isle of Elba. It served for the commissions of the agent Campbell; and often afforded a passage to the English travellers who wished to proceed to the Isle of Elba from Leghorn or Genoa. It had no other mission relative to Napoleon, than that of suitable behaviour, and to afford all the little services in its power to the French in the Isle of Elba. The idea that entered into

the mind of Napoleon of landing in France and making war against the French king, was never adverted to: it had not been foreseen by any of the powers, thanks to the libellists.

PAGE 130.

"The Emperor gave orders to have his proclamations printed during the night, and despatched emissaries in every direction to announce that he had entered Grenoble, and was followed by the King of Naples, at the head of 80,000 men, &c."

Napoleon always declared that he entered France alone, and had no other support than that of the French people.

PAGE 201.

"It was a great absurdity to send the Count d'Artois to face Napoleon. It was easy to foresee, that if this prince, in a city of 100,000 souls, should fail against 800 men, all would be over."

Nothing could be better imagined than to send the princes to Lyons, since the King could not go in person. It was the most likely way to prevent a city of 100,000 people from being conquered by 800 men. This step, which is so decisive a proof of the King's sagacity, is treated as imprudent, merely because it failed.

PAGE 212.

"It was a continued alternate cry of *Vive la nation! Vive l'Empereur!* Down with the priests! Down with the royalists! &c."

No cry was heard at Lyons but that of *Vive l'Empereur!—Vive la nation!* had not been usual in France since 1793, and Lyons was, of all France, the part in which this cry was least popular, because it had prevailed there during the demolition of that fine city, and the massacre of its principal citizens by grape-shot.

PAGE 215.

"At Gap and Grenoble he had expressed himself rather as a citizen than as a monarch; not one word or formal assurance had revealed his intentions; it might as well have been supposed that he meditated the restoration of the republic or consulate as that of the empire. At Lyons there was no longer any thing vague or uncertain; he spoke as a sovereign."

The language he held at Lyons was the same as he had held at Gap and Grenoble, and the same as appeared in his proclamations from the Isle of Elba. He never thought of restoring the republic or the consulate. Does he not say in his proclamations, *Come and rejoin your Emperor?* The empire was more popular in France than the republic.

PAGE 216.

"Madame, and dear Wife, I have reascended my throne, &c."

Napoleon's letters to the Empress were always in his own hand-writing. All who were in the intimate confidence of Napoleon well know

that his letters never commenced with *Madame, and dear Wife,* but with, *My good Louisa.*

PAGE 241.

"The Emperor thought to have found Marshal Ney at Auxerre, on his arrival there. 'I cannot conceive,' said he to General Bertrand, 'why Ney is not here. I am surprised and alarmed at this circumstance. Can he have altered his intention?' &c."

From the time when Marshal Ney made his submission, he corresponded four times a day, by extraordinary couriers, with the Grand Marshal, who did the duty of Major-General. His march, and the time at which he ought to reach Auxerre, were therefore known; and there could be no anxiety on the subject.

PAGE 244.

"The next day, the Emperor said, on perceiving him (Marshal Ney), 'Embrace me, my dear Marshal; I am very glad to see you again; I want neither explanation nor justification from you; I always honoured and esteemed you as the brave amongst the brave.' 'Your Majesty may always rely on me, where my country is concerned; it is for my country that I have shed my blood, and I am ready to do so again to the last drop. I love you, Sire, but my country above all. Had you not come to drive them out, we should have done it ourselves,' &c."

The author has had an incorrect report of this conversation; and, besides, this is not

like the conversation of two old warriors, grown grey in their accoutrements; they do not talk like a young Gracchus of twenty. It would have ill become Marshal Ney to adopt such a tone; for the fact is, that instead of commanding his troops, he had been commanded by them, and he had only determined to abandon the King's cause, and go over to that of Napoleon, because the greater part of his regiments had already abandoned him, and the rest of them were about to declare themselves.

PAGE 255.

"General Girard, I am assured that your troops, being acquainted with the decrees of Paris, have resolved, by way of reprisals, to destroy all the royalists they may meet with. You will meet with none but Frenchmen. I forbid you to fire a single musquet. Tranquillize your soldiers; persuade them of the falsehood of the reports by which they are exasperated. Tell them that I would not enter my capital at their head, if their arms were stained with French blood."

Why then did the troops drag after them a park of sixty pieces of cannon, which had been organized with great pains in the arsenals of Grenoble and Auxonne? So if 200 royalist volunteers had chosen to stand their ground, General Girard was to surrender, and give up all his cannon, because he could not fire a single shot; and Napoleon, if he met with any resistance, was not to enter his capital, but to

return to the Isle of Elba! Neither did he ever say to Cambronne, "Do not fire a single musquet," because that did not depend on him; but he said to him, as a prediction: "I hope you will not have to fire a single musquet." Cambronne was accompanied by a hundred brave fellows, furnished with ball cartridges, in order to overcome any resistance that might be offered them. But certainly the resistance that can be overcome with 100 men, or even with 1200, is not an affair of civil war, with respect to a great nation like France.

PAGE 257.

"At our request the Emperor took about 200 horse to accompany him. Up to that time he had had no other escort than General Drouot's carriage which went before his own, and mine which brought up the rear," &c.

When Napoleon reached Fontainebleau, that place was occupied by his troops; there were grand guards of cavalry at all the outlets of the forest, on the Paris, Melun, and Orleans roads, &c. and the forest had been scoured in every direction. These customary precautions were doubly necessary on this occasion; for the Duke de Berry's army was then supposed to be encamped on the heights of Essonne. Napoleon halted during four or five hours of the night, at Moret, at the entrance of

the forest, in order to receive the report of the grand guards sent to all the outlets of the forest.

PAGE 258.

"It was not until noon that the news of the King's departure was brought to him, at the same moment, by a courier from M. de Lavalette," &c.

Napoleon received no letter, either from M. de Lavalette or any other person.

PAGE 260.

"It had been supposed that Napoleon would make a triumphal entrance into his capital."

Napoleon entered Paris, as he did Grenoble and Lyons, at the end of a long day's march, at the head of the very troops that had been assembled to oppose his entrance; in fact, it was not with the grenadiers of the Isle of Elba, or with the garrisons of Grenoble or Lyons, that he entered Paris; but at the head of the troops which had encamped at Villejuif to fight him. He would not have delayed his entrance into the Tuileries a single hour, for the sake of allowing time for making preparations, and entering with greater pomp. Besides, except the first time he went thither from the Luxemburg, as First Consul, and afterwards, at the time of his marriage, when he made his entrance along with Maria Louisa, he always en-

tered Paris without ceremony; he did so after Marengo, after Austerlitz, after Tilsit, after Madrid, after Vienna, in a post-coach, without being announced, and at night.

PAGE 264.

"The Prince of Eckmuhl was nominated minister at war. The harshness of his manners and language, and his almost barbarous acts of severity, had drawn general animadversion upon him; but his fidelity to the Emperor and his defence of Hamburg had since reconciled the public to him. The weakness and versatility of his character excited, however, some apprehensions; but it was hoped that the Emperor would be able to master him, and that the army would derive solid advantages from his indefatigable zeal and strict probity."

A character drawn with much acrimony and injustice.

PAGE 265.

"The Duke of Otranto was intrusted with the police, &c."

The Duke of Otranto was intrusted with the police, because Cambaceres, the Duke of Bassano, Lavalette, Savary himself, Real, and all those in whom Napoleon placed most confidence, united to bear testimony to his good conduct in 1814, which had even exposed him to much danger. All these circumstances induced Napoleon to overcome his own repugnance to replacing in office a man whom he knew to be so thoroughly immoral.

PAGE 265.

"The situation of Minister of the Interior, intended, at first, for M. Costaz, was likewise offered to M. Molé, and given, eventually, to M. Carnot, on the recommendation of the Duke of Bassano."

The post of Minister of the Interior was never intended for M. de Costaz.

PAGE 272.

"The same favour was offered to La Bedoyere in reward for his conduct at Grenoble; but he only answered Napoleon's favours by a formal refusal, &c."

La Bedoyere was a true Frenchman; he was guided by the noblest and most chivalrous sentiments in the step he took at Grenoble; a devotion admirable at that time, when all was doubtful. He was too sensible how much he was honoured by the distinction granted him by Napoleon, in attaching him to his own person, to make the slightest difficulty of accepting it.

PAGE 282.

"He found his writing-table covered with mystical books, &c."

The table in the king's closet was covered with all the works which had been dedicated to him during the preceding nine months, and with seven or eight hundred memorials or reports on secret affairs. It is true that his personal portfolio, in which were his private

papers, such as the Duchess of Angouleme's correspondence since the time when she was in the Temple; that of Louis XVI. and Lord Malmesbury's letter announcing the death of the king, had been left on the small table. No person obtained any knowledge of these papers; Napoleon reserved the examination of them to himself exclusively; several of them were very curious, and sometimes gave rise to singular scenes.

PAGE 307.

"The guards and their worthy chiefs were only ambitious of preserving the title of grenadiers of the Isle of Elba. Vain illusion! The Emperor's thoughts, wholly absorbed by other cares, reverted no more to the brave men who had shared his exile and his misfortunes, &c."

It was not proper that the battalion of the Isle of Elba should form a separate corps; this would have made a guard within a guard. The grenadiers of the Isle of Elba were only the deputation of the guard. When volunteers were asked for, the whole guard presented themselves; there was, therefore, no reason to lower the other soldiers of the guard in any respect whatever. The subdivision of the guard would have been an error which would not have failed to have produced bad consequences; but all the soldiers of the Isle of Elba received the Legion of Honour; all those

who were capable of promotion were made sergeants; all the officers were advanced. As to the motives ascribed to Napoleon, such assertions are too paltry to deserve any answer.

PAGE 311.

"The orders given to General Excelmans were merely to force the King and princes out of France, step by step; he was never directed either to secure their persons, or to kill them in case of resistance.

"The instructions given at the same time to Marshal Ney, who was sent on a mission to the Northern and Eastern frontiers, commanded him in positive terms to cause the royal family to be respected, and to facilitate their free and peaceable departure out of France, by all possible means."

The instructions given to Excelmans were just what they ought to have been; namely, to make prisoners of the guard, the princes, and the King, if possible.

No instructions relative to the Bourbons were given to Marshal Ney; when he went to inspect the Flemish fortresses, those princes had long before quitted France.

PAGE 309.

"It has been maintained that the Duke of Bassano, entrusted for the moment with the portfolio of the Interior, had transmitted orders to arrest the King, to M. Simeon, then prefect royal at Lille. The Duke of Bassano, indignant at this odious imputation, &c."

The Duke of Bassano was not charged to

evening, the Duke of Bassano, when occupied with Napoleon, handed him a second telegraphic despatch, stating that, pursuant to the refusal of the ratification by the general-in-chief, the capitulation no longer existed. Napoleon asked his minister whether the first despatch had been forwarded? Yes. Whether, when he forwarded it, he had received the second? Yes. Napoleon approved of the conduct of his minister, and if it were necessary to tell those who will read this, why he did so, they would not comprehend it; nor could they know any thing of Napoleon's character. And the Duke of Bassano is wandering in exile!

PAGE 337.

"People could not forgive him (the King of Naples) for having, in 1814, betrayed his brother-in-law and benefactor, and revealed to Austria in 1815, the patriotic conspiracy of Milan. I know not whether the latter accusation be true; but whether true or false, it produced the same effect on the minds of the Italians."

The conspiracy of the patriots of Milan was revealed by an intriguing Frenchman, who, according to his own report of the business, which was handed to Napoleon during the hundred days, had been charged to contrive plots for transferring the iron crown to the

head of the Duke of Berri. This man related in his report, that having discovered that a conspiracy was hatching by the Italian patriots, he succeeded in getting into their confidence. He was in hopes of directing them towards his own aims, but this hope soon vanished. He ascertained that the conspiracy was wholly Italian; Republican, and not Monarchical; embracing not only the kingdom of Italy, but the whole of that country. He no longer thought of any thing but frustrating it. It was no longer in the name of a French prince that he laboured, but in that of the patriots of France, who, he said, wished for an alliance, and were ready to rise to support the Italians. He assured them that not only the Lyonnese, and Dauphiny, but Savoy and the Maritime Alps also, only awaited the event to take up arms. The Milanese patriots admitted this wretch into their councils; they deliberated before him and with him; and it was in his presence that their plan was determined on. The signal for the Revolution was to be given by the carrying off of Marshal Bellegarde, who inhabited the Villa-Bonaparte, a country house almost isolated, and situated at one of the extremities of Milan. The day of the execution of the plan was several times adjourned, to the

great alarm of the traitor, who durst not approach this place for fear of being suspected by the conspirators before the day should be appointed. It was at length fixed; upon which he instantly hastened to Marshal Bellegarde's, and, if he is to be believed, after having required the Marshal to give him his word of honour that he would spare the lives of the authors of the plot which he was about to disclose to him, he revealed all the particulars, and gave him complete lists of the conspirators, who were immediately seized and carried into the citadel of Mantua; they are there undergoing, and will long have to suffer, the punishment of their enterprise.

PAGE 385.

"Napoleon had never been able to overcome the repugnance with which the veterans of the Revolution inspired him; he feared their constancy and boldness, and would have thought himself menaced or lost, if they had regained consistency and influence. This panic terror was the reason that he did not derive from the confederation all the benefit which he had promised himself, and which they would undoubtedly have afforded him if he had not damped their ardour. It was also the reason of his committing, perhaps, a still greater error, in stopping the popular commotions, which had manifested themselves in most of the departments. In the critical situation in which he stood, and into which he had drawn France, he ought not to have despised any means of safety; and the most efficacious and analogous to his

situation would indisputably have been to connect the people in the strongest manner with his fortune and defence."

The veterans of the Revolution were Cambaceres, Merlin, Sieyes, Carnot, and Alquier.

The popular movement was not stopped, but regulated. It was as great as that from 1790 to 1792; but then there were three years to arm in, and now there were only forty days; at that period the attack was made by an army of only 80,000 men; but now we were assailed by 600,000. Had France been attacked in 1792 by only 300,000 men, Paris would have been taken, notwithstanding the energy of the nation, and the three years spent in preparing for defence.

PAGE 392.

"He also went to the polytechnic school; it was the first time he had ever presented himself to the view of the pupils of that school. Their love of absolute liberty, their inclination for republican institutions, had long estranged Napoleon's affection from them; but the brilliant valour they displayed under the walls of Paris restored them his esteem and friendship; and he was glad (these were his very words) to find so honourable an opportunity of reconciliation with them."

The polytechnic school was always the object of Napoleon's solicitude. It was founded by Monge, to whom he was attached. Laplace, Lagrange, and Prony, his friends, were at the

head of it. The mathematical and chemical sciences, to which he was partial, were taught there. What gave rise to the popular report that Napoleon did not like this school, was, that the scholars, most of whom were above fifteen years of age, being led into dissipation in the midst of the capital, were put into barracks, which at first displeased them.

PAGE 404.

"The death of the Duke d'Enghien was long imputed, and is still ascribed by people unacquainted with the truth, to M. de Caulaincourt."

Caulaincourt, Napoleon's *aide-de-camp*, was bound to obey the instructions which Berthier and Talleyrand, the minister of exterior relations, were ordered to give him for the mission with which he was intrusted:

1st, To frustrate the intrigues of the English ministry on the right bank of the Rhine:

2dly, To secure the persons and papers of the Baroness Reich and her accomplices, who were at Offemberg plotting the overthrow of the consular government, and the death of the First Consul:

3dly, To inspect and expedite the armament of the flotilla:

4thly, To cause explanations to be transmitted to the Court of Baden, respecting the vio-

lation of its territory, as soon as Ordenner should have seized the Duke d'Enghien.

It was Ordenner's duty to obey the order to pass the Rhine with 300 dragoons and to carry off the Prince.

It was the duty of the military commission to condemn him, if found guilty. Innocent or guilty, it was the duty of Ordenner and Caulaincourt to obey; if guilty, the military commission ought to have condemned him: if innocent it ought to have acquitted him, for no order can justify the conscience of a judge. There is no doubt but that if Caulaincourt had been appointed the Duke d'Enghien's judge, he would have refused the office; but being charged with a diplomatic commission, he had only to obey; the whole affair is so simple, that only folly, or the delirium of the spirit of party, can object to it.

This party madness, however, eager to assail an ancient name distinguished by new and honourable services, furiously attacked Caulaincourt on this occasion. The hatred and injustice thus manifested were amongst the causes of his favour. Before the Imperial reign, Caulaincourt was intrusted with one department of the duty of the palace, and received at a subsequent period only the title

appertaining to functions which he already fulfilled.

The death of the Duke d'Enghien ought to be attributed to those persons at London who directed and ordered the assassination of the First Consul, and who intended the Duke de Berri to enter France by Beville-cliffs, and the Duke d'Enghien by Strasburg; it ought also to be ascribed to those who eagerly sought, by reports and conjectures, to represent the Duke as the head of the conspiracy; it ought to form an eternal reproach against those who, hurried away by a criminal zeal, did not wait for the orders of their sovereign to execute the judgment of the military commission. The Duke d'Enghien fell a victim to the intrigues of the time. His death, with which Napoleon has been so unjustly reproached, was injurious to him, and could not have answered any political purpose. Had Napoleon been capable of such a crime, Louis XVIII. and Ferdinand would not now be reigning: their death, as has already been observed, was several times proposed, and even recommended to him.

PAGE 407.

" This decree, although supposed to have been drawn up at Lyons, appeared at Lyons, and was, as I have just said, the result of the resentment which Napoleon felt at the in-

trigues of the royalists. . . . . I was the person who wrote this decree by Napoleon's dictation. When I had finished, he ordered me to get it signed by Count Bertrand, who had countersigned the decrees of Lyons. I repaired to the Marshal. He read the decree, and returned it to me, saying, 'I will never sign it; that is not what Napoleon promised us.'"

The decree was made at Lyons, but it had not been published, for good reasons. On arriving at Paris, the decrees of Lyons were to be inserted in the Bulletin of the Laws; some difficulties occurred. The lawyers thought them ill drawn up, and likely to cause alarm. They were sent back to the council of state, which put them into a more legal form, in which state they were adopted and signed. At Lyons, Napoleon was more than a dictator; he was a conqueror. Bertrand neither could nor ought to have signed a decree; the signature of a major-general is merely to attest a copy. The Duke de Bassano refused to countersign the decrees as Minister Secretary of State; it was on that account that they appeared only as dated at Lyons, merely signed as true copies. In Book III. of the year 1815, this anecdote, so honourable to the character of Count Bertrand, will again be noticed.

PAGE 410.

"The effect which it produced justified the apprehensions of the Grand-Marshal. It was regarded as an act of vengeance and despotism."

Despotism on the part of a conqueror! a strange misapplication of language; despotism on the part of a man who dissolved the two chambers of the legislature! &c. The sequestration on Talleyrand's effects having been laid on that very day, there were letters of his found in his house addressed to the Duchess d'Angouleme, and even sealed.

VOLUME II. PAGE 1.

"But what was Napoleon's astonishment when the Duke of Vicenza came and informed him that a secret agent of M. de Metternich had arrived from Vienna at Paris, and appeared to have had a mysterious interview with M. Fouché."

Napoleon was not astonished, because he was already aware of the suspected intrigues of M. Fouché, in consequence of the mission of M. de Montron. He was going to have Fouché arrested and his papers seized, when the Duke of Vicenza brought him this intelligence. He suspended his resolution until M. de Fleury's return from Bâle, for the report of Fouché's disgrace would have put Werner to flight.

PAGE 4.

"I had never heard of this M. Werner."

It was well known that M. Werner's family had always been attached to the Metternichs; and that Baron Werner, the father, having been promoted in Austria, to high magisterial situations, had formerly been Administrator-general of the Abbey of Oxenhausen, which had devolved on Prince Metternich, by way of indemnity, through the arrangements of Germany. The Werners were in all the secrets of the affairs of that house; it was therefore natural to consider him as admitted to intimate confidence; and on that supposition his mission became important.

APPENDIX OF DOCUMENTS.

SECTION I.

NOTE from PRINCE METTERNICH, in answer to that of the DUKE of BASSANO, dated Dresden, Aug. 18.

Prague, Aug. 21, 1813.

THE undersigned, Minister-Secretary of State and Foreign Affairs, received yesterday the official letter which his Excellency the Duke of Bassano did him the honour to address to him on the 15th of August last.

War having broken out between Austria and France, the Austrian Cabinet does not now consider it necessary to answer the gratuitous accusations contained in the Duke of Bassano's note; strong in general opinion, Austria calmly awaits the judgment of Europe and of posterity.

As the proposal of his Majesty the Emperor of the French, still holds out to his Imperial Majesty a ray of hope of effecting a general pacification, his Imperial Majesty has thought it may be possible to seize the opportunity, and has consequently ordered the undersigned to acquaint the Russian and Prussian Cabinets with the proposal to open a Congress, which, even during the war, may deliberate on the means of effecting a general pacification. Their Majesties the Emperor Alexander and the King of Prussia, actuated by the

same sentiments as their August Ally, have authorized the undersigned to declare to his Excellency the Duke of Bassano that, being unable to decide on a subject of entirely common interest, without previously consulting the other Allies, the three courts will immediately communicate to them the proposal of France.

The undersigned has orders to transmit to the French Cabinet, with the least possible delay, the overtures of all the Allied Courts, in answer to the above-mentioned proposal.

The undersigned has the honour to present to the Duke of Bassano the renewed assurance of his high consideration.

(Signed) PRINCE METTERNICH.

NOTE written at Frankfort, October 10, by M. DE SAINT-AIGNAN.

COUNT METTERNICH has informed me, that the circumstance which has brought me to the head-quarters of the Emperor of Austria, may render it proper for me to carry back to his Majesty, the Emperor, the answer to the proposals which he made through Count Merfeldt. Count Metternich and Count Nesselrode have accordingly requested me to inform his Majesty, in reply:

That the Allied Powers were engaged to each other by indissoluble bonds, in which their strength consisted, and from which they would never detach themselves.

That the reciprocal engagements which they had

contracted had induced them to come to the determination of making no peace but a general one; that at the time of the Congress of Prague, there had been room to consider of a continental peace, because circumstances would not have afforded time to communicate for the purpose of treating in a different way; but that, since that time, the intentions of England and of all the other powers had been made known; and that it was therefore now become impossible to think, either of an armistice, or of any negotiation, of which the object of a general peace should not be the first principle.

That the Allied Sovereigns were unanimously agreed on the power and preponderance which France ought to retain in her integrity, confining herself within her natural limits, which are the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees.

That the principle of the independence of Germany was a condition *sine quâ non;* that France must therefore relinquish, not the influence which a great state necessarily exercises over a state of inferior strength, but all sovereignty over Germany; that it was, moreover, a principle laid down by his Majesty himself, in declaring that great powers ought to be separated by states of inferior strength.

That on the side of the Pyrenees the independence of Spain and the restoration of the ancient dynasty was likewise a condition *sine quâ non.*

That in Italy, Austria must have a frontier, which might be a subject of negotiation; that Piedmont presented several lines, which might be considered of, as well as the state of Italy; provided always that the

former, as well as Italy, should be governed in a manner independent of France or of any other preponderant power.

That the state of Holland would in like manner be a subject of negotiation, always proceeding on the principle that it should be independent.

That England was ready to make the greatest sacrifices for the sake of a peace founded on these principles, and to acknowledge such freedom of trade and navigation as France had a right to claim.

That if these principles of a general pacification should be agreed to by his Majesty, such place as should be deemed suitable on the right bank of the Rhine might be neutralized; whither the Plenipotentiaries of all the Allied Powers might proceed immediately; without suspending the course of the military operations on account of the negotiations.

At Frankfort, 10th Nov. 1813.

(Signed) SAINT-AIGNAN.

LETTER from the DUKE of BASSANO to PRINCE METTERNICH.

Paris, Nov. 16, 1813.

SIR,

BARON SAINT-AIGNAN arrived here on Monday, and has reported to us, according to the communications made to him by your Excellency, that England has acceded to the proposal of the opening of a Congress for a general peace, and that the powers are disposed to neutralize a town on the right bank of the Rhine for the reception of the Plenipotentiaries. His

Majesty is desirous that this town should be Manheim. The Duke of Vicenza, whom he intends for his plenipotentiary, will proceed thither as soon as your Excellency shall have informed me of the day fixed by the Powers for the opening of the Congress.

It appears, to us, Sir, to be proper and conformable to custom, that there should be no troops at Manheim, and that the duty should be done by the burgesses, whilst the police might be intrusted to a bailly, to be named by the Grand Duke of Baden. If it should be thought expedient to have piquets of cavalry, their strength ought to be equal on both sides. As to the communications of the English Plenipotentiary with his government, they might be carried on by way of France and Calais.

A peace, founded on the independence of all nations, as well in a continental as in a maritime point of view, has constantly been the object of the wishes and policy of his Majesty the Emperor.

His Majesty augurs favourably from M. de Saint-Aignan's report of what was said by the English Minister.

I have the honour to present to your Excellency the assurance of my high consideration.

(Signed) The DUKE of BASSANO.

REPORT of BARON SAINT-AIGNAN.

ON the 26th of October, having for two days been treated as a prisoner at Weimar, where were the head-quarters of the Emperors of Russia and Austria, I re-

ceived orders to set out the following day with the column of prisoners which was proceeding into Bohemia. Up to that time I had not seen any one, or made any application, thinking that the title with which I was invested spoke for itself, and having protested, in the first instance, against the manner in which I was treated. I thought it right, however, under these circumstances, to write to Prince Schwartzenberg and Count Metternich, and to represent to them the impropriety of this proceeding. Prince Schwartzenberg immediately sent Count de Parr, his first aide-de-camp, to me, to apologize for the mistake committed with respect to me, and to invite me to proceed to his quarters or those of M. de Metternich. I immediately proceeded to the latter, Prince Schwartzenberg having absented himself. Count Metternich received me with marked attention. He said only a few words respecting my situation, from which he undertook to extricate me, expressing himself happy to render me this service, and, at the same time, to testify the esteem which the Emperor felt for the Duke of Vicenza; he then talked to me of the Congress, without being led into this conversation by any expression of mine. We were sincerely desirous of peace, (said he,) and are so still, and we will make it; the only thing is to meet the question in a direct and open manner. The coalition will remain united. No indirect means, which the Emperor Napoleon might adopt to obtain peace, would now succeed. Let a candid understanding be come to, and peace will be made.

After this conversation Count Metternich desired

me to go to Tœplitz, where he said I should speedily hear from him, and hoped he should see me again on my return. I set out for Tœplitz on the 27th of October, and reached that place on the 30th. On the 2d of November I received a letter from Count Metternich, in consequence of which I left Tœplitz on the 3d, and proceeded to the head-quarters of the Emperor of Austria, at Frankfort, where I arrived on the 8th. I called on M. de Metternich on the same day. He immediately began to talk to me about the progress of the combined armies, the revolution which was taking place in Germany, and the necessity of making peace; he told me that the Allies, long before the declaration of Austria, had saluted the Emperor of Austria by the title of Emperor of Germany; that he did not accept this insignificant title, and that Germany was more his by this method than before; that he was anxious that the Emperor Napoleon should be convinced that the greatest calmness and spirit of moderation would prevail in the council of the Allies; that they would not sever, because they wished to preserve their activity and strength, and that their strength was in proportion to their moderation; that there was no enmity to the dynasty of the Emperor Napoleon; that England was more moderate than was imagined; that there never had been a more favourable opportunity for treating with her; that if the Emperor Napoleon was really desirous of making a solid peace, he would spare mankind many calamities, and save France from great danger, by not delaying the negotiations; that the parties were ready to come to an understanding; that the prin-

ciples of the intended peace ought to set just limits to the power of England, and to afford France, and the other European Powers, all the maritime freedom they had a right to claim; that England was ready to restore to Holland, when made independent, that which she would not restore to her as a French province; that, what M. de Merfeldt had been instructed to say on the part of the Emperor Napoleon, might have given rise to the message I was required to carry; that I was only required to repeat it exactly, without any alteration whatever; that the Emperor Napoleon was unwilling to comprehend the possibility of a balance of power in Europe; that such equilibrium was not only possible, but even necessary; that it had been proposed, at Dresden, to take in indemnity countries which the Emperor no longer possessed, such as the grand-duchy of Warsaw; and that similar compensations might still be made under the present circumstances.

On the 9th M. de Metternich sent to request me to come to his house at nine in the evening. He came from the Emperor's apartments, and delivered me his Majesty's letter for the Empress. He told me that Count Nesselrode was coming to his house, and that he would, in concert with that nobleman, impart to me the message I was to carry to the Emperor. He desired me to tell the Duke of Vicenza, that the sentiments of esteem, which his noble character had always inspired, were still felt towards him.

Presently afterwards Count Nesselrode came in. He repeated to me, in a few words, what Count Metternich

had already said respecting the mission I was requested to undertake; and added, that Count Hardenberg might be regarded as present, and as approving all that was about to be said. M. de Metternich then explained the intentions of the Allies, as I was to report them to the Emperor. After having heard him, I answered, that as I was only to hear and not speak, I had nothing to do but report his words literally; and that, for greater certainty, I requested permission to make a minute of them for my own use only, and to lay it before him. Count Nesselrode then proposing that I should immediately make this minute, M. de Metternich desired me to step alone into a closet, where I wrote the note hereto annexed. When I had written it I returned into the apartment. M. de Metternich said, "Here is Lord Aberdeen, the English Ambassador. Our intentions are common, we may therefore continue to explain ourselves before him." He then requested me to read what I had written. When I came to the article concerning England, Lord Aberdeen did not seem to have perfectly understood it. I read it a second time. He then observed that the expressions *liberty of commerce* and *rights of navigation* were very vague. I replied, that I had written, according to M. de Metternich's direction. M. de Metternich observed, that, in fact, these expressions might raise misunderstandings, and that it would be better to substitute others. He took the pen, and wrote, that England would make the greatest sacrifices to obtain *a peace on these foundations*, (those previously described.)

I observed that these expressions were as vague as those for which they were substituted. Lord Aberdeen was of the same opinion, and said that it would be better to restore what I had previously written; that he repeated the assurance, that England was ready to make the greatest sacrifices; that she possessed much, and that she would restore profusely. The rest of the note being found conformable to what I had heard, the conversation afterwards turned on indifferent subjects.

Prince Schwartzenberg came in, and all that had been said was repeated to him. Count Nesselrode, who had absented himself for a moment during this conversation, returned, and charged me, on the part of the Emperor Alexander, to tell the Duke of Vicenza, that he should never alter the opinion he had formed of his honour and high character, and that, if he were charged with a negotiation, matters would soon be arranged.

I was to have set out the following morning, Nov. 10, but Prince Schwartzenberg sent to request me to defer my departure to the evening, not having had time to write to the Prince of Neufchatel.

At night he sent Count Voyna, one of his aides-de-camp, to me, who gave me his letter, and conducted me to the French advanced posts. I reached Mentz on the morning of the 11th.

(Signed) SAINT-AIGNAN.

PRINCE METTERNICH to the DUKE of BASSANO.

MONSIEUR LE DUC,

THE Courier, whom your Excellency despatched from Paris on the 16th of November, arrived here yesterday.

I hastened to lay before their Imperial Majesties and his Majesty the King of Prussia the letter you did me the honour to address to me.

Their Majesties saw, with satisfaction, that the confidential conversation with M. de Saint-Aignan had been looked upon by his Majesty the Emperor of the French, as a proof of the pacific intentions of the high Allied Powers; animated with one spirit, unchangeable in their views, and indissoluble in their alliance, they are ready to enter into negotiations the moment they have the certainty that the Emperor of the French admits the general and summary principles which I indicated in my conversation with Baron Saint-Aignan.

There is, however, no mention of these foundations in your Excellency's letter. It merely expresses a principle in which all the governments of Europe participate, and which is amongst the first wishes of each of them. This principle, however, cannot, on account of its generality, supply the place of a definite basis.

Their Majesties are desirous that the Emperor Napoleon should explain himself on this latter point, as the only means of preventing the progress of the negotiations from being impeded by insurmountable difficulties from their very opening.

The choice of the town of Manheim seems to pre-

sent no obstacles to the Allies; its neutralization, and the measures of police proposed by your Excellency, being perfectly according to usage, can, in no case, produce any.

Accept, M. le Duc, the assurances of my high consideration.

(Signed) PRINCE METTERNICH.

DECLARATION OF FRANKFORT.

Frankfort, Dec. 1, 1813.

THE French government has just decreed a new levy of 300,000 conscripts. The preamble to the Senatus-Consultum contains a challenge to the Allied Powers. They find themselves called upon to promulgate anew, in the face of the world, the views which guide them in the present war, and the principles which form the basis of their conduct, wishes, and determinations.

The Allied Powers do not make war against France, but against that openly declared preponderance, which, to the misfortune of Europe and of France, the Emperor Napoleon has too long exercised beyond the limits of his empire.

Victory has conducted the allied armies to the Rhine. The first use which their Imperial and Royal Majesties made of their successes was to offer peace to his Majesty the Emperor of the French. Their position, strengthened by the accession of all the sovereigns and princes of Germany, did not influence the conditions of peace. Those conditions are founded as much on

the independence of the French empire, as on the independence of the other states of Europe. The views of the Allied Powers are just in their object, generous and liberal in their application, encouraging to all, honourable to every one.

The Allied Sovereigns are desirous that France should be great, strong, and happy, because the French power, great and strong, is one of the chief foundations of the social edifice. They wish France to be happy, her commerce to revive, and the arts, those blessings of peace, to flourish in her territories, because a great nation can only be tranquil in proportion as it is happy. The Allied Powers confirm to the French empire an extent of territory which France, under her kings, never knew, because a valiant nation is not degraded by having, in its turn, suffered some reverses in an obstinate and sanguinary struggle, in which it has fought with its accustomed bravery.

But the Allied Powers also wish to be free, happy, and tranquil themselves. They are desirous of a state of peace, calculated, by a prudent division of strength, by a just equilibrium, to preserve the different nations for the future from those innumerable calamities which have, for the last twenty years, oppressed Europe.

The Allied Powers will not disarm without attaining this grand and beneficent result, this noble object of their efforts. They will not disarm until the political state of Europe shall be re-established; until immoveable principles shall have resumed their rights over vain pretensions; in short, until the sanctity of treaties shall at length have secured a real peace to Europe.

LETTER from the DUKE of VICENZA to PRINCE METTERNICH.

Paris, Dec. 2, 1813.

PRINCE,

I HAVE laid before his Majesty the letter addressed by your Excellency, on the 25th of November, to the Duke of Bassano.

By admitting, without restriction, as the basis of peace, the independence of all nations, as well in their territorial as maritime relations, France has admitted in principle what the Allies seemed to desire; his Majesty has, on that very account, admitted all the consequences of this principle, the final result of which ought to be a peace founded on the equilibrium of Europe, on the acknowledgment of the integrity of all nations within their natural limits, and on the acknowledgment of the absolute independence of all states, so that no one may arrogate to itself, over any other, either sovereignty or supremacy, under any form whatever, either by land or sea.

It is however with lively satisfaction that I inform your Excellency that I am authorized by the Emperor my august master to declare that his Majesty adheres to the general and summary principles which were communicated by M. de St. Aignan: they will require great sacrifices on the part of France; but his Majesty will make them without regret, if England, by similar sacrifices, will give an opportunity of concluding a general and honourable peace for all parties, which

your Excellency affirms to be the wish, not only of the ontinental powers, but of England likewise.

Accept, Prince, &c.

(Signed) CAULAINCOURT, DUKE OF VICENZA.

ANSWER from PRINCE METTERNICH to the DUKE of VICENZA.

Frankfort-on the Maine, Dec. 10, 1813.

MONSIEUR LE DUC,

THE official note which your Excellency did me the honour to address to me, on the 2d of December, reached me from Cassel by our advanced posts. I lost no time in laying it before their Majesties. They observed with satisfaction that his Majesty the Emperor of the French had adopted a basis essential to the re-establishment of a state of equilibrium, and to the future tranquillity of Europe. They wished this document to be immediately communicated to their allies. Their Imperial and Royal Majesties have no doubt but that the negotiations may be opened immediately on receipt of the answers.

We shall be eager to have the honour of informing your Excellency of that event, and thereupon to concert with you the arrangements which shall appear to us best adapted to attain the object we purpose to ourselves.

I beg you will accept the assurances of the high consideration, &c.

(Signed) PRINCE METTERNICH.

LETTER from NAPOLEON to the DUKE of VICENZA, Minister of Exterior Relations, during the Congress of Chatillon.

Paris, Jan. 4th, 1814.

MONSIEUR LE DUC,

I APPROVE of M. de la Besnardiere's being charged with the portfolio. I think it is doubtful whether the Allies are sincere, and whether England is desirous of peace; for my part, I am; but only for a solid and honourable one. France, without its natural limits, without Ostend and Antwerp, would no longer be in proportion to the other powers of Europe. England and all the powers acknowledged these limits at Frankfort. The conquests of France on this side of the Rhine and the Alps are not equivalent to what Austria, Russia, and Prussia have acquired in Poland and Finland; or to what England has seized in Asia. The policy of England, and the hatred of the Emperor of Russia, will draw in Austria. I accepted the basis of Frankfort, but it is more than probable that the Allies have other ideas. Their proposals were merely a mask. When negotiations are once placed under the influence of military events, it is impossible to foresee the consequences of such a system. You must hear and observe every thing. It is not certain that you will be received at head-quarters. The Russians and English will be anxious to remove, before-hand, all means of conciliation and explanation with the Emperor of Austria. You must endeavour to discover the views of the Allies, and communicate to me, every day, what you have learnt, in order to enable me to give you instructions, which I have not, at present, sufficient information to prepare. Do they wish to reduce

France to her ancient limits? This would be debasing her. . . . . .

. . . . . .

If there are people who imagine that the misfortunes of war can induce the people to wish for such a peace, they deceive themselves. There is not a French heart which would not feel the opprobrium of it before six months had elapsed, and which would not reproach the government that had been cowardly enough to sign it. Italy is untouched; the viceroy has a fine army. In less than a week I shall have collected troops enough to fight several battles, even before the arrival of my forces from Spain. The devastations of the Cossacks will drive the inhabitants to arms, and double our forces. If I am seconded by the nation, the enemy is marching to his destruction. If fortune betray me, my resolution is taken, I will not cling to the throne. I will neither disgrace the nation nor myself, by subscribing shameful conditions. We must know what Metternich wants; it is not the interest of Austria to carry matters to extremities; one step more, and that power will cease to be the principal character. In this state of things I can prescribe nothing to you. Confine yourself for the moment to hearing every thing, and communicating it to me. I am setting out for the army. We shall be so near that your first reports will cause no delay in the business. Send me couriers frequently. Hereupon I pray God to have you in his holy keeping.

(Signed) NAPOLEON.

The Duke of Vicenza to Prince Metternich.

Luneville, Jan. 6, 1814.

Prince,

The letter which your Excellency did me the honour to write to me on the 10th of last month, has reached me.

The Emperor is unwilling to form any premature opinion respecting the motives which can have made it necessary that his full and entire acquiescence in the principles proposed by your Excellency, in concert with the Ministers of Russia and England, and by the consent of Prussia, should be communicated to the Allies before the opening of the Congress. It is difficult to conceive that Lord Aberdeen could have had powers to propose terms, without powers to negotiate. His Majesty will not do the Allies the injustice to suppose that they were undecided, and are still deliberating. They are too well aware that every conditional offer becomes an absolute engagement with respect to him who has made it, as soon as the condition he attached to it is fulfilled. At all events we had reason to expect by the 6th of January the answer which your Excellency announced to us on the 10th of December. Your correspondence and the reiterated declarations of the Allied Powers do not allow us to foresee any difficulties; and the reports of M. de Talleyrand, on his return from Switzerland, confirm the assurance that their intentions remain unaltered.

Whence, then, can delays arise? His Majesty, having nothing more at heart than the speedy resto-

ration of a general peace, thought he could not give a stronger proof of the sincerity of his sentiments in this respect, than by sending to the Allied Sovereigns his Minister for Foreign Affairs, furnished with full powers. I therefore lose no time in informing you, Prince, that I shall wait at your advanced posts for the passports necessary for passing through the posts of the Allied armies, and reaching your Excellency.

Accept, &c.

(Signed,) CAULAINCOURT, Duke of Vicenza.

PRINCE METTERNICH to the DUKE of VICENZA.

Friburg-in-Brisgau, Jan. 8, 1814.

MONSIEUR LE DUC,

I RECEIVED yesterday the letter which your Excellency did me the honour to address to me from Luneville, on the 6th of this month.

The delay of the communication which the French Government expected, in consequence of my offer of the 10th of December, arises from the course of proceeding which the Allied Powers were obliged to adopt amongst themselves. The confidential explanations with Baron Saint-Aignan having led to official overtures on the part of France, their Imperial and Royal Majesties considered the answer written by your Excellency, on the 2d of December, as of a nature to require to be made known to their Allies. The suppositions admitted by your Excellency, that it was Lord Aberdeen who proposed terms, and that he was furnished with full powers for that purpose, are totally unfounded.

The Court of London has just despatched the Secretary of State for the department of Foreign Affairs to the Continent. His Imperial Majesty of all the Russias, being at present at a considerable distance from this place, and Lord Castlereagh being expected every moment, the Emperor, my august master, and his Majesty the King of Prussia, direct me to inform your Excellency, that you will receive an answer to your proposal of proceeding to the head-quarters of the Allied Sovereigns as speedily as possible. I request your Excellency, &c.

(Signed,) PRINCE METTERNICH.

M. DE LA BESNARDIERE to the DUKE of VICENZA.

Paris, Jan. 13, 1814.

MONSEIGNEUR,

HIS Majesty commands me to inform your Excellency that he has received your despatch of the 12th, brought by the courier Simiame. He deigned to deliver to me this despatch and the documents annexed to it, except the report of M. Cham.

His Majesty approves of your correspondence being directly addressed to him; but it is his intention to answer it through the medium of the Cabinet, to which he wishes to submit every essential point in the negotiation, and all the documents tending to shew the state of it, at every period. He consequently desires that all your Excellency's despatches may be divided into official or ostensible, and *confidential*, a word which he

authorizes your Excellency to use to denote the despatches which may contain facts or particulars with which his Majesty alone ought to be acquainted.

His Majesty has recommended all the English gazettes to be sent to you; he has ordered the Minister of General Police to address them to the Ministry within twenty-four hours after their arrival at Paris, so that your Excellency will want only those which may not have arrived here.

His Majesty approves your Excellency's determination to remain at Luneville, and await the arrival of Lord Castlereagh at Friburg; as he sailed on the first of this month, it is probable that he is now arrived, or on the point of arriving.

His Majesty farther orders me to inform your Excellency, that the Emperor of Austria's letter to his august daughter is nearly to the same effect as that of M. de Metternich; that the Emperor again protests that whatever may be the course of events, he will never separate the cause of his daughter and grandson from that of France. As that may allude to schemes conceived by other powers in favour of the Bourbons, it is important to shew no apprehension on this point, and to let it be understood, that to bring forward the Bourbons would only serve to awaken sentiments very unfavourable to the hopes of their partizans; and that if a party could be formed in France, it could only be that of the Revolution, vulgarly called the *Jacobins*.

Condescend, my Lord Duke, to accept the homage of my respect.

(Signed,) LA BESNARDIERE.

M. DE LA BESNARDIERE to the DUKE of VICENZA.

Paris, Jan. 16, 1814.

MONSEIGNEUR,

His Majesty, having dictated the annexed letter, reperused and corrected it himself, ordered me to forward it to you to be written by your Excellency to Prince Metternich.

His Majesty nevertheless wishes this proceeding to be subject to your own judgment. "Send this letter," said he, "to the Duke of Vicenza, that he may write it, if he approves of it." These were his own expressions.

Condescend, &c.

(Signed,) LA BESNARDIERE.

LETTER dictated by his MAJESTY to be written by the DUKE of VICENZA to PRINCE METTERNICH.

PRINCE,

THE delay which has occurred in the negotiations originates neither with France nor Austria, yet France and Austria are the countries likely to be the greatest sufferers from it. The Allied armies have already invaded several of our provinces: if they advance, a battle will soon become inevitable; and surely it concerns Austria to take into her calculations and consider what would be the consequences of such a battle, whether the Allies or the French should be defeated.

In writing to a Minister so enlightened as your Excellency, it is unnecessary for me to describe these consequences; it will be sufficient for me to hint at them, in the certainty that no part of them will escape your penetration.

The chances of war are of daily recurrence: in proportion as the Allies advance, their strength decreases, whilst the French armies are reinforced; by advancing, also, the Allies inspire with redoubled courage a nation to which it becomes evident that it has its greatest and dearest interests to defend. Now the consequences of the loss of a battle by the Allies would not be felt by any of them so severely as by Austria, because she is at once the principal and leading power amongst the Allies, and one of the central powers of Europe.

Supposing that fortune should continue favourable to the Allies, it is undoubtedly important to Austria to consider attentively what would be the situation of Europe the day after the loss of a battle by the French, in the heart of France; and whether such an event would not be productive of consequences necessarily destructive of that equilibrium which Austria aspires to establish, and contrary to the policy, as well as to the personal and family affections, of the Emperor Francis.

Austria, however, protests that she is desirous of peace; but does she not run the risk of missing or overshooting this aim, by continuing hostilities when both sides wish to terminate them?

I have been led by these considerations to think,

that in the present state of the respective armies, and in this inclement season, a suspension of arms might be of mutual advantage to the two parties.

It might be established by a convention in form, or by a simple exchange of declarations between your Excellency and myself; it might be limited to a fixed period, or indefinite and determinable only on condition of so many days' previous notice.

This armistice seems to me to depend wholly on Austria, as she has the principal direction of the military affairs; and it was my opinion that, on either supposition of the possible event, it was the interest of Austria that things should go no farther, and not be carried to the utmost extremes. It is this persuasion which particularly induces me to write in a confidential manner to your Excellency.

If I am deceived, if such were not the intentions and policy of your Cabinet, if this wholly confidential step is to be ineffectual, I must entreat your Excellency to consider it as if it had never been taken.

You have shewn so much personal confidence in me by your last letter, and I myself place such perfect reliance on the rectitude of your views and on the sentiments which you have expressed on all occasions, that I venture to hope that in case a letter, dictated by that confidence, should fail to attain its object, it will for ever remain a secret between your Excellency and me. Accept, &c.

LETTER from M. DE LA BESNARDIERE to the DUKE of VICENZA.

Paris, Jan. 19, 1814.

MONSEIGNEUR,

AFTER having dictated for your Excellency the letter which you will receive with this, his Majesty, being at leisure, did me the honour to converse with me a long time respecting the future peace. I will relate to your Excellency, as faithfully as my memory will allow, and as briefly as I can, the substance of this conversation. The point on which his Majesty insisted most strongly, and to which *he most frequently reverted*, was the necessity that France should retain her natural limits. This was, he said, a condition *sine quâ non*. All the powers, not excepting England, had assented to these limits at Frankfort. France, reduced to her ancient limits, would not, at the present day, possess two-thirds of the relative power which she had twenty years ago; what she has gained on the side of the Alps and the Rhine, does not compensate for what Russia, Prussia, and Austria acquired by the partition of Poland alone: all these states have aggrandized themselves. To wish to reduce France to her ancient limits, is to wish to lower and degrade her. France, without the departments of the Rhine, without Belgium, Ostend, and Antwerp, would be nothing. The system of reducing France to her ancient frontiers is inseparable from the restoration of the Bourbons, because they alone could offer a guarantee

of the support of this system; and England was very sensible of this: with any other government, peace on this basis would be impossible, and could not last. Neither the Emperor nor the Republic, should political convulsions reproduce it, would ever submit to such conditions. With respect to his Majesty himself, his resolution was taken, and was immoveable; he would not leave France less great than he had received her. If, therefore, the Allies wished to change the terms accepted, and to propose the ancient limits, he saw only three courses to pursue: either to fight and conquer, or to fight and die with glory; or lastly, if the nation should not support him, to abdicate. He did not cling to greatness, and would never purchase its preservation by a disgraceful act. The English might wish to deprive him of Antwerp; but it could not be the interest of the Continent, for a peace thus made would not last three years. He was sensible that circumstances were critical, but he would never accept a shameful peace. In accepting the proposed terms, he had made all the absolute sacrifices in his power; if more were still required, they could only refer to Italy and Holland: he should certainly wish to exclude the Stadtholder; but, if France were allowed to preserve her natural limits, every thing might be arranged; nothing would form an insurmountable obstacle. His Majesty also spoke of Kehl and Cassel:—"Without those two *têtes-de-pont*," said he, "Strasburg and Mentz would become useless;" but he thinks the enemy will not attach very great importance to these points.

The Duke of Carignano just now brought me a letter from the King, which I carried to the Emperor. This letter is full of protestations of gratitude and regret, but announces that the King is forced, by necessity, to accept the proposals of England and Austria. This letter is dated the 3d; the treaties were not then signed: they remained without signature on the 6th; but the Duke of Carignano does not dissemble his belief that they are now signed. The viceroy is going to fall back on the Alps; Mantua and the fortresses will be guarded by the Italians.

I write in haste, as fast as my pen will go: it is midnight. I beg your Excellency to accept, &c.

(Signed,) LA BESNARDIERE.

P.S. Victor is just arrived, and has delivered me the packet from your Excellency. I send his despatch for the Emperor to the Cabinet. A part of his uncertainties is now determined; I venture to hope that the rest will also turn out fortunately.

The DUKE of VICENZA to PRINCE METTERNICH.

Chatillon-sur-Seine, Jan. 25, 1814. Evening.

PRINCE,

BY your eagerness to induce me to proceed to Chatillon, your Excellency led me to hope that the speedy meeting of the negotiators was about to terminate the constantly recurring delays which have succeeded each other for nearly two months. As long ago as the 6th of December, the formal acceptance of the conditions of peace by France had reached Frank-

fort, and had been immediately communicated by the Allies to the Court of London; and it was not until a month later, on the 6th of January, that the English Minister arrived on the Continent. On the 14th, after a longer delay than necessary, he was expected every moment. It is now the 26th, and your Excellency, to whom I am now so near, has not as yet sent me any intelligence. After all this delay, twelve days more have just been lost, at a time when the blood of the people of the Continent may every moment be expected to flow in torrents. All the evils produced by the war have nevertheless been equally destitute of motives and objects, ever since the desire of peace has been declared by all nations, and the explanations which have already taken place have removed all the essential difficulties. Is the fate of the world to continue to depend, indefinitely, on the delays of Lord Castlereagh, when England has already accredited Ministers with each of the Allied Sovereigns? Are the most sacred interests of humanity to be abandoned for a mere point of convenience.

The delay which has occurred in the negotiations, originates neither with France nor Austria, yet France and Austria are the countries likely to be the greatest sufferers from it. The Allied Armies have already invaded several of our provinces: if they advance, a battle will soon become inevitable, and surely it concerns Austria to take into her calculations and consider what would be the consequences of such a battle, whether the Allies or the French should be defeated.

In writing to so enlightened a Minister, I have no

occasion to particularize these consequences; it will be sufficient for me to hint at them in the certainty that no part of them will escape your penetration.

The chances of war are of daily recurrence; in proportion as the Allies advance, their force decreases, whilst the French armies acquire new strength; by advancing, also, the Allies inspire with redoubled courage a nation which henceforth becomes convinced that it has its greatest and dearest interests to defend. Now the consequences of the loss of a battle by the Allies would not be felt by any of them so severely as by Austria, because she is at once the principal power amongst the Allies, and one of the central powers of Europe.

Supposing that fortune should continue favourable to the Allies, it is undoubtedly important to Austria to consider attentively what would be the situation of Europe the day after the loss of a battle by the French in the heart of France, and whether such an event would not be productive of consequences necessarily destructive of that equilibrium which Austria aspires to establish, and contrary to the policy as well as to the personal and family affections of the Emperor Francis.

Austria, however, protests that she is desirous of peace, as well as her Allies; but may she not place herself in a situation to miss or overshoot this aim, by continuing hostilities when both sides wish to terminate them?

All these considerations have induced me to think that in the present situation of the respective armies,

and in this inclement season, a suspension of arms might be of mutual advantage to both parties. It might be established by a convention in form, or by a simple exchange of declarations between your Excellency and myself; it might be limited to a fixed period, or indefinite and determinable only on condition of so many days previous notice.

This armistice seems to me to depend more particularly on Austria, because she has the principal direction of the military affairs; and it was my opinion that on either supposition of the possible event, it was the interest of Austria that matters should go no farther, and should not be carried to the utmost extremes.

It is this persuasion that particularly induces me to write to your Excellency; if I am mistaken, if this strictly confidential step is to be ineffectual, I must beg your Excellency to consider it as never having been taken. You have shewn so much personal confidence in me, and I have so great a reliance on the rectitude of your views and on the noble sentiments which you have expressed on all occasions, that I venture to hope that a letter dictated by this confidence, will, should it fail in its object, remain between your Excellency and myself.

Accept, &c.

(Signed) CAULAINCOURT, Duke of Vicenza.

M. DE BESNARDIERE to the DUKE of VICENZA.

Paris, Jan. 19, 1814.

MONSEIGNEUR.

A LETTER from Prince Metternich, addressed to your Excellency, dated Bale, the 14th, came by I know not what road, and was carried to his Majesty, who sends you a copy thereof by an extraordinary estafette despatched this morning at ten. His Majesty ordered me to send your Excellency another attested copy thereof, which you will find annexed.

Your Excellency now has the letter which his Majesty dictated to me for you on the 16th, and which passed that which you wrote to his Majesty on the 17th, on the road.

You have seen that the Emperor was sensible of the need of an armistice. As to the conditions on which it may be concluded, his Majesty commands me to inform your Excellency that under no circumstances whatever will he ever consent to any dishonourable terms; and that he should look upon it as dishonourable in the highest degree to give up any French fortress, or to pay any sum of money whatever: but that to redeem any portion of the French territory from the occupation of the enemy, he would consent to surrender, in Italy, Venice, and Palma-nuova, and in Germany, Magdeburg, and Hamburg; it being understood that the garrisons should return freely into France, and that the stores and artillery deposited by his Majesty in those places, and the ships of war that are his property, should be reserved for him.

His Majesty commands me to add that he never re-

quired money as the price either of an armistice or of peace: that he has only insisted, on signing a peace, on the paying up of the contributions which he had laid on the countries occupied by his armies; which the enemy cannot demand, having imposed no contributions on France

As to the treaty of peace, the Emperor charges me to inform your Excellency that France ought to preserve her natural limits without any restriction or diminution whatever, and that this is a condition *sine quâ non*, from which he will never depart.

Condescend to accept, &c.

(Signed,) LA BESNARDIERE.

Letter from PRINCE METTERNICH to the DUKE of VICENZA.

Bale, Jan. 14, 1814.

MONSIEUR LE DUC,

LORD Castlereagh being on the point of arriving, and their Imperial and Royal Majesties wishing to avoid all delay, they have ordered me to propose to your Excellency to station yourself immediately near the place, where, under present circumstances, it will be most suitable to carry on the negotiations; I therefore request your Excellency to proceed to Chatillon-sur-Seine; I doubt not but that on your arrival there I shall be able to give you notice of the time and place of the meeting of the Plenipotentiaries.

(Signed,) PRINCE METTERNICH.

Letter from the Duke of Vicenza to Prince Metternich.

Chatillon-sur-Seine, Jan. 21, 1814, evening.

Prince,

I have the honour to inform your Excellency of my arrival at Chatillon-sur-Seine, where I await the information which your Excellency considered I might find here.

I embrace with pleasure this occasion of renewing, &c.

(Signed,) Caulaincourt, Duke of Vicenza.

Prince Schwartzenberg to the Duke of Vicenza.

At my head-quarters, Langres, Jan. 26, 1814, one o'clock in the morning.

Monsieur le Duc,

I hasten to inform you that his Majesty the Emperor of Austria, Prince Metternich, and Lord Castlereagh, are just arrived here. Your Excellency will receive farther information in the course of twenty-four hours.

I flatter myself that your Excellency will meet with every attention on the part of our military. The orders you desired relative to the admission of your secretaries and clerks were given on the spot, and your Excellency will have experienced their full effect.

It is with great regret that I have hitherto found myself deprived of the pleasure of seeing you, and assuring you, in person, of my high consideration.

(Signed,) Schwartzenberg.

PRINCE METTERNICH to the DUKE of VICENZA.

Langres, Jan. 29, 1814.

MONSIEUR LE DUC,

THEIR Imperial and Royal Majesties, and the principal Secretary of State of his Britannic Majesty, charged with the department of Foreign Affairs, being assembled at Langres, where they met on the 27th, their Majesties have chosen Chatillon-sur-Seine as the seat of the negotiations with France. The Plenipotentiaries of Russia, England, and Prussia, will have arrived in that town by the 3d of February next.

In acquainting your Excellency with this determination, I have no doubt you will see in it a proof of the eagerness of the Allied Powers to open the negotiations with as little delay as possible.

Receive, &c.

(Signed,) METTERNICH.

PRINCE METTERNICH to the DUKE of VICENZA.

Langres, Jan. 29, 1814.

MONSIEUR LE DUC,

I DID not receive, until yesterday, the confidential letter which your Excellency addressed to me on the 25th, in the evening. I submitted it to the Emperor, my master, and his Imperial Majesty declared it as his opinion that it would be best to make no use of the contents, being convinced that the step proposed would lead to nothing. It will remain for ever unknown; and I entreat your Excellency to feel con-

vinced, that, in any possible state of affairs, a confidential communication made to our Cabinet is safe from all abuse.

I feel pleasure in giving you this assurance at a moment of immense interest to Austria, France, and Europe. The conduct of the Emperor is and will remain uniform, like his character. His principles are above the influence of seasons and circumstances. They were the same in calamitous times; they are the same and will remain so, now that events, beyond all human calculation, are about to establish Europe in the only position suitable to her. The Emperor entered into the present war, and is now pursuing it, without feelings of hatred. The day on which he gave his daughter to the prince who then governed Europe, he ceased to regard him as a personal enemy. The chance of war has altered the situation of that prince. If the Emperor Napoleon listens, under the circumstances of the present moment, only to the voice of reason—if he will seek his glory in the happiness of a great people, renouncing his anterior political career, the Emperor will, with pleasure, think of him once more as at the moment when he intrusted him with his favourite child; but should a fatal blindness render the Emperor Napoleon deaf to the unanimous wishes of his people and of Europe, he will deplore the fate of his daughter, without altering his present line of conduct.

I recommend M. de Floret to you in the strongest manner: if you will write to me by him, I shall with pleasure keep up such confidential relations as circumstances permit, the object of which will be the acce-

leration of the great work for which you are about to assemble. I no less highly recommend to you Count Stadion, whom the Emperor sends as a negotiator; it is impossible to be more united than he and I are, in thoughts, views, and principles.

It would be difficult for me to express to your Excellency how much I rely on you at this crisis, which concerns the whole world. If Europe is to be any longer the victim of a terrible scourge, neither you nor myself will be the cause.

I rely on that discretion on your Excellency's part which you are sure to find in me, and I beg you to accept the assurances, &c.

(Signed,) METTERNICH.

PRINCE METTERNICH to the DUKE of VICENZA.

Langres, Jan. 29, 1814.

MY official letter will prove to your Excellency that the Plenipotentiaries are about to reach you, and that the place at which you are at the present moment was chosen by the Allied Sovereigns. If you consider that Lord Castlereagh only saw the Emperor of Russia for the first time on the 27th, you will see no delay in the circumstance of fixing the 3d of February for the arrival of the negotiators.

I shall despatch M. de Floret in the course of to-night to Chatillon. He is instructed to select and prepare lodgings for the Plenipotentiaries. It is unnecessary for me to recommend him more particularly to your Excellency.

Accept, Monsieur le Duc, the assurance of my high consideration, and unalterable sentiments.

(Signed,) PRINCE METTERNICH.

The DUKE of VICENZA to PRINCE METTERNICH.

Chatillon, Jan. 30, 1814.

I HAVE received the letter by which your Excellency does me the honour to inform me, that Chatillon-sur-Seine has been appointed by the Allied Sovereigns as the place for carrying on the negotiations, and that the Plenipotentiaries of Russia, England, Prussia, and Austria, will have reached that town by the 3d of February next.

My departure from Paris, nearly a month ago, and even my residence at Chatillon, are such evident proofs of the solicitude and sincere desire of the Emperor, my master, to contribute to the utmost of his power to the restoration of peace, that it cannot now be necessary for me to renew the assurance of those intentions. Your Excellency is not ignorant that it has not depended on us to accelerate an event so long expected.

Receive, Prince, &c.

(Signed,) CAULAINCOURT, Duke of Vicenza.

The DUKE of VICENZA to PRINCE METTERNICH.

Chatillon-sur-Seine, Jan. 31, 1814.

M. DE FLORET has delivered me the letter which your Excellency has done me the honour to write, in answer to that which I addressed to your Excellency on

the 25th of this month; my confidence in you led the way to that which you do me the honour to place in me, and is the guarantee of my discretion.

It is more than ever necessary for men, who are actuated by just sentiments, to communicate together, in order, if it is not too late, to put an end to the calamities which threaten the world. I regret that the idea of a general interest, which I submitted to your judgment, and the adoption of which seems to me so necessary for the attainment of this object, does not appear to you admissible; I wish to think that it is only adjourned, and that I shall find your Plenipotentiary disposed to second me in reproducing it when opportunity shall offer.

I can only repeat to your Excellency what I have already communicated. The Emperor is sincerely desirous of peace. We have no other idea, no other view, than that of settling Europe, as your Excellency so judiciously says, on such foundations as will secure her a long period of tranquillity. I assure you the difficulties will not originate with us; but can the hopes you had conceived be realized, if moderation and adherence to engagements, entered into in the face of the whole world, are found on our side only? After waiting so long, after so many efforts, and, I may add, so many personal sacrifices, for the sacred cause for which I am labouring, as well as yourself, I am forced to confess to your Excellency that I did hope to have been personally seconded by you in a task as important as difficult, and that you would yourself have completed your work. M. de Stadion is, however, substi-

tuted for your Excellency. As an *Austrian,* the true interests of our two countries ought to unite us: as *your friend,* he will have my whole confidence; and, in this point of view, his nomination cannot but be agreeable to me. But what influence, but that of the Minister who directs the policy of the most preponderant power on the Continent, can counterpoise that of all the passions of Europe united, and placed, if the expression be admissible, in the hands of an English negotiator, to make use of, if he should not be sincerely desirous of peace, as his particular views may dictate? Did not some of the nominations which have been made warn your Excellency that it would require all your credit to give effect even to the most reasonable ideas?

You see, Prince, how frankly I meet the candour you have evinced towards me. No one can place greater or more entire confidence in the character of the Emperor, your master, than I do. The constant invariableness of his principles can alone give us peace; but will not the moment for making it escape us, unless you declare warmly in favour of this cause, from the very opening of the negotiations? Success will depend on the energy you employ in repressing the passions of all parties, and in moderating an ambition which would destroy in its birth the equilibrium you aspire to establish. Posterity will give us no credit for our exertions, unless we are successful. Your Excellency, who are so well situated for becoming the regulator of these great interests, will have done nothing, unless an end be now put to the troubles

which have so long agitated unhappy Europe, by a peace, securing to every state its proper limits and degree of power, and thus bearing in itself the guarantee of its duration.

For my own part, my wishes have long been known to you; nothing can alter them. You may therefore rely on me, as I depend on you, in every thing conducive to this noble end.

Accept, &c.

(Signed,) CAULAINCOURT, Duke of Vicenza.

LETTER from NAPOLEON to the DUKE of VICENZA.

Troyes, Feb. 4, 1814.

MONSIEUR the DUKE of VICENZA,

PRINCE SCHWARTZENBERG'S report is nonsense. There has been no battle; the old guard was not there; the young guard did not engage. A few pieces of cannon were taken from us by charges of cavalry, but the army was marching to pass the bridge of Lesmont, when this affair occurred, and the enemy would not have found us two hours later. It seems that the whole of the enemy's army was there, and that they look upon it as a battle: in that case these folks are not very skilful; they had not more than 15,000 of our troops to deal with, and yet we kept the field all day. The letter which M. de Metternich has written to you is quite ridiculous; but I observe in it what I have long since perceived, that he thinks he is guiding all Europe, and is himself led by every one. It was very natural that at the moment of opening the negotiations,

a few days should pass without any thing being done, and without concluding any armistice for that purpose. You still ask me for powers and instructions, although it remains doubtful whether the enemy will negotiate at all. The conditions appear to have been resolved on amongst the Allies in the first instance. Yesterday was the 3d, you do not mention that the Plenipotentiaries said a word to you about them. As soon as they communicate them to you, you are at liberty either to accept them, or to refer them to me within the twenty-four hours. I really do not comprehend that phrase of M. de Metternich's, which you transmit me. What do they mean by adjournments, when you have been a month at the advanced posts? M. de la Besnardiere, whom I saw last night, has, I suppose, joined you. On the 2d an Austrian corps was defeated at Rosnay; it had 600 men taken prisoners, and a great number killed. The Prince de Neufchatel's aide-de-camp was the first taken, as he was going round the advanced posts. Hereupon, I pray God, &c.

(Signed,) NAPOLEON.

The DUKE of BASSANO to the DUKE of VICENZA.

Troyes, Feb. 5, 1814.

MONSIEUR LE DUC,

I HAVE despatched a courier to you with a letter from his Majesty (1) and the new full powers (2)

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(1) The foregoing of the 4th of February, 1814.

(2) These full powers were the chancery instrument, or letters of credit on parchment, necessary to accredit the Plenipotentiary to the Congress.

which you required. At the moment of his Majesty's departure from this city he charges me to despatch a second to you, and to inform you in plain terms, that his Majesty gives you *carte blanche* for bringing the negotiations to a favorable issue, saving the capital, and avoiding a battle, which would risk the last hopes of the nation. The conferences were to have commenced yesterday. His Majesty would not wait until you had informed him of the result of the first overtures, for fear of occasioning the least delay.

I am therefore charged, Monsieur le Duc, to inform you that it is his Majesty's intention that you should consider yourself as invested with all the necessary powers in this important crisis, for adopting the most eligible course, in order to stop the progress of the enemy and to save the capital.

His Majesty desires to hear from you as frequently as possible, that he may have proper information for the direction of his military operations.

I have the honour, &c.

(Signed,) The DUKE of BASSANO.

PRINCE METTERNICH to the DUKE of VICENZA.

Feb. 5, 1814.

I HASTEN, Monsieur le Duc, to send your Excellency herewith a letter from Madame de Maussion, which her husband, whom I saw at Chaumont, intrusted to me. I have just agreed with Marshal Prince Schwartzenberg that he is to be established in some

good town of Germany. He is very well, and charged me with many compliments for your Excellency.

I thank you for the information you have given me respecting Baron Hardenberg, who was taken prisoner on the 29th; his relations believed him dead; and his family will learn with great pleasure that he is well and at Paris.

Accept, with my thanks, the assurances, &c.

(Signed,) The PRINCE DE METTERNICH.

The DUKE of VICENZA to NAPOLEON.

Chatillon, Feb. 6, 1814.

SIRE,

A COURIER, who left Troyes on the 5th of February, has brought me a despatch in cypher from the Duke of Bassano, which, while it gives me, in your Majesty's name, the most extensive powers, places and keeps me in the most perplexing embarrassment.

I find myself here opposed to four negotiators, counting the three English Plenipotentiaries only as one. These four negotiators have all one uniform set of instructions, drawn up by the ministers of state of the four courts. Their language has been dictated to them beforehand. The declarations they give in have been handed to them ready made. They do not take a step, or say a word, without having previously concerted it amongst themselves. They will have a protocol; and if I myself wish to insert the most simple observation on the most notorious fact, the most moderate expression gives rise to difficulties, and I am

obliged to give way, to avoid consuming time in vain discussions. I feel how precious the moments are; on the other hand I feel that by hurrying every thing, all would be lost. I urge, but with the moderation required by the necessity of not compromising the great interests with which I am intrusted. I press as much as I can without making myself too cheap with these people, and placing myself at their mercy.

In this situation I receive a letter full of alarm. I had set out almost with my hands tied, and now I receive unlimited powers; I was held back, and now I am spurred on. Still I am left ignorant of the grounds of this alteration. A glimpse of danger is afforded me, but I am not informed of its degree, or whether it appears on one side only or in several directions. Your Majesty first, and next the army you command, then Paris, Brittany, Spain, and Italy, by turns or altogether present themselves to my mind; my imagination strays from one to another, without being able to form any fixed opinion; ignorant of the true state of affairs, I can only guess at what it requires and what it allows; whether it is such that I ought to consent to every thing, blindly, without discussion, and without delay, whether I have several days, or even one, or not a moment before me for the discussion of the various points, or those of most essential importance. I might have been spared this anxiety by proper information, but the Duke of Bassano's letter contains none.

In the ignorance in which it leaves me I shall proceed with precaution, as one ought to do between two

rocks; but let what will happen, I shall do whatever your Majesty's safety and the welfare of my country may appear to me to require.

I am, &c.

(Signed,) CAULAINCOURT, Duke of Vicenza.

The DUKE of VICENZA to PRINCE METTERNICH.

Chatillon, Feb. 8, 1814.

PRINCE,

I RECEIVED on the 30th your letter, informing me that Chatillon was the place appointed for the conferences. I immediately wrote to Paris for my household and every thing I should require. The whole arrived on the 5th at your advanced posts. Although provided with a passport, countersigned by General Herzenberg, they have been sent back, and I remain here like a courier, with nothing but what I have worn during my long journey. My couriers, forced out of their way, are obliged to travel sixty leagues instead of twenty, and are ill used, and delayed three or four hours at every post of Cossacks; and all this has gone on for the last four days. This conduct is so remote from the proceedings of your Excellency, and from the noble respect of your army for the rights of nations, and is also so contrary to the known principles of Prince Schwartzenberg, that I address myself in full confidence to your Excellency, to obtain the more speedy and safe arrival of my couriers. Let their eyes be bandaged, let them be escorted, I have always proposed it. As to my people, baggage, and horses,

they will come whenever our advanced posts on the Nogent road are informed that they may pass.

Has your Excellency received the little box for the Archduchess Leopoldine?

Accept, &c.

(Signed,) CAULAINCOURT, Duke of Vicenza.

The DUKE of VICENZA to PRINCE METTERNICH.

Chatillon-sur-Seine, Feb. 8, 1814.

You have authorized me, Prince, to explain myself to you without reserve. I have already done so, and shall do so still; it is a consolation which it would be too painful to me to renounce.

I regret every day more and more, that it is not with yourself I have to treat; could I have foreseen it, I would not have accepted the office; I should not have been here; I should have been in the ranks of the army, where I should, at least, have found in battle a death which I must look upon as a blessing, if I cannot serve my Prince and my country here. Count Stadion is doubtless worthy of the friendship which connects him with you; he merits the confidence you wish me to place in him; but M. de Stadion is not you, nor can he have that ascendancy over the negotiators that belongs to you personally. Had you been charged with the negotiation, you would, I am persuaded, have prevented it from taking, as it now does, a course evidently calculated to consume time in endless delays. What end can be answered by these delays, if peace be

the only object in view? Am I not here to conclude it, and do I ask any thing but to know the conditions on which the other parties will make it? Do the Allies wish to gain time to reach Paris? I will not tell you, Prince, to think of the consequences of such an event with respect to the Empress; is she to be reduced to fly before the troops of her father, when her august consort is ready to sign a treaty of peace? But I will tell you that Paris is not the whole of France; that when once the capital is occupied, the French may think that the time for sacrifices is over; that sentiments which several causes have rendered dormant, may awaken; and that the arrival of the Allies at Paris may be the commencement of a series of events which Austria may not be the last to regret her not having prevented; for were we at last to be overwhelmed, is it the interest of Austria that we should be so? What can she imagine she shall gain by it, or what glory can she expect from our sinking under the efforts of all Europe? You, Prince, have an immense harvest of glory to reap; but only on condition that you remain master of events; and the only means you have of commanding them is to arrest their progress by an immediate peace. We do not refuse any reasonable sacrifice; we only desire to be informed of all those that are required of us, and for whose benefit we are to make them; and whether, on making them, we are certain to put an immediate end to the calamities of war. Let these questions, Prince, be proposed in a serious manner, and in their due connexion. I will not delay my answer. You are cer-

tainly too prudent not to feel that our demand is as just as our views are moderate. Could not your Excellency come with M. de Nesselrode, and pass a few hours at Lord Castlereagh's? It would be highly worthy of the character of the Emperor of Austria, and the heart of the Empress's father, to permit this journey, which might in three hours terminate a struggle which is now without object, and costs humanity so many tears.

Accept, &c.

(Signed,) CAULAINCOURT, Duke of Vicenza.

TO NAPOLEON.

Chatillon, Feb. 8, 1814.

SIR,

I HAVE only this moment received the letter which your Majesty has directed the Duke of Bassano to write me. I will immediately go and complain of the delays and interruptions which the couriers meet with.

The satisfactory account which the Duke of Bassano gives me respecting the troops which your Majesty has collected, leads me to think it will be best for me to wait for the orders I requested in my letter of yesterday.

I am, &c.

(Signed,) CAULAINCOURT, Duke of Vicenza.

LETTER from the DUKE of VICENZA to PRINCE METTERNICH.

Chatillon, Feb. 9, 1814.

PRINCE,

I PROPOSE to ask the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts, whether France, if she consent to return within her ancient limits, will immediately obtain an armistice. If by such a sacrifice an armistice can be obtained without delay, I shall be ready to make it; I shall also be ready, on that supposition, to surrender part of the fortresses which we shall lose by this sacrifice, immediately.

I know not whether the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts are authorized to answer this question in the affirmative, or whether they have powers to conclude an armistice. If not, no one can so effectually contribute to furnish them therewith as your Excellency; the reasons which induce me to request you to do so, do not seem to me so exclusively peculiar to France, that they ought to interest her alone. I entreat your Excellency to lay my letter before the Empress's father: let him see the sacrifice we are ready to make, and let him decide.

Accept, &c.

(Signed,) CAULAINCOURT, Duke of Vicenza.

LETTER from the DUKE of VICENZA to NAPOLEON.

Chatillon, Feb. 10, 1814.

SIRE,

I AM unwilling to lose a moment in sending your Majesty the strange declaration I have just re-

received. (*) I am employed on the answer to be sent to it, which I will transmit to your Majesty by a second courier. The little I know of what passed last night, and even the night before, would prove that the Plenipotentiaries of the Allies are far from unanimous, that great difficulties arose, and that it was not until this morning that they resolved to deliver this note; the Russian Plenipotentiary declaring that he could not continue to negotiate, and the others being unwilling to appear to separate from him. If Austria has a reasonable object in view, this circumstance will oblige her to declare herself, if it is not too late. My letter of yesterday to Prince Metternich leaves her no excuse for not doing so. Lord Castlereagh's journey may even give her the means of explaining herself openly, for it seems to me that what has been passing during the last forty-eight hours depends on a motive for which the parties were unprepared. This, however, must soon appear clearly; the force of events has such a predominant influence that human wisdom and foresight are quite ineffectual.

If there is no safety but in arms, I entreat your Majesty to reckon me amongst those who esteem it a point of honour to die for their Prince.

Lord Castlereagh set out at nine this morning. I subjoin a copy of the letter which I think it expedient to write to M. de Metternich.

I am, &c.

(Signed,) CAULAINCOURT, Duke of Vicenza.

(*) See this declaration in the protocol.

LETTER from the DUKE of VICENZA to PRINCE METTERNICH.

Chatillon-sur-Seine, Feb. 10, 1814, Noon.

PRINCE,

I RECEIVED only at eleven o'clock this morning, by a person employed in your legation, the note of which a copy is hereto annexed, under date of the 9th. My letter of yesterday, delivered in the evening to M. de Floret, has informed you of all that we are ready to do for the sake of peace. This note explains too clearly all that is proposed to the contrary, to make it necessary for me to add any reflection. Our cause becomes that of all governments which are desirous of peace.

Accept, &c.

LETTER from PRINCE METTERNICH to the DUKE of VICENZA.

Troyes, Feb. 15, 1814.

MONSIEUR LE DUC,

THE Emperor having authorized me to communicate the letter which you did me the honour to address to me on the 9th of this month, to the Allied Cabinets; the Plenipotentiaries assembled at Chatillon have received orders to confer with you on the proposition contained in your Excellency's letter.

The object of the request which you do me the honour to make of me, being thus fulfilled, I have only to offer the assurance, &c.

(Signed,) PRINCE METTERNICH.

Letter from Prince Metternich to the Duke of Vicenza.

Troyes, Feb. 15, 1814.

I have not answered your Excellency's confidential letters, because I had nothing to communicate. We have just put your negotiations in train again, and I assure your Excellency that it is no easy task to be the Minister of the Coalition. The flattering things you have said respecting your regret at not seeing me at Chatillon, can only apply to the personal sentiments of which you have given me so many proofs. Believe me, I am more useful, with regard to business, where I am; than I could be with you. I have already recommended Count Stadion to you; believe me, on my word. Lord Castlereagh is likewise a man of the best disposition, upright, honourable, free from passions, and consequently from prejudices. It required exactly such a set of men as the present English Ministers to render the grand work on which you are engaged possible, which will, I trust, be crowned with success. Your Excellency ought not to regret having accepted the ministry, which is only honourable in difficult times.

Count Stadion will speak to you respecting the line of your couriers. It is not only in a military point of view that it is impossible to ensure their passage through the armies; but we cannot, although with the best intentions possible, answer for our hordes of light troops. If you have any very pressing despatches, and the direction of your Emperor's head-quarters be

convenient, send me despatches in cypher, and I will forward them by the most direct road, through the advanced posts.

I inclose you a letter from the Mesgrigny family to their brother, son, &c.; have the goodness to forward it to him. They are worthy people, who enjoy the happiness of having me with them, for I do not eat them up. War, my dear Duke, is a sad thing, particularly when it is made with 50,000 Cossacks or Baskirs.

Accept the assurance of my inviolable sentiments, &c.

(Signed,) PRINCE METTERNICH.

LETTER from the EMPEROR to the DUKE of VICENZA.

Nangis, Feb. 17, 1814.

MONSIEUR DUKE OF VICENZA,

I GAVE you *carte blanche* to save Paris and avoid a battle, which was the last hope of the nation. The battle has taken place; and Providence has blessed our arms. I have made 30 or 40,000 prisoners. I have taken two hundred pieces of cannon, a great number of generals, and destroyed several armies, almost without striking a blow. I yesterday attacked Prince Schwartzenberg's army, which I hope to destroy before it can repass our frontiers. Your attitude ought still to be the same. You ought to do every thing for peace, but my intention is that you should sign nothing without my orders, because I alone know my own situation. In general I desire

nothing but a solid and honourable peace, and peace can only be so upon the terms proposed at Frankfort. If the Allies had accepted your proposals on the 9th, I should not have run the risks of fortune, at the moment when the slightest failure would have ruined France; in short, I should not have known the secret of their weakness. It is just that in return I should have the benefit of the chances which have turned out favourably to me. I wish for peace, but not for a peace imposing on France more humiliating terms than the conditions proposed at Frankfort. My position is certainly more advantageous than it was at the period when the Allies were there. They could defy me at that time; I had obtained no victory over them, and they were far from my territories. Every thing is now very different; I have gained immense advantages over them, and such as are unparalleled in a military career of twenty years, and of some activity. I am ready to cease hostilities, and to let the enemy return quietly home, if they will sign the preliminaries founded on the proposals of Frankfort. The enemy's bad faith and violation of the most sacred engagements are the only causes of delay between us, and we are so near that if the enemy would let you correspond directly with me, you might have answers to your despatches in twenty-four hours. Besides I mean to come still nearer to you. Hereupon, I pray God, &c.

P. S. How happens it that to-day, the 18th, I have no despatches from you since those of the 14th? Yet we are only twenty-five leagues distant from you.

(Signed,) NAPOLEON.

PRINCE METTERNICH to the DUKE of VICENZA.

Langres, Feb. 29, 1814.

THE Emperor has received a letter from his august daughter, informing him that she has charged you with direct commissions for him. His Majesty not being at present able to see you, desires you to communicate to me what she has confided to you; and in case you find any difficulty therein, to intrust the Empress's commissions to M. de Floret.

(Signed,) METTERNICH.

The DUKE of VICENZA to PRINCE METTERNICH.

ACCORDING to your desire, Prince, I have imparted to M. Floret all the particulars which her Majesty the Empress had directed me to communicate to her august father. Your Excellency will comprehend, better than any one else, the extent of the affliction she must suffer from the present state of affairs. Her health, which continues better, supports her courage; but peace alone can restore her the happiness of which her exalted virtues render her so eminently worthy. Expedite that event, my dear Prince, by your exertions, and you will have deserved equally well of mankind in general and of your country.

Accept, &c.

(Signed,)

CAULAINCOURT, Duke of Vicenza.

The DUKE of VICENZA to the EMPEROR.

Chatillon, March 5, 1814.

SIRE,

I CANNOT refrain from expressing to your Majesty my deep concern at finding my fidelity and zeal misunderstood. Your Majesty is dissatisfied with me, testifies that dissatisfaction, and gives orders to inform me of it. My candour displeases, and is called rude and harsh; you reproach me with fancying I see the Bourbons in every direction, of whom I scarcely speak, and perhaps am to blame for saying so little. Your Majesty forgets that it is yourself who first mentioned them in the letters you have written or dictated. It would not, however, be so very unreasonable, if things are carried to extremes, to foresee, like your Majesty, the chances which the passions of some of the Allies may afford the Bourbons, and those which might arise from unfortunate events, and the interest which their heavy misfortunes might inspire in this country, if the presence of a prince and a party were to awaken those old recollections at a critical moment. In the present state of men's minds, in the fever that pervades Europe, in the state of anxiety and lassitude in which France is, foresight ought to embrace every consideration; it is merely prudence. Your Majesty, I perceive, would imbue all who serve you with your strength of mind, and the grand energy of your own character; but your Minister, Sire, does not stand in need of this stimulus. Adversity raises his courage, instead of de-

pressing it; and although he is constantly repeating to you the word peace, it is because he thinks it indispensable, and even of urgent necessity, to avoid ruining every thing. It is when there is no third person between your Majesty and himself, that he speaks openly: it is your strength, Sire, which obliges him to appear to you weak, or at least more disposed to yield than he actually would be found. No one would be more ready than myself to console your Majesty, and to mitigate the pain which you must suffer from present circumstances and the sacrifices they will require; but the interests of France and of your dynasty prescribe truth and foresight as my first duties. From one moment to another, all may be hazarded by those niceties which defer the determinations which our urgent and difficult situation requires. Is it my fault if I am the only one who holds this faithful language to your Majesty? If those who surround you and think as I do, dreading your displeasure, and wishing to spare your feelings when you have already so many vexations to endure, dare not repeat to you what it is my duty to say, am I to blame on that account? What glory, what advantage can I possibly derive from advocating and even signing this peace—if, indeed, we can obtain it? Will not this peace, or rather these sacrifices, be a perpetual cause of resentment in your Majesty against his Plenipotentiary? Will not many people in France, who now probably feel the necessity of this measure, reproach me with it six months after its conclusion? As I no more deceive myself with respect to my own situation than that of

your Majesty, I ought to be believed. I see things as they are, and future consequences as they may ensue. Fear has united all the sovereigns; discontent has rallied all the Germans: the party is too well cemented to be broken. In accepting office under the circumstances which existed at the time, and in afterwards undertaking this negotiation, I devoted myself for your service and to save my country: I had no other object, and that alone was sufficiently noble and elevated to appear to me above all sacrifices. In my situation, to make sacrifices was all I could do; and this decided my conduct. Your Majesty may say whatever you please against me; but in your heart you cannot think ill of me, and you will always be obliged to do me the justice to consider me as one of your most devoted subjects, and one of the best citizens of France; which country I ought not to be suspected of wishing to debase, when I would lay down my life to save her a single village.

I am, &c.

(Signed,) CAULAINCOURT, Duke of Vicenza.

The DUKE of VICENZA to the EMPEROR.

Chatillon, March 6, 1814.

SIRE,

THE question about to be decided is so important, it may in an instant produce so many fatal consequences, that I consider it my duty to resume the subject I have so often urged to your Majesty,

even at the risk of your displeasure. There is no weakness in my opinion, Sire; but I see all the dangers which threaten France and your Majesty's throne, and I conjure you to prevent them. Sacrifices must be made, and they must be made in time. The opportunity will escape us, if we do not take care, as it did at Prague; present circumstances are more like those of that period than your Majesty, perhaps, imagines. At Prague, peace was not made, and Austria declared against us, through a refusal to believe that the time limited was absolute and final. Here the negotiations will be broken off, for want of a conviction that a question of such magnitude can depend on our giving such an answer, and giving it by such a day. Yet the more I consider what is passing, the more I am convinced that unless we give in the counter-scheme required, and unless it contain modifications of the proposals of Frankfort, all is over. I will venture to say, as I sincerely think, Sire, that neither your Majesty's glory, nor the power of France, depend on your possessing Antwerp, or any other particular point of the new frontiers.

This negotiation, it cannot be too often repeated, resembles no other; it is even the exact opposite of all those which your Majesty has hitherto directed. We are far from being able to command; nor can we hope to attain our object, but by following the established course with patience and moderation: to depart from this track would be to ruin all. The English, on account of their responsibility, and the vindictive men who are here, in order to gratify their passions, will

certainly prefer breaking off the negotiations, to entering into discussion on this point.

If once the negotiations are broken off, your Majesty must not think to renew them, as you have been able to do on other occasions. A pretext is all that is wanted; and for want of resolving on the adoption of the measure which circumstances require, all will escape us, without our knowing when or how ideas of conciliation are to be resumed.

I entreat your Majesty to reflect on the result which the rupture of the negotiations may produce in France, and to weigh all the consequences. You will still do me sufficient justice to believe, that, in order to write as I do, I must be most thoroughly convinced that the present moment is to decide on the dearest interests of your Majesty and my country.

I am, &c.

(Signed,) CAULAINCOURT, Duke of Vicenza.

PRINCE METTERNICH to the DUKE of VICENZA.

Chaumont, March 8, 1814.

IT is proper to inform you, Sir, of the circumstances attending the loss you have sustained, of four of your horses and some carriages. The troop which entered Troyes met with some men in the Emperor's livery, and did not understand their protestations; the Marshal instantly gave orders to restore you the things which had been carried off, but it was found impossible to collect them.

The Emperor instructs me to inform your Excellency that he undertakes to replace the horses you have lost; he also desires to be exactly informed what carriages have been taken from you. In sending you this assurance, he is not merely actuated by his regard for the rights of nations, but considers it due to you on your own personal account.

I flatter myself your couriers will now experience less delay. The precaution you take to have their passports countersigned by the Austrian and Russian legations must facilitate their passage, although such journeys will always be difficult through armies in operation. The commandants of the different corps of the army have the strictest orders to afford them every facility, assistance, and protection.

The despatch which you yesterday transmitted to us for the Prince of Neufchatel was instantly forwarded.

Receive, &c.

(Signed,) PRINCE METTERNICH.

PRINCE METTERNICH to the DUKE of VICENZA.

Chaumont, March 8, 1814.

THE little box you sent me for the Archduchess Leopoldine was immediately sent to her. I hope to be soon enabled to forward to your Excellency an answer for her august sister.

You have hitherto rendered such signal services to the cause of France, which is assuredly inseparable from that of Europe, that I indulge the hope of speedily

seeing you crown the great work. Let the Emperor be fully convinced that he will have done nothing if he does not obtain a general peace. Years of troubles would follow years of calamities. I doubt not but you have daily opportunities of observing that England goes to work in earnest; the present ministry is strong enough *to desire peace*. Unless it is now made, no future opportunity will offer for an English minister to venture to propose even a negotiation: the triumph of the partisans of a war of extermination against the Emperor of the French will be ensured; the world will be overturned, and France will be the prey of these events.

I shall always hold the same language to you; it ought to be understood by prudent men who wish for what is right. We have only one wish—that of peace; but this peace is impossible, unless you make that by which you ought to regain your Colonial establishments. To attain that peace, it is also necessary to be willing to adopt the means, and not to forget that England alone disposes of all possible compensations, and that, in stripping herself of almost all her conquests, in favour of France and other independent states, she does but propose the admission of a just compensation, in requiring France to replace herself on a level with the greatest Continental powers.

If the Emperor Napoleon enters into these views, as he formerly did, Europe is pacified: twenty years of disturbance await her, on the contrary supposition.

Receive, &c.

(Signed,) METTERNICH.

NAPOLEON to the DUKE of VICENZA.

Rheims, March 17, 1814.

MONSIEUR LE DUC,

I HAVE received your letters of the 13th: I have desired the Duke of Bassano to answer them at length. I authorize you directly to make such concessions as may be indispensable to keep the negotiations in activity, and to ascertain the ultimatum of the Allies; it being understood that the result of the treaty is to be the evacuation of the territory, and the return of all the prisoners on both sides. This letter having no other object, I pray God to have you in his holy keeping.

(Signed,) NAPOLEON.

The DUKE of BASSANO to the DUKE of VICENZA.

Rheims, March, 17, 1814.

MONSIEUR LE DUC,

HIS Majesty has read with interest the note you transmitted on the 10th to the Plenipotentiaries of the Allies.

The surrender of all that the English have taken from us during the war is a real concession, of which his Majesty approves, particularly if the result is to be to leave us Antwerp.

His Majesty would have wished, and still wishes, if circumstances will allow, that you would remit a new note on receipt of this letter, requiring the Allies to explain themselves with precision respecting the following ques-

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I r ote the instance mentioned in my letter of ou cc d, of what took place at the end of the second Punic War, the consequence of which was the ruin of Carthage; you would insist on the second question, declaring that if the proposal of the Allies is their ultimatum, we cannot treat; which will oblige the Allies to answer that their proposal is not their ultimatum, and will enable you to ask for it. It ought to be easy to make them comprehend that it rests with them to give their ultimatum, because they wish to take back what has been secured to us by treaties.

If the Allies reply that the evacuation of the territory will immediately follow the signature of the treaty, and consequently renounce the claim of having places in depôt, this will be a great step gained.

If the negotiation must be broken off, it is best that it should break off on the question of the evacuation of the territory, and the surrender of the fortresses; and if it is to be continued, it is equally desirable to com-

by obtaining concessions on these points from
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time his Majesty, having taken into
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all proper latitude, not only as to
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apture of the negotiations. The Emperor, who writes to you himself, does not think it necessary to repeat, that the indispensable condition of any treaty must be the evacuation of our territory. Any act to the contrary effect, stipulating the surrender of our fortresses, and opposed to the liberation of the prisoners of war on both sides, would not be approved of in France even by the most timid of men. His Majesty conceives that the latitude he gives you will supply you with the means of getting at the ultimatum of the Allies, and of discovering what are the sacrifices which France cannot avoid making.

The surrender of Belgium is undoubtedly one of the first subjects that will be brought into discussion; but it is not the only one, and cannot be separately treated on. Next will come the departments of the banks of the Rhine, Italy, &c. All these questions are connected, and depend, in a certain degree, on one another. That of Belgium is of itself complex; for it would be very different, instead of giving it up to the Prince of

Orange, that is to say to England, to make it an independent state, to belong by way of indemnity to a French Prince; or to give it to the Republic of Holland, such as it was at the Peace of Amiens. If it become necessary to depart from the conditions of Frankfort, and to give up Antwerp, the Emperor considers it proper, not only to maintain the principles of Frankfort as far as possible with respect to Italy, but that this sacrifice be insisted on as a motive for demanding the restoration of all our colonies, including the Isle of France, unless compensation be obtained for the last-mentioned colony.

Accept, &c.

(Signed,) The DUKE of BASSANO.

PRINCE METTERNICH to the DUKE of VICENZA.

Troyes, March 18, 1814.

MONSIEUR LE DUC,

I DO not believe that the declaration which has been made to you can have excited your surprise, when, after the Plenipotentiaries have been above six weeks assembled, the first counter-scheme presented by France differs totally from the spirit which pervades the scheme of the Allied Powers; they could see nothing in this fact but an attempt on the part of your Cabinet to prolong the negotiations, the mere existence of which is useful to it.

We shall not lay aside our arms without obtaining the only fruit of the war which we consider worthy of our ambition; the certainty of enjoying for some years

a state of repose which is no less necessary for you than for ourselves. We do not believe that the document you presented on the 15th of March is the ultimatum of your Court. Why, on this supposition, and at a moment when every day costs France enormous sacrifices, have you not been put in a condition to adopt the course most conformable to your interest? Why have not candid and full explanations been given to you, which would have been the only way for you to accomplish your aim with the least delay possible? If the conditions of the counter-scheme are the Emperor's ultimatum; or, I may even say, if the spirit which pervades that document still presides in your councils, there is no possibility of peace, and the fate of Europe and of France must be decided by arms.

I should find it difficult to express the painful sensations which the Emperor, my master, suffers. He loves his daughter, and he sees her exposed to new alarms, which cannot but increase. The more our political questions are complicated, the more personal they become. The Emperor Napoleon has ill acknowledged the good intentions which the Emperor Francis has never ceased to testify towards him in the most unequivocal manner.

Perhaps we may be nearer peace, after the rupture of such barren negotiations, than before. This is the only event which can fulfil all our wishes.

Accept, &c.

(Signed,) PRINCE METTERNICH.

Letter from Prince Metternich to the Duke of Vicenza.

March 18.

Affairs are taking a very unfavourable turn, Monsieur le Duc. Whenever there shall be a full determination to make peace, with the indispensable sacrifices for that purpose, come and conclude the treaty; but do not come to be the organ of inadmissible proposals. The questions are too strongly put to admit of continuing to write romances, without great danger to the Emperor Napoleon. What do the Allies risk? Were they to meet with great reverses, they could, after all, only be compelled to quit the French territory. What will the Emperor Napoleon have gained? The people of Belgium are making enormous efforts at the present moment. The whole of the left bank of the Rhine will shortly be placed under arms. Savoy, which has hitherto been reserved, so as to be disposable according to any ultimate arrangement, is about to be raised; and attacks of the most personal nature, which it is no longer possible to prevent, will be made against the Emperor Napoleon. You see I speak candidly to you, as to a man of peace. I shall always preserve the same line. You ought to be acquainted with our views, principles, and wishes. The first are wholly European, and consequently French; the second incline to keep Austria interested in the welfare of France; the third are in favour of a dynasty so closely connected with that of our country.

I have engaged, my dear Duke, to place the most perfect confidence in you: it still depends on your

master to put an end to the dangers which threaten France, by making peace. In a short time it will probably depend on him no longer. The throne of Louis XIV., with the acquisitions of Louis XV. affords chances which are surely too good to be hazarded on a single card. I shall do all in my power to keep Lord Castlereagh here a few days longer. If once this Minister departs, there will be no peace.

Receive, &c.

(Signed,) PRINCE METTERNICH.

The DUKE of VICENZA to PRINCE METTERNICH.

Chatillon, March 20, 1814.

PRINCE,

I MUST begin by assuring you that M. de Floret executes your commissions extremely well. I cannot allow that the declaration delivered to me caused me no surprise. I had reason to think that discussions would be entered into, that a counter-scheme would be proposed, or that an ultimatum would be given in, as the scheme of the 17th of February was not one, any more than that of the 15th of March.

Your Excellency knows as well as myself that tardiness, trouble, and difficulties of every kind, were inherent in the mode of negotiation adopted by the Allies. If the pacific intentions of your master, the ascendancy of your own character, and all the preponderance of the principal power of the Coalition,

have been unable to procure the acceptance of my confidential proposal of the 9th of February, at the only moment, and upon the only condition on which it could be accepted, judge whether any means existed here of making the negotiation proceed a single step. You wish us to cede every thing, yet you will not tell us what you intend to do with what you demand of us. In order to come to an understanding, it is at least necessary to talk together; but has this been possible? Perhaps, as you say, we may be nearer a peace after this rupture than before. I wish to think so, and it shall not be my fault if this hope is not realized; neither should I have any doubt of it, were I assured that you and Lord Castlereagh were to be the instruments of the endeavour to effect this glorious object. We must not deceive ourselves; peace can only be made by men who possess the entire confidence of their Cabinets.

I deplore, as you do, the situation of the Empress; she displays a courage which renders her as worthy of the tenderest concern of her august father, as of the affection of the people she has adopted.

As long as there shall be any chance of peace, no difficulties will discourage me. Rely, therefore, on me; but deign to recollect, Prince, that I must also rely on you: for, as you seem convinced, there are too many interests common to France and Austria, for it to be possible that you should wish to separate them in the great European question.

Accept, &c.

(Signed,) CAULAINCOURT, Duke of Vicenza.

The DUKE of VICENZA to PRINCE METTERNICH.

Joigny, March 21, 1814.

PRINCE,

I CANNOT suffer Count Wolfenstein to depart, without entreating your Excellency to lay at the Emperor's feet the expression of my respectful gratitude for all the attentions which I have received from that officer.

I hasten to our head-quarters, in order to see you again the sooner. Pray add to the marks of confidence you have already bestowed on me, the obliging attention of sparing me all delays at your advanced posts, when I present myself at them.

I enclose under cover to you several letters which I have received, on my road, by a courier who has increased my affliction: what he has brought me leaves me no farther doubt on the possibility that any understanding could have been effected, even at Chatillon. I repeat to you, Prince, that it is only under your auspices that peace can be effected; do not leave the glory of making it to others; and, I will answer for it, the world will, before long, enjoy the repose of which it is so much in need.

The DUKE of VICENZA to PRINCE METTERNICH.

Despatched from Doulevent, on the 25th of March, by M. de Gallebois, an Officer of the Prince of Neufchatel's, to the Imperial Head-quarters.

I REACHED the Emperor only this night, when his Majesty immediately gave me his last orders with

respect to the conclusion of peace. He furnished me, at the same time, with all the powers necessary for negotiating and signing it with the Ministers of the Allied Courts; this being in reality the most effectual way of securing its speedy restoration. I therefore hasten to inform you that I am ready to repair to your head-quarters, and I await your Excellency's answer at your advanced posts. Our eagerness will prove to the Allied Sovereigns the pacific intentions of the Emperor, and satisfy them that no delay, on the part of France, will retard the conclusion of the salutary work, which is to ensure the repose of the world.

Accept, &c.

(Signed,) CAULAINCOURT, Duke of Vicenza.

The DUKE of VICENZA to PRINCE METTERNICH.

Despatched from Doulevent, March 26, 1814, by an Officer of the Prince of Neufchatel's, to Head-quarters.

PRINCE,

I AM only just arrived, and I lose not a moment in executing the Emperor's orders, and in adding to my letter confidentially all that I feel due to the confidence you have placed in me.

The Emperor empowers me to renew the negotiations, and in the most candid and positive manner. I therefore claim the facilities you led me to expect, in order that I may reach you as speedily as possible. Do not leave to others, Prince, the care of restoring peace to the world. There is no reason why it should not be

made in the course of four days, if your good genius presides over it, and if others are as sincerely desirous of it as we are. Let us seize the opportunity, and many errors and misfortunes will be retrieved. Your task, Prince, is glorious; mine will be very painful; but since the repose and happiness of so many nations may be the result, I shall not be less zealous and devoted than yourself.

The last letters from the Empress assure us that her Majesty's health is very good.

Accept, &c.

(Signed,) CAULAINCOURT, Duke of Vicenza.

SECTION II.

PROTOCOL

Of the CONFERENCES at CHATILLON-SUR-SEINE.

Sitting of the 4th of Feb. 1814.

His Excellency the Duke of Vicenza, Minister of Exterior Relations, and Plenipotentiary of France, on the one part:

And the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts. that is to say,

His Excellency Count Stadion, &c. for Austria:

His Excellency Count Razoumowski, &c. for Russia:

Their Excellencies Lord Aberdeen, Lord Cathcart, and Sir Charles Stewart, &c. for Great Britain;

And his Excellency Baron Humboldt. &c. for Prussia, on the other part:

Having reciprocally paid the customary visits on the 4th of February, agreed at the same time to hold their first sitting on the morrow, the 5th of the month of February.

Sitting of the 5th of Feb. at one o'clock in the afternoon.

The Plenipotentiaries above designated assembled at the house of a third party (that of M. de Montmort) chosen for the place of session; and after having indiscriminately taken their places at a round table, produced their respective full powers in the original, and in attested copies; which were mutually accepted.

The Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts then gave in the following declaration:

The Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts declare that they do not present themselves to open these conferences as merely sent by the four Courts, whose full powers they bear, but as being empowered to treat for peace with France in the name of Europe as forming only one whole; the four Powers answer for the accession of their Allies to the arrangements which shall be agreed upon at the actual period of peace.

His Excellency the Duke of Vicenza replied, that nothing could be more agreeable to the views of his Court than whatever tended to simplify and shorten the negotiations.

After this declaration, the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts passed to the determination of the forms of the conferences, wherein they declare on this point;

That they are bound to treat only conjointly, and to admit no other form of negotiations than that of Sittings, with protocol to be kept thereof.

His Excellency the French Plenipotentiary declared, that he had no objection to make to this form.

The Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts then declare:

That the Allied Courts adhere to the declaration of the British Government, purporting:

That all discussion on the maritime code would be contrary to the usages hitherto observed in negotiations of the nature of the present: that Great Britain neither asks other nations nor grants them any concession relative to the rights which she considers as of reciprocal

obligation, and of such a nature that they ought only to be regulated by the *law of nations*, except where the same rights have been modified by special conventions between particular states:

That, consequently, the Allied Courts would consider the insisting on this article, by France, as contrary to the object of the meeting of the Plenipotentiaries, and as tending to prevent the re-establishment of peace.

On receiving this declaration, his Excellency the Duke of Vicenza answered, that it had never been the intention of France to demand any thing derogatory to the rules of the law of nations, and that he had no other observation to make.

The Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts thereupon observe, that they take this declaration as an acceptance.

The Duke of Vicenza, after saying that his Government had despatched him long since to accelerate the conclusion of peace as much as possible, demanded that the subject of the negotiation should be immediately entered into, protesting that France had no other desire than to arrive at a knowledge of the whole of the propositions which might produce the cessation of the calamities of war.

His Excellency Count Razoumowski said he had not yet received the signed despatch of his instructions.

His Excellency the Duke of Vicenza observed, that, according to the time which had elapsed, Count Razoumowski being so near his Sovereign, this hindrance

could not have been expected, and proposed proceeding.

But their Excellencies, the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts, having said that they had expected the first sitting to be wholly occupied by the above-mentioned objects, and it having been observed that Count Razoumowski's instructions would probably arrive in the course of the day, the conference was adjourned until to-morrow.

Chatillon-sur-Seine, Feb. 5, 1814.

(Signed,) CAULAINCOURT, Duke of Vicenza.

(Signed,) Count A. DE RAZOUMOWSKI, CATHCART, HUMBOLDT, ABERDEEN, J. Count STADION, CHARLES STEWART, Lieutenant-general.

Sitting of February 7, 1814.

THE protocols of the sitting of the 5th having been engrossed in duplicate, and compared yesterday, all the Plenipotentiaries, on the opening of the present sitting, affixed their signatures to such engrossments, observing the alternative between the Plenipotentiary of France on the one side, and the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts on the other, the latter having proceeded amongst themselves in an indiscriminate order, saving all claims.

This formality being fulfilled, the Plenipotentiaries register what follows on the protocol.

The Allied Powers, combining their views for the future safety and independence of Europe, with the desire of seeing France possessed of an extent of territory analogous to the rank she has always held in the political system; and considering the situation in which Europe stands with respect to France, in consequence of the successes of their arms, the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts have orders to demand:

That France shall be confined within the limits she was bounded by before the Revolution, saving all arrangements of reciprocal convenience with respect to portions of territory without the limits on both sides, and saving the restitutions which England is ready to make for the general interest of Europe, in return for the retrocessions hereinbefore demanded of France, which restitutions shall be taken out of the conquests made by England during the war; that France shall consequently abandon all direct influence beyond her future limits; and that the renunciation of all titles which spring from the relations of sovereignty and protectorship over Italy, Germany, and Switzerland, shall be an immediate consequence of this arrangement.

After the Duke of Vicenza had heard this proposition read, a conversation, explanatory of its object, took place between the Plenipotentiaries, in closing which his Excellency the French Plenipotentiary observes, that the proposition is of too great importance for him to be able to give an answer; he therefore desires that the sitting be suspended.

The Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts do not hesitate to comply with this wish; and it is agreed that the sitting shall be continued at eight o'clock in the evening.

At which hour, the sitting being resumed by the Plenipotentiaries, the Duke of Vicenza declares as follows:—

The Plenipotentiary for France again renews the engagement already taken by his Court to make *the greatest sacrifices*, for the sake of peace, remote as the demand made in the sitting of this day, in the name of the Allied Powers, is from the *principles proposed by themselves at Frankfort*, and founded on what *the Allies themselves* called the *natural limits* of France; remote from the declarations which all the Courts have constantly repeated in the face of Europe; inconsistent as their proposition even is with an extent of territory analogous to the rank which France has always occupied in the political system, principles to which the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Powers still refer in their proposition of this day. In short, although the result of this proposition is to apply to France alone, a principle which the Allied Powers do not speak of adopting for themselves, and of which, nevertheless, the application cannot be just unless it be reciprocal and impartial, the French Plenipotentiary would not hesitate to explain himself, without delay, in the most positive manner, respecting this demand, if every sacrifice that can be made, and the degree in which it can be made, did not necessarily depend on the kind and

number of those which shall be demanded, as the sum of the sacrifices also necessarily depends on that of the compensations; every question in such a negotiation is so connected with and dependent on the rest, that no determination can be formed on any one, without a knowledge of the whole. It cannot be indifferent to him from whom sacrifices are demanded, to know for whose advantage they are to be made, and to what use they will be applied; and finally, whether by making them, an immediate stop can be put to the miseries of war. A plan developing the whole extent of the views of the Allies would fulfil this object.

The Plenipotentiary, therefore, in the most earnest manner, renews the request, that the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts *will explain themselves* positively on all the foregoing points.

After having read what has just been inserted in the protocol on the part of the Plenipotentiary for France, the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts declare that they take his answer *ad referendum*.

Chatillon-sur-Seine, Feb. 7, 1814.

(Signed,) CAULAINCOURT, Duke of Vicenza.

(Signed,) Count STADION, ABERDEEN, HUMBOLDT, Count RAZOUMOWSKI, CATHCART, CHARLES STEWART.

NOTE of the PLENIPOTENTIARIES of the ALLIES.

Chatillon-sur-Seine, Feb. 9, 1814.

THE undersigned, Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts, have just received from his Excellency the Plenipotentiary for Russia, a communication purporting,

That his Majesty the Emperor of Russia, having thought proper to consult with the Sovereigns his Allies on the subject of the conferences at Chatillon, has given orders to his Plenipotentiary to declare, that he desires the conferences may be suspended until his Majesty shall have furnished his Plenipotentiary with farther instructions.

The undersigned have the honour to give the Plenipotentiary of France notice thereof, informing him at the same time, that the conferences can only remain suspended for the moment. They will hasten to inform the French Plenipotentiary of their being ready to resume the course of the proceedings, the moment they are in a situation to do so.

The undersigned have the honour, at the same time, to present to his Excellency the assurance of their high consideration.

(Signed,) C. A. RAZOUMOWSKI, CATHCART,
Count STADION, HUMBOLDT,
ABERDEEN, CHARLES STEWART.

NOTE to the PLENIPOTENTIARIES of the ALLIES.

Chatillon-sur-Seine, Feb. 10, 1814.

THE undersigned, Plenipotentiary for France, having only this day received, between the hours of ten and eleven o'clock in the morning, a declaration dated yesterday the 9th, and signed by their Excellencies the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts, could not but be much surprised at its reaching him in this manner, after their Excellencies had themselves, at the first conference, established it as an invariable principle, that nothing relative to the negotiation could be treated on, nor consequently any resolution relating thereto be put in or received, but in the conferences; and when it might so easily have been delivered to him at the sitting he has been requiring these two days, and which it still seems to him impossible that the Plenipotentiaries should not grant him, were it only to settle and sign the protocol of the last conference, which, belonging to the past, does not depend on the present or future determinations of the Allied Courts.

But the undersigned was extremely astonished on perceiving by the note of the Plenipotentiaries, that the mere wish of one of the Allied Courts only seems to them all a sufficient cause for an indefinite suspension of the negotiations; although the only motive that has been assigned for this wish is an intention of consulting with the Allies; and although it was declared repeatedly, and in the most solemn manner, that the Allied Sovereigns and their Cabinets had long

since communicated to each other all their views, and had framed them by common consent.

The undersigned therefore considers it a duty to protest against the determination announced by their Excellencies the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts; and the more so, since he finds himself, through a singularity of circumstances which he cannot but notice, charged with the defence, not only of his own cause, but of that of the powers whose Ministers are assembled at the Congress, and of all those powers in whose names the same Ministers are instructed to treat.

Whatever may be the result of the protest, the evils occasioned by the interruption of the negotiations cannot, at least, be imputed to France, which power, as the undersigned declared in the answer which he delivered in the conference of the 7th, and, as he now repeats, is ready to make the greatest sacrifices to put an immediate end to the evils of war.

The undersigned has the honour to offer their Excellencies the Plenipotentiaries the assurances of his high consideration.

(Signed,) CAULAINCOURT, Duke of Vicenza.

NOTE of the PLENIPOTENTIARIES of the ALLIES.

Chatillon-sur-Seine, Feb. 21, 1814.

THE Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts at the conferences of Chatillon, had the honour, by a note of the 9th of this month, to inform his Excellency the Plenipotentiary of France, of the motive on account

of which the conferences were to be momentarily suspended. Being now enabled to resume them, they have the honour to inform the Plenipotentiary of France thereof.

At the same time they present to his Excellency the assurances of their high consideration.

(Signed) Count RAZOUMOWSKI, CATHCART, HUMBOLDT, ABERDEEN, STADION.

CONTINUATION OF THE PROTOCOL OF THE CONFERENCES OF CHATILLON-SUR-SEINE.

Sitting of February 17, 1814.

THE Sittings having been suspended, according to a note of the Plenipotentiaries of the Allies, dated the 9th inst. were resumed this day, Feb. 17th.

The Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Powers begin the conference by the following insertion in the Protocol:

The French Plenipotentiary introduced his declaration, contained in the protocol of the 7th of this month, by a preamble, in which he makes comparisons between the anterior declarations and present proposals. It would be easy to reply to these comparisons, as well as to the other reflections contained in this preamble, and to prove that the political proceedings of the Courts, during the present transactions, have been constantly directed by the firm and unalterable intention of restoring a proper equilibrium in Europe, *adapted to the events produced by the operations of their armies;* but as such a discussion would be entirely foreign to the object of the negotiation, from which the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts are scrupulously desirous

not to depart, as such digressions would degrade the protocols of their conference into mere verbal notes; and as they are firmly resolved not to suffer themselves to be diverted, by any cause whatsoever, from the simple course of proceeding to which, in the first instance, they declared their determination to adhere, they entirely disallow what is set forth in the preamble of the said declaration of the French Plenipotentiary, and pass on immediately to the principal object.

To this end, the *Austrian* Plenipotentiary, speaking in the name of his colleagues, says, that after the sitting of 7th of this month, the French Plenipotentiary did, by a letter addressed on the 9th to Prince Metternich, intimate an intention of asking the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts, whether, in case France should consent, according to the demand of the Allies, to return within her ancient limits, she would immediately obtain an armistice; that if an armistice could be immediately obtained by such a sacrifice, he would be ready to make it; and farther, that on that supposition, he would instantly be ready to give up part of the fortresses which France was to lose by that sacrifice.

That the Minister for Foreign Affairs to his Majesty the Emperor of Austria, having communicated this overture to the Allied Courts, the latter had authorized their Plenipotentiaries at the conferences to declare:

That they consider that a preliminary-treaty, founded on the principle above specified, and having as its immediate result the cessation of hostilities by land and sea, by thereby putting an equally speedy termination to the miseries of war, would attain the object gene-

rally desired better and more suitably than an armistice; and that, farther to shorten the negotiations, the Allied Powers have transmitted to their Plenipotentiaries *the projet of a preliminary treaty*, which was about to be read.

The French Plenipotentiary observes, that in making to Prince Metternich the confidential request of an armistice, which he had addressed to that Minister, he had been far from expecting that the sittings would be suspended in such an unlooked-for manner, and the negotiations interrupted for nine days; which suspension had altered the state of the question and the object which he proposed to himself; that preliminaries, as they require more or less discussion, do not instantly stop the effusion of blood, like an armistice.

The *Austrian* Plenipotentiary then reads the following *projet of a preliminary treaty*.

PROJET OF A PRELIMINARY TREATY BETWEEN THE HIGH ALLIED POWERS AND FRANCE.

In the name of the Most Holy and Undivided Trinity: Their Imperial Majesties the Emperors of Austria and Russia, His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and His Majesty the King of Prussia, acting in the name of all their Allies, on the one part, and His Majesty the *Emperor of the French* on the other part, desiring to cement the repose and future welfare of Europe, by a solid and durable peace by sea and land; and having, in order to accomplish this salutary end, their Plenipotentiaries now assembled at Chatillon-sur-Seine, to

discuss the conditions of this peace, the said Plenipotentiaries have agreed on the following articles:

Art. 1. There shall be peace and amity between their Imperial Majesties of Austria and Russia, His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and His Majesty the King of Prussia, acting at the same time in the name of all their Allies, and His Majesty *the Emperor of the French, their heirs and successors for ever.*

The high contracting parties engage to exert their utmost endeavours to maintain *the harmony so happily re-established between them,* for the future happiness of Europe.

Art. 2. His Majesty the Emperor of the French renounces, for himself and his successors, the whole of the acquisitions, annexations, and incorporations of territory made by France, since the commencement of the war of 1792.

His Majesty equally renounces all constitutional influence, direct or indirect, out of the ancient limits of France, such as they stood fixed before the war of 1792, and the titles derived therefrom, and namely, those of *King of Italy, King of Rome,* Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, and Mediator of the Swiss Confederation.

Art. 3. The high contracting parties formally and solemnly acknowledge the principle of the sovereignty and independence of all the states of Europe, as they shall be constituted on the definitive peace.

Art. 4. His Majesty the Emperor of the French formally acknowledges the following reconstruction of the countries bordering on France.

1st. Germany, composed of independent states, united by a federative connexion.

2d. Italy, divided into independent states, placed between the Austrian possessions in Italy, and France.

3d. Holland, under the sovereignty of the House of Orange, with an increase of territory.

4th. Switzerland, a free and independent state, with her ancient boundaries restored, under the guarantee of all the great powers, including France.

5th. Spain, under the dominion of Ferdinand VII. with her ancient boundaries.

His Majesty, the Emperor of the French, farther acknowledges the right of the Allied Powers to determine, according to treaties existing between the Powers, the limits and relations, as well of the countries ceded by France, as of their states with respect to each other, without any right of interference on the part of France.

Art. 5. On the other hand, his Britannic Majesty consents to restore to France, *with the exception of the Isles called the Saintes*, all the conquests she has made from France, during the war, and which are at present in the power of His Britannic Majesty, in the West Indies, Africa, and America.

The Isle of Tobago, conformably to the 2d article of the present treaty, shall remain to Great Britain; and the Allies promise to use their good offices, to induce their Swedish and Portuguese Majesties to throw no obstacle in the way of the restoration of Guadaloupe and Cayenne to France.

All the establishments and factories conquered from

France to the East of the Cape of Good Hope, except the Mauritius (Isle de France), Bourbon, and their dependencies, shall be restored to her. France shall only resume such of the said factories and establishments as are situate on the continent of India, and within the limits of the British possessions, on condition of possessing them wholly as commercial establishments; and she consequently promises to have no fortifications constructed therein, and to keep up no garrisons or military forces whatsoever, beyond what is necessary for the maintenance of the police in the said establishments.

The restitutions above-mentioned in Asia, Africa, and America, shall not extend to any possession which was not actually in the power of France before the commencement of the war of 1792.

The French government engages to prohibit the importation of slaves in all the colonies and possessions restored by the present treaty, and to interdict its subjects, in the most efficacious manner, from the negro slave trade in general.

The Isle of Malta, with its dependencies, shall remain in full sovereignty to his Britannic Majesty.

Art. 6. His Majesty the Emperor of the French shall, as speedily as possible after the ratification of the present preliminary treaty, give up the fortresses and forts of the ceded countries, and those which are still occupied by his troops in Germany, without exception, and particularly the fortress of Mentz, in six days; those of Hamburg, Antwerp, and Bergen-op-zoom, in the space of six days; Man-

tua, Palma-nuova, Venice, and Peschiera, and the fortresses of the Oder and Elbe, in fifteen days; and the other places and forts with the least possible delay, which cannot exceed fifteen days. These places and forts shall be given up in their present state, with all their artillery, military stores, provisions, archives, &c.; the French garrisons of these places shall march out with their arms, baggage, and private property. His Majesty the Emperor of the French shall likewise cause to be delivered up to the Allied armies, within the space of four days, the fortresses of Besançon, Befort, and Huninguen, which shall remain in pledge until the ratification of the definitive peace, and which shall be restored in the condition in which they shall be delivered up, as fast as the Allied troops shall evacuate the French territory.

Art. 7. The generals commanding in chief shall, without delay, name commissioners to determine the line of demarcation between the respective armies.

Art. 8. As soon as the present preliminary treaty shall have been accepted and ratified on both sides, hostilities shall cease by land and sea.

Art. 9. The present preliminary treaty shall be followed, with the least possible delay, by the signature of a definitive treaty of peace.

Art. 10. The ratifications of the preliminary treaty shall be exchanged in four days, or sooner if possible.

In faith whereof the Plenipotentiaries of their Imperial Majesties of Austria and Russia, of his Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain

and Ireland, and of his Majesty the King of Prussia, on the one part, *and the Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of the French* on the other part, have signed the same, and caused the seal of their arms to be affixed thereto. Done at Chatillon, &c. &c.

This reading being finished, the French Plenipotentiary requests the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts to answer the observation and questions following:

He remarks that the Projet confounds the title of King of Italy, with those of Mediator and Protector, which essentially differ therefrom; that the first is a title of sovereignty, which the others are not; that it is attached to the possession of a state; that that state is independent of France; that the renunciations of the latter power would by no means convey a renunciation of the crown of Italy, which the Emperor of the French could not renounce as Emperor, but only in his quality of King.

The Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts answer, that it is certainly the intention of the Allied Courts that the treaty should contain the Emperor Napoleon's renunciation of the possession of the kingdom of Italy, and that as it appears that the projet may leave doubts on that point, it will be proper to add this renunciation in explicit terms.

The French Plenipotentiary then asked if *the King of Saxony* were comprised in the arrangements which the Allies projected for Germany, and would be re-established *in the full possession of his kingdom?*

If the King of Westphalia, acknowledged by all the

Continental powers, would recover his kingdom, or obtain an indemnity?

And lastly, if the rights of the Viceroy, as heir to the Kingdom of Italy, were acknowledged, in case the King of Italy should renounce the crown of that kingdom?

The Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts declared, that they confine themselves at present to their projet.

The French Plenipotentiary then says, that the document which has just been read and communicated to him, is of too high importance to admit of his giving any answer to it during this Sitting, and that he will hereafter propose to the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts, an ulterior conference, when he shall be in a situation to enter into discussion upon that which forms the subject of the overtures made in the present Sitting.

(Signed,) CAULAINCOURT, Duke of Vicenza.
(Signed,) ABERDEEN, CATHCART, Count RAZOUMOWSKI, HUMBOLDT, Count STADION, CHARLES STEWART, Lieutenant-General.

Sitting of Feb. 28, 1814.

THE Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts deliver the following Declaration to be inserted in the Protocol:

Several days having elapsed since the Projet of the preliminaries of a general peace was presented by the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts to the French Plenipotentiary, and no answer having been given,

either in the form of acceptance or modification of the said projet, their Imperial and Royal Majesties have considered it expedient to enjoin their Plenipotentiaries to demand of the French Plenipotentiary a distinct and explicit declaration from his government on the projet in question. The Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts think that there is the less reason for delay on the part of the French government, with respect to a decision on the preliminaries proposed, as the projet delivered by them was founded, in substance, on an offer made by the French Plenipotentiary in his letter to Prince Metternich, dated the 9th of this month, which the Prince submitted to the Allied Courts.

Moreover, the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts are instructed to declare, in the name of their Sovereigns, that adhering firmly, as they do, to the substance of the demands contained in those conditions, which they regard as equally essential to the safety of Europe, and necessary to the arrangement of a general peace, they cannot interpret any farther delay of an answer to their proposals, otherwise than as a refusal on the part of the French government. Consequently, the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts, being ready to agree with the French Plenipotentiary, with regard to the time indispensably necessary for communicating with his government, have orders to declare, that if on the expiration of the time considered sufficient, and agreed on with the French Plenipotentiary, an answer shall not have arrived acceding, in substance, to the basis laid down in the projet of the Allies, the negotiations shall be considered as terminated, and the Ple-

nipotentiaries of the Allied Courts shall return to head-quarters.

After having delivered this declaration, of which a copy was handed to the French Plenipotentiary, the Austrian Plenipotentiary, in the name of his colleagues, adds verbally, that the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts are ready to discuss, in a spirit of conciliation, any modification which the French Plenipotentiary may be authorized to propose; but that the Allied Courts could listen to no proposal which should essentially differ from the sense of the offer already made by the Plenipotentiary for France, and that, if such pretensions should be brought forward by France, the Allies would be compelled, though with regret, to refer the decision to the fortune of arms.

The Plenipotentiary for France answers, that their Excellencies the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts, after having had so much time to prepare their projet, cannot complain of the time occupied by him in preparing his answer; that time is requisite for the examination of a projet embracing so many questions of high importance, and for most of which there had been nothing antecedent to prepare him.

That their Excellencies are aware, from his numerous complaints, of the delays which his couriers have experienced, through the circuitous routes they have been forced to take;

That they also know that since the delivery of the projet, the armies have been incessantly in motion, and that the projet by which that of the Allies is to be answered cannot be made out during an almost hourly change of place.

That the Allies are the less justified in complaining of delay, from having suspended the sittings for nine days, immediately after the opening of the negotiations, without giving any reason.

Finally, that France has sufficiently proved, by all that preceded the delivery of the projet, *that she is desirous of peace;* That as to what is said in the new declaration of their Excellencies, respecting an offer made by him *in a confidential letter to Prince Metternich*, he must repeat what he has already remarked, that this offer was made subject to the demand of an immediate armistice, which was refused, and that consequently such offer cannot now be urged.

The Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts invite the French Plenipotentiary to specify the time he considers sufficient for the communications above alluded to.

He answers that in so weighty an affair, the obligation to answer by a fixed day ought neither to be imposed nor entered into.

The Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts insisting, according to the formal orders of their Courts, on having the term fixed, it was finally agreed to limit it, on both sides, to the 10th of March inclusively.

(Signed,) CAULAINCOURT, Duke of Vicenza.
(Signed,) CHARLES STEWART, Count STADION, CATHCART, HUMBOLDT, Count RAZOUMOWSKI, ABERDEEN.

Sitting of March 10, 1814.

THE French Plenipotentiary begins the conference by consigning what follows to the Protocol.

The Plenipotentiary of France had hoped, according to the representations which it had fallen to him to make to the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts, and by the manner in which their Excellencies had been pleased to accept them, that orders would be given to enable his couriers to reach him without difficulty or delay. Nevertheless, the last courier who reached him, was not only stopped for a long time by several Russian officers and generals, but even *obliged to give up his despatches, which were not restored to him until thirty-six hours after, at Chaumont.* The French Plenipotentiary is therefore sorry to find himself under the necessity of again calling the attention of the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts to this subject, and to protest the more earnestly against a line of conduct contrary to received usages and to the prerogatives which the law of nations secures to Ministers intrusted with a negotiation, because it is the true cause of the delays which impede the present conferences.

The Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts not being informed of the fact, promise to communicate this protest to their Courts.

The French Plenipotentiary then causes the following document to be read, demanding its insertion in the Protocol, as well as that of the documents thereto annexed, numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.

The Plenipotentiary of France has received from his Court orders to make the following observations on the Protocol:

The Allied Sovereigns, in their declaration of Frankfort, with which all Europe is acquainted, and their Excellencies the Plenipotentiaries, in their proposal of the 7th of February, have alike laid it down as a principle, that France ought to retain, in peace, the same relative power as she possessed previously to the wars which are to be terminated by this peace; for what the Plenipotentiaries say in the preamble to their proposition, of the wish of the Allied Powers to see France possessed of a territory analogous to the rank she has always held in the political system, neither has nor can have any other meaning. The Allied Sovereigns had, consequently, demanded that France should be confined within the limits formed by the Pyrenees, the Alps, and the Rhine, and France had acquiesced therein. But their Plenipotentiaries, on the contrary, have, by their note of the 7th, and by the projet of articles which they delivered on the 17th, demanded that France should be restricted within her ancient limits. How could they, without ceasing to insist on the same principle, pass from one of these demands to the other? What has happened since the first to justify the second? This last demand could not, either on the 7th or the 17th, still less can it now be founded on the confidential offer made by the Plenipotentiary of France to the Minister of the Cabinet of one of the Allied Courts; for the letter containing that offer was not written until the 9th, and it was indispensable to answer it immediately, since the offer was made on the absolute condition of an immediate armistice, to stay the effusion of blood, and avoid a battle which

the Allies wished to fight; instead of which the conferences were, by the mere will of the Allies, and without any motive assigned, suspended from the 10th to the 17th, on which day the proposed condition was even formally rejected. An offer made subject to that condition could not, therefore, nor can now, by any means, be urged. Did not the Allied Sovereigns wish, three months ago, to establish a just equilibrium in Europe? Do they not declare that this is still their intention? It is also the only wish of France to preserve the same relative power which she has always possessed. *But Europe no longer resembles what she was twenty years ago.* At that period the kingdom of Poland, which had already been dismembered, disappeared entirely; the immense territory of Russia was increased by the accession of vast and wealthy provinces. Six millions of people were added to a population already greater than that of any European state. Nine millions more were allotted to Austria and Prussia.

The face of Germany was speedily changed. The ecclesiastical states, and the greater part of the free Germanic towns, were divided amongst the secular princes. Prussia and Austria received the greater part of them. The ancient republic of Venice became a province of the Austrian monarchy; two additional millions of subjects, with new territories and new resources, were afterwards given to Russia by the treaties of Tilsit, Vienna, Jassi, and Abo. England, during the same lapse of time, has not only acquired by the treaty of Amiens, the Dutch possessions of Ceylon and the Island of Trinidada; but has doubled

her Indian possessions, and made thereof an empire which two of the greatest European monarchies would scarcely equal. If the population of this empire cannot be considered as an increase of the British population, does not England, nevertheless, derive from it, both by sovereignty and by commerce, an immense increase of her wealth, that other element of power. Russia and England have preserved all they have acquired. Austria and Prussia have, indeed, suffered losses; but do they give up all intention of retrieving them? and are they now content with the extent of territory with which the present war found them? Yet it differs little from that which they possessed twenty years ago.

It is not for her own interest alone that France ought to be anxious to preserve the same relative power as she possessed. The declaration of Frankfort (see the annexed document, No. 4.) will shew that the Allied Sovereigns were convinced it was also the interest of Europe. Now when every thing round France has been altered, how can she *preserve the same relative power by being replaced in the same state as before?* Were she replaced in that state, *she would not even have the degree of absolute power which she then had;* for her possessions beyond sea were incontestably one of the elements of that power; and the most important of these possessions, that which in value equalled or surpassed all the rest together, has been wrested from her: it is of little importance from what cause; she has lost it. It suffices that she no longer has it, and that it is no longer in the power of the Allies to restore it to her.

To estimate the relative powers of states, it is not

enough to compare their absolute strength; the use which their geographical situation allows or obliges them to make of their means, must needs be taken into the calculation.

England is a power essentially maritime, which can place all her forces on the water. Austria has not sufficient coasts to become so; Russia and Prussia have no occasion to be so, because they have no possessions beyond the seas; they are powers essentially continental. France, on the contrary, is at once essentially maritime, on account of the extent of her coasts and colonies, and essentially continental also. England can only be attacked by fleets. Russia, with her back against the pole of the world, and bounded on almost every side by seas or vast solitudes, has only been assailable on one side, ever since her acquisition of Finland. *France is liable to attack at every point of her circumference; at once on the land side, where she every where adjoins valiant nations, by sea, and in her distant possessions.*

To restore a real equilibrium, her relative power ought therefore to be considered under two distinct aspects: to estimate it justly, it must be divided; and its absolute forces must not be compared with those of the other states of the continent, until after deducting the part she has to employ by sea; or to those of the maritime states, until after deducting the part she must employ on the continent.

The Plenipotentiary for France requests their Excellencies, the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts, to weigh attentively the preceding considerations of

striking truth, and to judge whether the acquisitions which France has made on this side of the Alps and Rhine, and which were secured to her by the treaties of Luneville and Amiens, would even be sufficient to restore that equilibrium between her and the other great European powers, which has been destroyed by the changes that have taken place in the extent of the possessions of those powers.

The simplest calculation clearly demonstrates that these acquisitions, added to all that France possessed in 1792, would still be *far* from giving her the degree of relative power which she then possessed, and which she had constantly had in preceding times; and yet she is required, not to abandon any particular part, but the whole of them; although the Allied Sovereigns, in their declaration of Frankfort, had proclaimed to the world, *that they acknowledged France with a more extensive territory than she had possessed under her kings.*

The internal strength of a state is not the only element of its relative power, which is partly composed of the ties that unite it with other states; ties which are generally stronger and more durable between states governed by princes of the same blood. The Emperor of the French possesses, besides his empire, a kingdom; to which his adopted son is the appointed heir. Other princes of the French dynasty possessed foreign crowns or sovereignties. Their rights had been sanctioned by treaties, and acknowledged by the Continent. The projet of the Allied Courts preserves a silence with respect to them, which the very proper and natural questions of the French Plenipotentiary have not induced them to break.

But in renouncing the rights of these princes, and the portion of relative power thence derived, as well as what she has acquired on this side of the Alps and the Rhine, France would find herself a loser of her ancient relative power, maritime and continental, exactly in the same ratio as that of the other great states is already increased, or will be increased on the conclusion of peace, by their respective acquisitions. The restitution of her colonies, which would only place her, then, in her ancient state of absolute greatness, (but which the situation of Saint-Domingo would not allow to be completely effected,) would not and could not be a compensation for her losses: those losses would merely be diminished thereby, and undoubtedly this would be the least she would have a right to look for. But what does the projet of the Allied Courts offer her in this respect?

Of the French colonies fallen into the power of the enemy, (and the wars of the continent have placed them all in his power,) there are three, the importance of which, in various respects, places them beyond all comparison with the others; these are Guadaloupe, Guiana, and the Isle of France. Instead of the restitution of the two former, the projet of the Allied Courts only offers their good offices in procuring this restitution; and it would appear from that circumstance, that these two colonies were in the hands of powers which are strangers to the present negotiation, and ought not to be included in the future peace. But, on the contrary, the powers which occupy them are amongst those in whose name, and for whom the Allied Courts

have declared they were authorized to treat; are they then only authorized to treat on clauses at the expense of France; does their authority cease when clauses in her favour are brought forward? If this were the case, it would become indispensable that all the states engaged in the present war should immediately take part in the negotiations, and each send Plenipotentiaries to the Congress.

It is, moreover, to be remarked that Guadaloupe having only ceased to be in the hands of England, by means of an act which the law of nations did not authorize, it is England alone which, with respect to France, can be considered to occupy it, and it is of her only that restitution can be demanded.

England wishes to keep to herself the Isles of France and la Runion, without which the other possessions of France, east of the Cape of Good Hope, lose all their value; the Saintes, without which the possession of Guadaloupe would be precarious; and the Isle of Tobago; the last under the pretext that France was not possessed of it in 1792, and the others, although France had possessed them from time immemorial: thus establishing a rule which is strict only towards France, allows of no exception but against her, and thus becomes a two-edged sword.

An isle of a certain extent, but which has lost its ancient fertility, two or three others infinitely less, and a few factories which the loss of the Isle of France would compel us to abandon,—this is what the grand restitutions which England promised to make, are reduced to.

Are these what she made at Amiens, where, nevertheless, she restored Malta, which she now wishes to keep, and which is no longer disputed with her? What could she have offered less, if France had nothing to give up except to her? The restitutions she promised were announced as an equivalent for the sacrifices which were to be made to the continent. It was upon this condition that France declared herself ready to make great sacrifices. They ought to be proportioned to the restitutions. Could a projet have been expected, by which the Continent demands every thing, and England restores scarcely any thing; and the result of which is in substance, that all the other great powers of Europe ought to retain what they have acquired, retrieve the losses they may have suffered, and gain still more possessions; but that France alone was to preserve none of her acquisitions, and to recover only the least and worst part of what she had lost?

After so many sacrifices demanded of France, nothing remained to be required of her but the sacrifice of her honour!

The projet tends to deprive her of *the right of interference in favour of unfortunate old Allies.* The Plenipotentiary of France having asked whether the King of Saxony would be replaced in possession of his estates, could not even obtain an answer.

Cessions and renunciations are demanded of France; and she is required to make them without knowing by whom, under what titles, or in what proportions the territories she is to relinquish are to be possessed.

It is required that she shall not know who are to be her nearest neighbours; it is wished to regulate, without her, the fate of the countries which she shall have renounced, and the condition of those with whom her sovereign was connected by particular ties; it is wished to make arrangements, without her, to settle the general system of possessions and balance of power in Europe; it is wished that she should be a stranger to the arrangement of a whole, of which she is a considerable and necessary part; in short, it is wished, that by subscribing to such conditions, she should in some sort exclude herself from European society.

Her establishments on the continent of India are restored; but on condition of possessing in dependency and subjection, what she formerly held in sovereignty.

Finally, rules of conduct are dictated to her for the ulterior government of her colonies, and towards people unconnected with the governments of Europe by any tie of subjection or dependence, and with respect to whom no right of patronage can be acknowledged in any of them.

Such propositions as these could not have been expected from the language of the Allied Sovereigns, or that of the Prince Regent of England, when he told the British Parliament, That no disposition on his part to demand of France any sacrifice incompatible with her interest as a nation, or with her honour, should be an obstacle to peace.

Attacked at once by all the powers combined against her, the French nation feels, more than any other, the want of peace, and therefore is more desirous of it;

but all generous nations, as well as individuals, prefer honour even to existence.

It cannot surely have entered into the views of the Allied Sovereigns to debase France; and although the French Plenipotentiary cannot account for the want of conformity between the projet of articles which has been delivered to him, and the sentiments which they have so often and so explicitly declared, he still presents with undiminished confidence to the judgment of the Allied Courts themselves and of the Plenipotentiaries, the foregoing observations, dictated by the general interest of Europe as much as by the particular interest of France, and which in no point deviate from the declarations of the Allied Sovereigns, and that of the Prince Regent to the English parliament.

Documents annexed.

No. 1. Note written at Frankfort Nov. 9, 1813, by Baron Saint-Aignan.

No. 2. Letter from Prince Metternich to the French Minister of Exterior Relations, dated Frankfort, Nov. 25, 1813.

No. 3. Letter from the Duke of Vicenza to Prince Metternich, dated Paris, Dec. 2, 1813.

No. 4. Declaration of Frankfort, extracted from the Journal of Frankfort of Dec. 7, 1813, and dated the 1st of the said month.

No. 5. Extract of a Speech of the Prince Regent to the Parliament of England.

The Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts answer, that the observations they have just heard read do not contain a distinct and explicit declaration from the French government, on the projet presented by them in the sitting of the 17th of February, and consequently do not satisfy the demand which the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts made in the conference of the 28th of February, to have a distinct and explicit answer in the course of ten days, on which term they mutually agreed with the Plenipotentiary for France. They farther declare that by the admission of these observations in the protocol, they do not acknowledge all the papers annexed as of an official character.

The French Plenipotentiary answers that such of those papers as are not strictly official, are at least authentic and public.

The Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts thereupon preparing to break up the sittings, the French Plenipotentiary verbally declares that the Emperor of the French is ready to renounce by the treaty to be concluded, every title expressive of relations of sovereignty, supremacy, protection, or constitutional influence with countries out of the limits of France; and to acknowledge—

The independence of Spain within her ancient limits, under the sovereignty of Ferdinand VII; the independence of Italy, and the independence of Switzerland, under the guarantee of great powers; the independence of Germany; and the independence of Holland, under the sovereignty of the Prince of Orange.

He farther declares that if, to remove all possibility of misunderstanding, and to render the friendship more cordial, and the peace more durable between France and England, cessions on the part of France of territories beyond sea should be deemed necessary, France will be ready to make them on having a reasonable equivalent.

Whereupon the sitting was closed.

(Signed,) CAULAINCOURT, Duke of Vicenza.
(Signed,) ABERDEEN, Count RAZOUMOWSKI,
CATHCART, Count STADION,
CH. STEWART, Lieutenant-General.

Sitting of March 13, 1815.

THE Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts make the following declaration, to be inserted in the Protocol:

The Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts have taken into consideration the Memorial presented by the Duke of Vicenza, in the sitting of the 10th of March, and the verbal declaration dictated by him and entered on the protocol of the same sitting. They considered that the former of these documents was of such a nature that it could not be brought into discussion without impeding the progress of the negotiations.

The verbal declaration of the Plenipotentiary contains only the acceptance of some points of the projet of a treaty given in by the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts in the sitting of the 17th of February; it neither answers the whole, nor even the

major part of the articles of this projet, and it is still less adapted to be considered as a counter-projet containing the substance of the proposals made by the Allied Powers.

The Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts therefore find themselves under the necessity of inviting the Duke of Vicenza to state positively whether he intends to accept or reject the projet of a treaty presented by the Allied Courts, or to give in a counter-projet.

The Plenipotentiary of France, in answer to this declaration of the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts, as well as to their observations on the same subject, said—

That a paper, such as that which he had given in on the 10th, in which the articles of the projet of the Allied Courts, which are susceptible of modification, were examined and discussed in detail, far from impeding the progress of the negotiations, could not, on the contrary, fail to accelerate them, because it tended to throw light on every question as affecting both France and the rest of Europe.

That after having declared so positively as he had done, by his verbal note of the same day, that France was ready to relinquish, by the proposed treaty, the sovereignty of a territory containing above seven millions of inhabitants, and its influence over one containing twenty millions, which concessions would form, at least, six-sevenths of the sacrifices demanded by the projet of the Allies, he cannot be accused of not having answered in a distinct and explicit manner.

That the counter-projet which the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts require of him, is, in substance, contained in his verbal declaration of the 10th, as far as regards those points to which France can consent without discussion; and that as to the rest, which are all susceptible of modification, they have been answered by the observations made, but that he is nevertheless ready to discuss them immediately.

The Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts here reply:

That the two papers delivered by the French Plenipotentiary in the sitting of the 10th of March, did not refer to each other in such a manner that it could be said that one of them comprises the points to which the French government consents without discussion, and the other those respecting which it is desirous of negotiating; but that, on the contrary, the one contains only general observations leading to no conclusion; and the other declares, in a manner equally far from clear and precise, what the Plenipotentiary for France has just stated; since (to notice only the two following points) it does not explain what is therein meant by the limits of France, and it speaks only in general terms of the independence of Italy. The Plenipotentiaries then add, that these two papers having been laid before their Courts, they have positive, precise, and strict instructions to declare, as they have done, that these documents have been held insufficient, and to insist on another declaration on the part of the Plenipotentiary for France, containing either an acceptance or a refusal of their projet of a treaty proposed in the

conference of the 17th of February, or else a counter-projet. They, therefore, once more invite the Plenipotentiary for France to make this declaration. The Plenipotentiary for France renews his urgent request that discussions may be entered into, observing that the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts, by declaring, in the sitting of the 28th of February, that they were ready to discuss the modifications which should be proposed, had proved, by that alone, that their projet was not an ultimatum; that in order to meet each other's ideas, and come to a result, a discussion was indispensable, and that there could, in reality, be no negotiation without discussion.

The Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts reply, that they have fairly proved that they did not wish to exclude discussion, because they had demanded a counter-projet; but that it was their intention to admit no propositions into discussion but such as might really lead to the end proposed.

Having consequently again insisted on a categorical declaration, and having invited the Plenipotentiary for France to give in this declaration, he requested that the sitting should be suspended, and resumed in the evening at nine o'clock. After having deliberated amongst themselves, the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts told the French Plenipotentiary that in order to give him a better opportunity of preparing his answer for the evening, they wish to inform him, immediately, that according to their instructions, it will be their duty to request him (after he shall have declared, this evening, whether he will deliver an acceptance or re-

fusal of their projet, or a counter-projet) to fulfil that engagement in the course of twenty-four hours, which term has been peremptorily fixed by their Courts.

Whereupon the sitting was adjourned until nine o'clock in the evening.

Continuation of the Sitting.

THE Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts having renewed, in the most express manner, the declaration by which they had concluded the first part of the sitting, the Plenipotentiary for France declares, that he will deliver the counter-projet required to-morrow evening at nine o'clock; he observed, however, that not being certain that he should be able to finish the requisite writings by that time, he now requested, beforehand, that in that case the conference might be adjourned to the morning of the 15th.

The Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts insisted that the conference should stand fixed for to-morrow evening, and should only be adjourned in case of absolute necessity to the morning of the day after to-morrow, to which the French Plenipotentiary consented.

Chatillon-sur-Seine, March 13, 1814.

(Signed,) CAULAINCOURT, Duke of Vicenza.
(Signed,) ABERDEEN, Count RAZOUMOWSKI, HUMBOLDT, CATHCART, Count STADION, CHARLES STEWART, Lieut.-General.

Sitting of March 15, 1814.

The FRENCH PLENIPOTENTIARY opens the Sitting by causing the following projet of a treaty to be read.

PROJET OF A DEFINITIVE TREATY BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE ALLIES.

His Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, and Mediator of the Swiss Confederacy, on the one part; His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia, His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and His Majesty the King of Prussia, stipulating each of them for himself, and all of them together for the whole of the Powers engaged with them in the present war, on the other part:

Having at heart to put a stop as promptly as possible, to the effusion of human blood and the misfortunes of nations, have named as their Plenipotentiaries——

Who have agreed on the following articles:

ART. 1.—From this day forth there shall be peace, sincere friendship, and a good understanding, between His Majesty the Emperor of the French, King of Italy, Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine, and Mediator of the Swiss Confederation, on the one part: and His Majesty the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary and Bohemia; His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias; His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland; and His Majesty

the King of Prussia, and their Allies, on the other part, their heirs and successors for ever.

The High Contracting Parties engage to use their utmost endeavours to maintain the harmony so happily re-established amongst them, for the future happiness of Europe.

ART. 2.—His Majesty the Emperor of the French renounces, for himself and his successors, all titles whatsoever, other than those derived from the possessions which, in consequence of the present treaty of peace, shall remain subject to his sovereignty.

ART. 3.—His Majesty the Emperor of the French renounces, for himself and his successors, all rights of sovereignty and possession over *the Illyrian provinces*, and over the territories forming the French departments *beyond the Alps*, *the Isle of Elba excepted*, and the French departments beyond the Rhine.

ART. 4.—His Majesty the Emperor of the French, as King of Italy, relinquishes the crown of Italy in favour of his appointed heir, Prince Eugene Napoleon, and of his descendants for ever.

The Adige shall form the boundary between the kingdom of Italy and the empire of Austria.

ART. 5.—The High Contracting Parties solemnly acknowledge, and in the most formal manner, the absolute independence and full sovereignty of all the European states, in the limits by which they shall respectively be bounded in consequence of the present treaty, or by means of the arrangements referred to in Article 16, hereinafter contained.

ART. 6.—His Majesty the Emperor of the French acknowledges :

1st. The independence of Holland under the sovereignty of the House of Orange.

Holland shall receive an increase of territory. The title and exercise of sovereignty in Holland can in no case belong to a prince wearing, or called to wear, a foreign crown.

2dly. The independence of Germany and of each of the German states, which may be united amongst themselves by a federative union.

3dly. The independence of Switzerland, governing herself, under the guarantee of all the great powers.

4thly. The independence of Italy, and of each of the princes between whom she is or shall be divided.

5thly. The independence and integrity of Spain under the reign of Ferdinand VII.

ART. 7.—The Pope shall be immediately reinstated in possession of his states, as they were settled in consequence of the Treaty of Tolentino, the Duchy of Benevento excepted.

ART. 8.—Her Imperial Highness the Princess Eliza shall retain for her and her descendants, in full property and sovereignty, Lucca and Piombino.

ART. 9.—The principality of Neufchatel remains in full property and sovereignty to the Prince who now possesses it, and to his descendants.

ART. 10.—His Majesty the King of Saxony shall be re-established in full and entire possession of his Grand Duchy.

ART. 11.—His Royal Highness the Grand Duke of Berg shall in like manner be re-instated in possession of his Grand Duchy.

the King of Prussia, and their ...men, Hamburg, Lubeck, their heirs and successors f... be free towns.

The High Contractir... Isles shall belong in full sove... utmost endeavours t... ...om of Italy. re-established am... ...le of Malta and its dependencies of Europe. ... full sovereignty and property to his

ART. 2.— ... renounces ... The colonies, fisheries, settlements, es... whatso... and factories, which France possessed be... sessi... the present war, in the seas or on the continents of of ... Africa, and Asia, and which have fallen into the power of England or of her Allies, shall be restored to her, to be possessed by her under the same titles as before the war, and with the rights and privileges which were secured to her by anterior treaties, and especially by that of Amiens, with respect to commerce and fishing; but at the same time France engages to consent, on condition of a reasonable equivalent, to the cession of such of the abovementioned colonies as England has expressed a wish to retain, with the exception of the Saintes, which necessarily depend on Guadaloupe.

ART. 16.—The dispositions to be made of the territories relinquished by his Majesty the Emperor of the French, and which are not disposed of by the present treaty, shall be made; the indemnities to be given to kings and princes, dispossessed by the present war, shall be determined; and all the arrangements necessary to settle the general system of possession, and equilibrium in Europe shall be regulated in a special Congress, which shall assemble at within days after the ratification of the present treaty.

17.—In all the territories, towns and places ...d by France, the military stores, magazines, ..., ships and vessels armed and unarmed, and ...rally all things whatsoever placed there by that ...ower, shall remain her property, and be reserved for her use. The debts of the countries united to France, and which she relinquishes by the present treaty, shall be charged on the said countries and their future possessors.

ART. 19.—In all the countries which are to change masters, either by virtue of the present treaty, or of the arrangements which may be made in consequence of Article 16, hereinbefore contained, there shall be granted to the inhabitants, both natives and foreigners of every condition and age, a space of six years, reckoning from the exchange of the ratifications, to dispose of their property acquired, either before or since the present war, and to retire into such country as they shall think proper to choose.

ART. 20.—The property, goods, and revenues of every kind, which the subjects of any one of the states engaged in the present war may possess, under any title whatever, in the countries which now are, or shall be, by virtue of Article 16, subjected to any other of the said states, shall continue to be possessed by them without trouble or hindrance, under the clauses and conditions only which are precedently attached to their possession, and with full liberty to enjoy the same and dispose thereof, as well as to export their revenues, and, in case of sale, the value thereof.

ART. 21.—The High Contracting Parties wishing to

consign, and cause to be consigned, to total oblivion the divisions which have agitated Europe, declare and promise, that in the countries subject to them respectively, no individual, to whatever class or condition he may belong, shall be molested in person, property, rents, pensions, revenues, rank, degree, or dignity, or pursued or prosecuted in any manner whatsoever, on account of any part he may have taken, in any manner whatsoever, in the events which produced the present war, or have resulted therefrom.

ART. 22.—As soon as intelligence of the signature of the present treaty shall reach the respective head-quarters, orders shall immediately be despatched for the cessation of hostilities both by land and sea, as speedily as distance will allow: the High Contracting Powers engage to employ sincerely all possible expedition in the despatch of the said orders, and passports shall on both sides be given both for the officers and ships employed to carry such orders.

ART. 23.—To prevent all subjects of complaint and contest which might arise in consequence of prizes made at sea after the signature of the present treaty, it is mutually agreed that the ships and goods which may be taken in the Channel and North Seas after the lapse of twelve days from the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, shall on both sides be restored; that the term from the Channel and North Seas to the Canary Isles, inclusive, either in the Ocean or the Mediterranean, shall be one month: two months from the said Canary Isles to the Equator; and, finally, five

months in every other quarter of the world, without other exception or more particular distinction of time and place.

ART. 24.—The Allied troops shall evacuate the French territory; and the places ceded or to be restored by France by virtue of the present peace, shall be surrendered to them within the periods hereinafter mentioned: on the third day from the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, the troops which are most distant from the frontiers, and on the fifth day from the said exchange the Allied troops which are nearest the frontiers, shall begin to retire, directing their march towards the frontier nearest the place at which they may be, and marching thirty leagues every ten days; so that the evacuation may be uninterrupted and successive, and that in forty days at latest it may be completed.

The necessary provisions and means of carriage shall be supplied them until their leaving the French territory; but they shall not be allowed, from the day of the signature of the present treaty, to levy any contribution, or require any loan, otherwise than is above specified. Immediately after the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, the fortresses of Custrin, Glogau, Palma-Nuova, and Venice, shall be surrendered to the Allies; and those which are occupied by the French troops in Spain, to the Spaniards. The fortresses of Hamburg and Magdeburg, and the citadels of Erfurth and Wurtzburg, shall be surrendered when half the French territory shall be evacuated.

All the other fortresses of the ceded countries shall be delivered up on the total evacuation of the territories of France.

The countries which the garrisons of the said towns shall cross, shall furnish them with the necessary provisions and means of carriage, to return to France, and carry thither every thing that shall be deemed French property by virtue of Article 17 hereinbefore contained.

ART. 25.—The restitutions which are to be made to France by England or her Allies, in virtue of Article 15, shall be made, with respect to the continents and seas of America and Africa, within three months, and with respect to Asia within six months, following the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty.

ART. 26.—The ambassadors, envoys extraordinary, ministers, residents, and agents, of each of the High Contracting Powers, shall enjoy, in the Courts of the others, the same rank, prerogatives, and privileges, as before the war, the same ceremonial observances being maintained.

ART. 27.—All the prisoners on both sides shall, immediately after the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, be restored without ransom, paying the private debts they may have contracted.

ART. 28.—The four Allied Courts engage to transmit to France, within the space of ———, an act of accession to the present treaty on the part of each of the States for which they stipulate.

ART. 29.—The present treaty shall be ratified, and

the ratifications shall be exchanged, within the space of five days, or sooner, if possible.

After having finished the reading of the preceding projet, and having taken a certificate of its insertion in the protocol, the French plenipotentiary verbally declares that he is ready to enter into discussion, in a conciliatory spirit, on all the articles of the said projet.

The Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts say, that the paper which has just been read and communicated to them is of too high importance to allow of their giving any answer whatever in this Sitting, and that they will hereafter propose to the French Plenipotentiary an ulterior conference.

Chatillon-sur-Seine, March 15, 1814.

(Here follow the signatures.)

Sitting of March 18, 1814.

THE Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts, in the name and by the order of their sovereigns, declare as follows:

The Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts declared on the 28th of February last, after waiting in vain for an answer to the projet of a treaty delivered by them on the 17th of the same month, that adhering firmly to the substance of the demands contained in the conditions of the projet, conditions which they considered equally essential to the safety of Europe and necessary to the arrangement of a general peace, they could not interpret any farther delay of an answer to their

proposals otherwise than as a refusal on the part of the French Government.

The 10th of March having been absolutely limited, by common consent, by the respective Plenipotentiaries, as the day by which the answer of the French Plenipotentiary was to be given in, His Excellency the Duke of Vicenza presented on that day a memorial which, without either admitting or refusing the terms proposed at Chatillon, in the name of the great European Alliance, would only have afforded pretexts for endless delays in the negotiations, if it had been received by the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts as proper for discussion. Some articles, consisting of particulars nowise concerning the merits of the principal questions in the pacific arrangements, were verbally added by the Duke of Vicenza in the same sitting. The Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts consequently declared, on the 13th of March, that unless the French Plenipotentiary should, within a short period, declare either the acceptance or refusal of the proposals of the Allies, or present a counter-projet containing the substance of the conditions proposed by them, they should be compelled to regard the negotiation as terminated by the French Government. His Excellency the Duke of Vicenza then engaged to deliver the French counter-projet in the course of the 15th: this document has been communicated by the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts to their Cabinets; and they have just received orders to insert in the Protocol the following declaration thereon.

"Europe allied against the French Government

aims only at the restoration of a general peace, continental and maritime. It is only such a peace that can secure to the world a state of repose of which it has for a long series of years been deprived; but this peace cannot exist without a just distribution of strength between the powers.

No views of ambition or conquest dictated the terms of the projet of a treaty delivered in the name of the Allied Powers in the sitting of the 17th of February last; and how indeed should such views be admitted into relations established by all Europe, in a projet of pacification presented to France by the combination of all the powers which compose that portion of the world? France, by returning to the boundaries by which her territories were limited in 1792, would remain, through the centrality of her situation, her population, the richness of her soil, the nature of her frontiers, and the number and distribution of her fortified places, on a level with the strongest powers of the Continent; the other great political bodies, in aiming at their reconstruction on a scale of proportion conformable to the establishment of a just equilibrium, and by securing to the intermediate states an independent existence, satisfactorily prove the principles by which they are actuated. There remained, however, a principle essential to the welfare of France to regulate. The extent of the coasts of that country give her a claim to all the advantages of maritime commerce. England restores her her colonies, and with them her commerce and navy; England goes farther yet, and far from pretending to exclusive do-

minion over the seas, which would be incompatible with a system of political equilibrium, she strips herself of nearly the whole of those conquests which the policy pursued for so many years by the French Government had produced her. Animated by a principle of justice and liberality worthy of a great nation, England throws into the balance of Europe possessions, the preservation of which would secure her, for a long time to come, this exclusive dominion. In restoring to France her colonies, in making great sacrifices for the reconstruction of Holland, the national energy of whose people renders them worthy of resuming their place amongst the powers of Europe, she annexes but one condition to these sacrifices; she only yields up so many pledges in favour of the restoration of a true system of political equilibrium; she will only despoil herself of them in order that Europe may be effectually pacified, and on condition that the political state of the Continent be rendered such as to afford her a guarantee that she is not entirely throwing away such important cessions, and that her sacrifices will not prove detrimental to Europe and to herself.

Such are the principles which presided in the Councils of the Allied Sovereigns at the period when they foresaw the possibility of undertaking the grand work of the political reconstruction of Europe. These principles have received their full developement; and they were pronounced on the day that the success of their arms enabled the Continental Powers to secure their effect, and England to designate the sacrifices she places in the balance of peace.

The counter-projet presented by the French Plenipotentiary is formed from a totally opposite point of view: France, according to the conditions therein specified, would retain a territorial force infinitely greater than would suit the balance of Europe; she would retain offensive positions and points of attack, by means whereof her government has already effected such convulsions; the cessions she would make would only be apparent. The principles announced in the face of Europe by the present Sovereign of France, and the experience of many years, has proved that intermediate states, under the dominion of members of the reigning family of France, are only nominally independent. Were they to deviate from the spirit which dictated the terms of the treaty proposed on the 17th of Feb. the Allied Powers would have done nothing for Europe: the efforts of so many nations united in the same cause would be lost; the weakness of the respective Cabinets would prove injurious to themselves and their people; Europe, and even France herself, would soon become victims of new troubles; Europe would not have made peace, but would merely have disarmed.

The Allied Courts, considering that the counter-projet presented by the French Plenipotentiary not only varies materially from the terms of peace proposed by them, but is essentially opposed to the spirit thereof, and thus fulfils none of the conditions which they annexed to the continuation of the negotiations of Chatillon; they can perceive nothing in the course adopted by the French Government, but a wish to protract negotiations equally useless and compromising;—useless, *because the explanations given by France are in*

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disarm until their principles shall have been acknowledged and admitted by her government."

After the reading this declaration, the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts delivered a copy thereof to the French Plenipotentiary, who expressed a wish that the sitting should be suspended until nine o'clock in the evening.

At the request of the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts, the sitting which had been adjourned to nine o'clock in the evening of the 18th, was further adjourned to the following day, the 19th, at one o'clock in the afternoon.

Continuation of the Sitting, March 19, at one o'clock.

THE French Plenipotentiary demands the insertion of the following observations in the Protocol:

The Plenipotentiary of France, being under the necessity of answering, extempore, a declaration which the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts have had several days to prepare, will repel, as far as the shortness of the time will allow, the accusations made against his Court, and founded partly on facts, and partly on arguments, of which he can by no means admit the correctness.

It is stated in this declaration that the only object of the Allied Courts is the restoration of a general continental and maritime peace.

That this peace cannot subsist without a just distribution of strength amongst the powers.

That such just distribution is established in their projet of the 17th of February.

That no ambitious views could have dictated this projet, because it is the work of the whole of Europe.

That the observations of France, delivered in the sitting of the 10th of March, are no answer to this projet, and cannot be a subject of discussion.

That the verbal note of the same day no way touches on the main subject of the principal arrangements proposed by the Allies.

That France, when confined to her ancient limits, and reinstated in possession of the colonies which England will restore to her, will be on a par with the strongest Continental Powers.

That, according to her counter-projet, presented on the 15th, France would retain a much more considerable extent of territory than is compatible with the equilibrium of Europe.

That the members of her dynasty would retain states, which, in their hands, would be merely dependencies on France.

That the counter-projet is therefore essentially in opposition to the spirit of the projet of the Allied Courts, and that, seeing it fulfils none of the conditions which they annexed to the prolongation of the conferences of Chatillon, by their declarations of the 28th of February and 13th of March, they consider the negotiations as closed by the French Government.

The Plenipotentiary of France replies:

That France, oppressed by the twofold calamities of continental and maritime war, must desire, even more ardently than any other state, the twofold peace which is to end them; and that there ought to be no doubt of her wishes on this head.

That the willingness of France to concur in the establishment of a proper balance in Europe, is proved by the greatness of the sacrifices to which she has already consented; that she has not confined herself to advocating or acknowledging the principle, but has acted upon it.

That the projet of the Allies speaks only of the sacrifices required of France, and not of the application of these sacrifices; that it affords no means of knowing what will be the distribution of power amongst the different states; and that it has even been drawn

up with the full intention that France should be unacquainted with this distribution.

That, without charging any of the Allied Courts with ambition, he cannot, nevertheless, avoid remarking that the greater part of the sacrifices France is to make is to contribute to the individual aggrandizement of the greater number, if not of the whole of them.

That although, in order to give an additional proof of her conciliatory disposition, and to attain peace the more speedily, France consented that the four Allied Courts should negotiate as well for themselves as for the whole of the States engaged with them in the present war, she cannot, nevertheless, admit that, either in fact or of right, the will of these four Courts is the will of Europe.

That the observations delivered in the Sitting of the 10th of March, embracing the whole as well as all the particulars of the projet of the Allies, examining the principle upon which they rest and their application, were a real answer to that projet; an answer full of moderation and respect, and which it was the more necessary to discuss, since, until principles are agreed on, it is impossible to agree on consequences.

That the verbal note of the same day was so truly relevant to the main question of the arrangements of the Allies, that it was a consent to more than six sevenths of the sacrifices they required.

That the declaration of that day says and repeats, that England restores the French Colonies; but that, according to the projet of the 17th of February, Eng-

land keeps the only ones which are of any value, and does not restore them.

That, by affirming that France wishes to retain an extent of territory greater than is compatible with the balance of Europe, the Allies lay down as a fact what is really questionable, and assert, without any proof, the contrary of what the observations of the 10th of March establish and prove by facts and arguments which they have refused to discuss, and also contrary to what the Allied Sovereigns thought and declared in the month of November last.

That if England proves her moderation by the restitution she has promised to Holland, France gives an equal proof of her sincere desire of peace, by also promising Holland an increase of territory.

That it has surely been forgotten that the Prince Viceroy, in favour of whom the Emperor of the French relinquishes a kingdom independent of France, is allied by family ties to Germany as well as to France.

That the Grand Duchy of Berg belongs entirely to the federative system proposed by the Allies; and that as to Lucca and Piombino, they can hardly be called states.

That thus, far from being essentially in opposition to the spirit of the projet of the Allied Courts, the French counter-projet is more conformable to that spirit than it was, perhaps, natural to expect, considering that this was only the first step towards the object of the negotiation.

That, in fact, the projet of the Allied Courts and the French counter-projet could only be considered

as establishing, on both sides, certain points from which to proceed towards the attainment of the end reciprocally proposed, by a gradation of alternate and mutual demands and concessions, amicably discussed, without which there can be no such thing as a real negotiation.

That one proof of the very sincere desire of peace entertained by France, is, that by the counter-projet of the 15th of March, she confined herself, at the first word, much within what the basis proposed by the Allied Courts four months ago, and which they then declared to be suitable to the equilibrium of Europe, authorized her to demand.

That he expected to see the discussion which he has constantly offered and claimed, begun in the sitting of this day; instead of which a rupture is announced to him, as if to prevent all discussion.

He consequently declares that this rupture can by no means be imputed to his government; and that on the contrary he cannot yet consider his pacific mission as at an end; that he must await the orders of his Court; and that he is, as he has already declared, ready to discuss, in a spirit of conciliation and peace, any modification of the respective projets which may be proposed or demanded by the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts; that he hopes they will communicate with their Cabinets on the subject, and wait for the answers of their respective Courts, in order to give a proof of their personal inclinations to effect a peace which is universally desired. He farther declares that his government is ready to continue the negotiation, or

resume it, in such manner and form as may be most promptly conducive to the termination of the war.

The Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts then observe, that, through an error of the copyist, the two following paragraphs have been omitted in the declaration, which they yesterday dictated for insertion in the protocol, and which they now require to be added thereto, in order to complete that document.

1st. After the words, "on the part of the French Government," they added verbally, "that they were ready to discuss, in a conciliatory spirit, any modification which the French Plenipotentiary might be authorized to propose, and which should not be contrary to the spirit of the proposals made by the Allied Courts;" the period of the 10th of March having been, &c. &c.

2dly. After the words, "which she places in the balance of peace," "These principles seem to have been thought just by the French Government, at the period when it thought the capital menaced by the Allied troops after the battle of Brienne. . . . . .

"The French Plenipotentiary not only admitted by a confidential overture, the limits of France, as they stood in 1792, as the basis of pacification; he even offered the immediate surrender of fortresses in the countries ceded, as pledges of security for the Allies, in case the powers would immediately consent to an armistice.

"The Allies gave a proof of their desire to see Europe pacified, with the least possible delay, by declaring for an immediate signature of preliminaries of peace.

"But a few apparent advantages sufficed to alter the intentions of the French Government." The counter-

projet presented by the Plenipotentiary for France purports, &c.—

The French Plenipotentiary remarks, that it seems at least extraordinary, that two paragraphs should have been omitted in a document which had been prepared for several days by the Cabinets; and he then replies to the new declaration made to him.

As to the first point:

That he must deeply regret that the conduct of the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts, in constantly refusing, notwithstanding his repeated proposals, to enter into discussion with him, either on their own projet, or on the counter-projet which he delivered to them, has been, up to the present moment, so completely at variance with the declaration they now bring forward.

As to the second:

That what is said respecting the *confidential* overture made by him, on the 9th of February, has been sufficiently refuted, as to the fact, in the preceding conferences: and as to the new reflections which are made, let Europe judge whether it is his Government or the Allied Sovereigns that may justly be accused of a want of moderation for having suspended the negotiations, without any avowed cause, at the very period in question, and in rejecting the proposal as well as the condition annexed to it. Have not the Allied Powers proved that in this circumstance, as in all others subsequent to the day when the basis of a negotiation was laid down at Frankfort by their ministers, they have constantly placed their views under the indefinite influence of events, instead of aiming, as they say, with justice and

moderation, at the re-establishment of a true equilibrium in Europe.

After this answer, of which a copy was delivered to the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts, the latter declared that their powers had expired, and that they had orders to return to the head-quarters of their sovereigns.

Chatillon-sur-Seine, March 19, 1814.

(Signed,) CAULAINCOURT, Duke of Vicenza.
Count STADION; A.D. Count RAZOUMOWSKI; CATHCART; HUMBOLDT; CHARLES STEWART, lieut.-gen.

The undersigned Plenipotentiaries of the Allied Courts, seeing with lively and profound regret the negotiations commenced at Chatillon closed without contributing to the tranquillity of Europe, cannot refrain from taking one step more towards that object before their departure, by addressing the present note to the Plenipotentiary for France, relating to a subject which is, and ought always to have been, remote from political discussions. It was the intention of the Allied Courts, in insisting upon the independence of Italy, to replace the Holy Father in his ancient capital; the French Government has evinced the same disposition in the counter-projet presented by the French Plenipotentiary: it would be unfortunate that so natural a design, on which the two parties agree, should remain ineffectual through causes no way concerning the functions, to the performance of which, the head of the Catholic Church has religiously confined

himself. The religion professed by a great part of the nations now at war, the general principles of justice and equity, in short humanity itself, equally require that his Holiness should be set at liberty; and the undersigned are persuaded that they have only to signify this wish, and to demand, in the name of their Courts, this act of justice from the French Government, to induce it to place the Holy Father in a condition to attend to the occasions of the Catholic Church, by rendering him entirely independent.

The undersigned avail themselves of this opportunity to repeat to his Excellency the Plenipotentiary for France the assurance of their high consideration.

Chatillon, March 19, 1814.

(Signed,) Count STADION; Count RAZOUMOWSKI; CATHCART; HUMBOLDT; CHARLES STEWART; ABERDEEN.

*** Note by the French Editor. Several documents relative to some of the Notes in this Volume have been unavoidably omitted for the present, but will be printed at the end of the last Volume.

END OF THE SECOND VOLUME OF MISCELLANIES.

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

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